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I, Charles A. Wilson-deGrazia, declare that Chapters 1 and 4 are my own work
and Chapters 2 and 3 are comprised of collaborative work. Where information has
been derived from other sources, I confirm that these references have been duly in-
dicated in the thesis. Chapter 2 was co-authored with Professors Alan C. Marco
and Joshua Sarnoff. For this chapter, I (1) created the underlying datasets using
USPTO patent application and claim data (created by the USPTO’s Office of the
Chief Economist); (2) wrote the first draft of this chapter; (3) edited/added to each
subsequent iteration (as did my co-authors); (4) ran 95% of the regressions and
created each table used in this chapter; (5) discussed research ideas with each co-
author. Chapter 3 was co-authored with Dr. Nicholas Pairolero and Professor Mike
Teodorescu. For this chapter, I (1) worked collaboratively with my co-authors to
write the first draft and subsequent drafts; (2) generated each of the tables and
figures except the “First Round of Patent Examination Outcomes” figure and ex-
aminer’s amendment examples; (3) ran each of the regressions; (4) created each of
the datasets from numerous USPTO data inputs except for the TF-IDF cosine sim-
ilarities (specialization and examiner’s amendments) and the initial identification
of the examiner’s amendments; (5) discussed research ideas with each co-author.
Please note that many of the Chapter 2 & 3 tasks, even if executed independently,
were performed collaboratively, with input from co-authors. Each co-author has
given written permission that each respective collaboratively-written chapter may
be included in this thesis. Finally, much of the work on this thesis was undertaken
while working at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), allowing me ac-
cess to internal data, which was used in this thesis, and a collaborative environment,




This thesis contains three papers that contribute to the measurement and understand-
ing of patent quality at the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), its
determinants, and its effects on innovation.
Chapter 2 introduces and develops two measures of patent scope, an impor-
tant aspect of patent quality, which allows for the first large-scale analysis of patent
scope changes during the examination process. Results from this chapter show that
applications with narrower incoming scope are associated with a higher probability
of grant and a shorter and less intense examination period in comparison to applica-
tions with broader incoming scope. Further, the results demonstrate that the exami-
nation process itself tends to narrow the scope of patents and that changes in scope
are more significant when the duration and intensity of examination is increased.
Chapter 3 reexamines prior research on USPTO examiner incentives, and con-
cludes that increasing first-action allowance rates with seniority and experience re-
sults in lower examination quality, and thus, patent quality. This chapter identifies
an examiner learning mechanism that mostly accounts for the increasing first-action
allowance rate, without sacrificing examination quality. However, the results show
that examination quality differs between junior and senior examiners (GS-14). This
learning mechanism also reduces patent grant delay, likely benefiting innovators
and firms.
Chapter 4 examines how patent validity, an aspect of patent quality, may affect
follow-on patenting decisions by both assignees and technology rivals. The results
indicate that validation increases for both overall and external follow-on patenting
but the results are mixed for internal follow-on patenting. The increase in follow-
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on patenting by rivals can be attributed to an increase in defensive patenting based
on the positioning of follow-on patents in technology space after validation. The
positioning of external follow-on patenting is unaffected by validation. Finally, the
evidence shows that the validation effect is more prominent in complex technologies
relative to discrete technologies.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis advances the economics of innovation and intellectual property litera-
ture by specifically analyzing the relationship between patent office processes at
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and patenting outcomes in
the United States. Patents, which are used as an incentive mechanism to promote
innovative activities, confer the right to attempt to exclude other entities from the
claimed technology space detailed in the granted patent. In recent years, academics
within the field of innovation economics have studied the issue of “low quality”
patents granted by the USPTO, finding that the existence and proliferation of such
patents lead to diminished innovative activity (UKIPO 2013). Much of the literature
on patent quality determinants focuses on the relationship between patent examina-
tion and granted patent quality at the USPTO.1 A different but related strand of the
literature studies the social welfare trade-offs between ex ante (patent examination)
and ex post (post-issuance procedures) screening of patent quality and their effects
on the innovation ecosystem. Finally, some studies have examined the effects of in-
tellectual property rights on follow-on innovation (Murray and Stern 2007; Moser
and Voena 2012; Moser 2013; Galasso and Schankerman, 2015a, 2015b; Gaessler
et al. 2017; Sampat and Williams 2019;), many using outcomes at ex post screening
venues across multiple patent offices (USPTO and European Patent Office).
1See Alcacer et al. 2009; Cockburn et al. 2002; Cotropia et al. 2013; Frakes and Wasserman
2016a, 2016b, 2017, 2019; Kovacs 2017; Langinier and Marcoul 2012, 2016; Lei and Wright 2017;
Lemley 2001; Lemley and Sampat 2012; Mann and Underweiser 2012; Tabakovic and Wollmann
2017; and Whalen 2018.
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This chapter serves as (1) an introduction to the literature and debates sur-
rounding the issues described above; and (2) an analysis on how my work advances
the literature and contributes to these debates. Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis focus
on the relationship between patent examination quality, patent office outcomes, and
innovative activity. Chapter 2 delves into a particular component of patent quality,
patent scope, and its evolution over the course of examination at the USPTO. Chap-
ter 3 reevaluates the recent literature on patent examination quality, allowance rates,
and patent quality at the USPTO (Lemley and Sampat 2012; Frakes and Wasserman
2017, 2019). It concludes that, contrary to the prior literature, the increased al-
lowance rate in grade and experience is due not to diminished examination quality
but to improved examination efficiency through learning. These chapters connect
to a main area of research in innovation economics, specifically the study of patent
quality determinants at the USPTO and their effects on the innovation ecosystem.
Chapter 4 deviates from analysis of examination quality to the effects of ex post
determinations of patent validity on follow-on patenting. This chapter, along with
Chapters 2 and 3, contributes to a current debate on the merits of ex ante versus ex
post screening of patent quality in the United States. Broadly, the work of this thesis
contributes to the literature on the study and analysis of the U.S. patent system and
the optimality of such a system in encouraging innovation. The rest of this chapter
is structured as follows: First, I provide a literature review of each interconnected
subtheme of my thesis (patent quality, patent examination, innovation outcomes,
patent quality screening). Then I provide a summary of each subsequent chapter
in this thesis and discuss the implications of each chapter in relation to the broad
questions in innovation economics discussed above.
1.1 Patent Quality
Patent quality refers to several legal features of a granted patent application, in-
cluding patentability of the subject matter (35 U.S.C. 101), utility (35 U.S.C. 101),
novelty (35 U.S.C. 102), nonobviousness (35 U.S.C. 103), and an adequate written
description (35 U.S.C. 112). These characteristics ensure that a covered invention
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is new and not a trivial advancement of existing inventions, that the patent right
covers an area over which intellectual property rights can be granted, and that the
language in the patent itself is clear enough to “enable any person skilled in the
art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and
use the same,” (35 U.S.C. 112(a)). Patents granted without meeting these criteria
violate the fundamental trade-off between the disclosure of a technological inno-
vation and the granting of monopoly rights over the claimed invention space. For
example, a patent that covers a non-novel or obvious invention is granted monopoly
rights to specific technology space, leading to deadweight loss without the compen-
sating technological innovation. Patents, although covering a new invention, may
not properly convey the components of the innovation. The disclosure requirement
remedies this potential issue and helps to facilitate knowledge spillovers for those
who will utilize or improve the invention (Hall and Harhoff 2004).
Researchers have also identified other dimensions of patent quality, namely
scope and the clarity of patent claim language, as significant concerns for the in-
novation ecosystem (Rai 2013; Churnet 2013; Petherbridge 2009; Zimmer 2008;
Wagner 2009). This issue arises, in part, because overly broad or vague claims can
be exploited for the purposed of rent seeking, particularly by nonpracticing entities,
or NPEs (Schwartz and Kesan 2014; Allison and Mann 2007). Abramowicz and
Duffy (2011) argues that legally invalid, overly broad, or vague claims also impose
deadweight losses, as well as to reduce sequential innovation. Finally, Hall and
Harhoff (2004) and Lemley and Shapiro (2005) argue that the certainty surrounding
a granted patent is an important aspect of patent quality. Uncertainty surrounding
patent rights can occur along two dimensions: likelihood of validity and the scope
of the patent. Vague patents or patents with ambiguous scope may cause uncertainty
as to the validity of the patent and how far the legal metes and bounds of the patents
extend, leading to uncertainty for both the patent holder and technological rivals in
the same technology area. Also, patent assignees face uncertainty regarding the va-
lidity of a patent right, where existing art could lead to an invalidation of the patent
right. Lemley and Shapiro (2005) argues that to some degree, all granted patents
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are to some extent “probabilistic”.
1.2 Patent Quality and Patent Examination
As the arbiters of granted patents, examiners at patent offices across the world make
the final determinations as to whether a patent application is ultimately granted
(Marco et al. 2017). It is the responsibility of each examiner to ensure that each
granted application meets the legal standards of patentability, including the aspects
of patent quality discussed in the previous section. This responsibility leads to a nat-
ural research focus on examiner behavior and patent office policy as determinants
of patent quality. Once an applicant submits a patent application to the USPTO, the
USPTO provides a technology classification which reflects the technological nature
of the invention and routes the application to an examiner concentrated in that art.
The prior literature on patent examination has concentrated on the several areas of
the examination process that are problematic for accurate examination and subse-
quent granting of high-quality patents. These areas include production incentives
at the USPTO, patent office policies, vast increases in the number of patents that
examiners must evaluate as prior art, complex nature of certain technologies, and
feedback effects from existing low-quality examination (UKIPO 2013; Lemley and
Sampat 2012; Schuett 2013; Frakes and Wasserman 2017, 2019).
As these frictions may lead to examiners granting patents that do not satisfy all
requirements of patentability, researchers have focused on the high allowance rates
at the USPTO as an indication of low-quality examination. For example, during
patent prosecution at the USPTO, an examiner searches existing patents, publicly-
available patent applications, and non-patent literature to determine if the examined
patent applications is indeed novel and non-obvious, two requirements for a patent
application to be granted. Ceteris paribus, as an examiners searches the prior art,
higher scrutiny will lead to the discovery of prior art that demonstrates the claimed
invention is non-novel or obvious. An applicant, in response to these objections,
can either modify the claims of the patent in light of the prior art or abandon the
application.2 Therefore, as the higher level of scrutiny increases, examiners are
2This example represents the simple case. The applicant may challenge the rejection, file a
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less likely to issue “invalid” patents, or patents that do not meet the requirements
for allowance. In the face of complex technologies with myriad potential relevant
prior art patents or non-patent literature, the task of evaluating the art within the
allotted time becomes more difficult, leading to a higher probability of granting
“low-quality” patents. There are many issues related to innovation outcomes and
“low-quality” patents, which I explore further in the next subsection.
1.3 Patent Quality and Innovation Outcomes
Recent academic and governmental studies have found that low-quality patents
cause reduced innovative activity by firms, market failures, and sub-optimal eco-
nomic outcomes, including limited competition and increased costs (FTC 2003;
Hall et al. 2004; Galasso and Schankerman, 2015a, 2015b). These studies highlight
many of the ways that low-quality patents lead to economic inefficiencies, includ-
ing:3 first, patents with uncertain validity or scope lead directly to an increased risk
of ex post hold up and to higher costs of licensing relevant intellectual property.
These issues then cause an underinvestment in new technologies and a diminished
rate of innovation, especially in cumulative technologies. Second, the increase of
the low-quality patents is associated with fragmentation of ownership and the cre-
ation of patent thickets. Increased fragmentation can also lead to ex ante contracting
failures through an increase in transaction costs for licensing agreements (Ziedo-
nis 2004), resulting in lower innovative activity (Cockburn et al. 2010). Finally,
within patent thickets, firms with weaker patent portfolios face increased costs of
production because they cannot adequately insulate themselves from potential in-
fringement lawsuits from competitors. These higher expected litigation costs can
cause firms with weaker patent portfolios to exit the market, effectively erecting
barriers to entry. The exit of these firms is coupled with decreased entry from in-
creased barriers to entry (UKIPO 2013). The rest of this subsection expands on the
consequences of granting “low-quality” patents dicsussed above.
continuation, etc.
3This is not an exhaustive list. For more information, see FTC (2003) and UKIPO (2013), among
other studies related to patent quality.
1.3. Patent Quality and Innovation Outcomes 22
For low-quality patents, vague claims or unclear scope may lead to disadvan-
tageous outcomes for firms in regards to either patent hold-up or patent invalida-
tion. Hold-up refers to the ability of one firm to expropriate rents from another
firm. In the context of technology and innovation, hold-up occurs when a com-
petitor undertakes investment in innovative activity without a license for the rele-
vant intellectual property (bargaining failure or lack of awareness), or the terms of
the licensing agreement are unclear and the patent owner asserts the patent ex post
(Shapiro 2001). In the context of vague patents, firms may be unaware that they are
infringing on a patent due to lack of clarity in the claims, leaving them susceptible
to hold-up (Ziedonis 2004). This risk of hold-up increases the expected litigation
costs, decreasing investment in new technologies and innovative activities. The risk
of hold-up could induce risk-averse firms to obtain licenses for potentially relevant
vague patents, driving up innovation costs, leading to lower investment in new tech-
nologies and innovative activities.
Second, the increase of the low-quality patents in complex technologies is
associated with fragmentation of ownership and the creation of patent thickets.4
Patent thickets are defined as “an overlapping set of patent rights requiring that those
seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees,”
(Shapiro 2001). The UKIPO report on patent thicket notes that one cause of patent
thickets is the average drop in patent quality associated with the considerable in-
crease in patent filings in the last thirty years (Jaffe and Lerner 2004; Bessen and
Meurer 2008). In addition to overlapping patents, another byproduct of low quality
patenting within patent thickets is increased fragmentation within a particular tech-
nology. When, in complex technology areas with overlapping patents, the number
of potential licensors from which a firm needs to obtain a license is increasing in the
number of patents, patent ownership becomes fragmented. Increased fragmentation
can lead to ex ante contracting failures through an increase in transaction costs for
licensing agreements (Ziedonis 2004), resulting in lower innovative activity (Cock-
burn et al. 2010).
4UKIPO(2013) provides a discussion of the literature related to the creation of patent thickets,
including the increase in “low quality” patents.
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Finally, within patent thickets, firms adopt a defensive patent strategy to miti-
gate the risk of ex post hold-up (Hall and Ziedonis 2001; Ziedonis 2004; Noel and
Schankerman 2013). A defensive patenting strategy is defined as, the accumula-
tion of patents to use as bargaining chits to preserve the freedom to operate and
to improve the bargaining position of the firm in resolving patent disputes when
they arise, (Noel and Schankerman 2013). Firms with weaker patent portfolios face
increased costs of production because they cannot adequately insulate themselves
from potential infringement lawsuits from competitors. These higher expected liti-
gation costs can cause firms with weaker patent portfolios to exit the market, effec-
tively erecting barriers to entry. The exit of these firms is coupled with decreased
entry from increased barriers to entry (UKIPO 2013).
1.4 Ex Ante v. Ex Post Patent Quality Screening
A current academic debate centers on the social optimality of ex ante (patent exami-
nation) versus ex post (post-issuance review procedures) screening of patent quality.
Lemley (2001) argues with a cost-benefit analysis that since such a small percentage
of patents is ever asserted, society is better off spending additional resources screen-
ing valuable patents ex post, allowing for the “rational ignorance” of examiners to
balance production efficiency with examination quality (Lemley 2001). The study
finds that the costs to improve examination quality exceed the social costs of al-
lowing some “bad” patents. Using a similar method and estimates from Frakes and
Wasserman (2017), Frakes and Wasserman (2019) comes to the opposite conclu-
sion. The authors argue that some of the main assumptions used in the cost-benefit
analysis from Lemley (2001) were not accurate, including the degree to which dou-
bling examination time would reduce the allowance rate at the USPTO. Frakes and
Wasserman (2019) then estimates, with updated assumptions derived from empir-
ical evidence, that benefits of additional examiner time per application exceed the
cost of such a policy reform. In particular, doubling the amount of time provided
to examiners would cost $660 million annually but save over $904 million from
decreased litigation, PTAB, and prosecution costs (Frakes and Wasserman 2019).
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1.5 Patent Quality Screening and Innovative Out-
comes
Several recent studies have leveraged ex post patent screening outcomes (U.S. lit-
igation, oppositions at the European Patent Office, etc.) as a way to estimate the
effects of intellectual property rights on innovative outcomes, especially follow-on
innovation. Galasso and Schankerman (2015a) analyzes a set of nearly 1,400 patent
validity decisions at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) and
estimates the effect of invalidation on the number of forward citations within five
years of the validity decision for each relevant patent. To address the endogeneity
of the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator for the invalidation dummy variable,
the authors construct a propensity to invalidate index for the set of CAFC judges
randomly assigned to each case. The index, the paper argues, is correlated with
the validity decision, but uncorrelated with unobserved characteristics affecting the
dependent variable. The main result of Galasso and Schankerman (2015a) suggests
that patent invalidation leads to a fifty percent increase in forward citations to the
invalidated patent, but the effect is heterogeneous and depends on the bargaining
environment. Gaessler et al. (2017) utilizes a large dataset of opposed European
Patent Office (EPO) patents granted between 1993 and 2011. The authors construct
an instrument from the participation of the opposed patents examiner at grant in
the post-grant opposition proceedings. The main results in Gaessler et al. (2017)
are consistent with the main findings of Galasso and Schankerman (2015a): patent
invalidation leads to more total and external citations. However, the Gaessler et al.
(2017) results differ from Galasso and Schankerman (2015a) in invalidation effects
in discrete versus complex technologies, in the presence of patent thickets, and in
other environments. Finally, Galasso and Schankerman (2015b) builds on their pre-
vious work (Galasso and Schankerman 2015a) and finds that the invalidation effect
is driven by smaller firms in specific technologies but the patenting rate for larger
firms is mostly unaffected.
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1.6 Chapter Summaries
Chapter 2 provides an in-depth analysis of patent scope, one of the important as-
pects in the debates over “patent quality”. This purported decrease in patent quality
over the last decade or two has supposedly led to granting patents of increased
breadth, decreased clarity, and questionable validity (in part due to over-breadth).
Such patents allegedly diminish the incentives for innovation due to increased trans-
action costs in the market for technology, more frequent disputes and litigation,
trolling behavior, and breakdowns in bargaining. This chapter focuses on the patent
examination process at the PTO, highlighting the relationship between patent scope
and the patent examination process. My coauthors (Professors Alan Marco and
Joshua Sarnoff) and I develop and validate two measurements of patent scope: in-
dependent claim length and independent claim count. These metrics —in contrast
to other measurements of patent scope— can be calculated before and after exami-
nation and enable us to provide the first large-scale analysis of patent scope changes
during the examination process. Our results show that applications with narrower
scope are associated with a higher probability of grant and a shorter and less intense
examination period in comparison to applications with broader scope. Further, we
find that the examination process itself tends to narrow the scope of patents relative
to the scope at filing, and that the changes are more significant when the duration
and intensity of examination is increased. We explain our metrics and make our data
available in a public use dataset, which we hope will encourage more research in
the evaluation of patent scope, patent examination, and patent quality more broadly.
This chapter has been accepted and published at Research Policy.
Chapter 3 reevaluates prior research on USPTO examiner incentives, which
suggests that first-action allowance rates increase with seniority and experience,
resulting in lower patent quality. However, my coauthors on this chapter (Dr.
Nicholas Pairolero and Professor Mike Teodorescu) and I identify an examiner
learning mechanism that accounts for this empirical fact. Furthermore, we find that
patent examination quality does not diminish with the use of this learning mech-
anism, leading to implications for patent quality. Our analysis suggests that the
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policy prescriptions in the literature regarding modifying time allocations should
be reconsidered. In particular, rather than re-configuring time allocations for ev-
ery examination promotion level, researchers and stakeholders should focus on the
variation in outcomes between junior and senior examiners. Further, we find that
the identified examiner learning mechanism also reduces patent grant delay, and
therefore likely benefits innovators and firms.
The final chapter analyzes the effects of ex post declarations of patent validity,
a component of patent quality, on follow-on patenting decisions by both assignees
and rivals to a given patent. Using a DiD-matching estimator, this chapter estimates
the effects of validation, or an increase in the probability of validity through ex parte
reexamination on follow-on patenting. I find that validation increases for overall
and external follow-on patenting but the results are mixed for internal follow-on
patenting. The increase in follow-on patenting by rivals can be attributed to an
increase in defensive patenting based on the positioning of follow-on patents in
technology space after validation. The positioning of external follow-on patenting is
unaffected by validation. Finally, I find that the validation effect is more prominent
in complex relative to discrete technologies.
1.7 Contributions to the Literature
Research on patent quality, though a well-studied topic, remains highly relevant
given the general persistence of low-quality patents granted by the USPTO and the
lack of consensus regarding solutions to the issue. The body of work in this the-
sis provides an in-depth analysis of patent quality and its implications at various
points of the patenting experience, including at filing (Chapter 2), during prosecu-
tion (Chapters 2 and 3), and post-grant (Chapter 4). The goals of this thesis, which
addresses current holes in the literature, include providing a framework for ana-
lyzing changes to patent quality over prosecution, understanding how patent office
processes affect patent quality, and analyzing and evaluating policy solutions re-
lated to patent quality. This section articulates how my work advances the current
understanding of overarching questions in innovation economics, how the chapters
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relate to each other, and the implications of each chapter for the field and future re-
search. The second and third chapters of this thesis add to the innovation economics
literature by addressing a major question currently debated in the literature, namely,
how do patent office processes affect patent quality? Or more narrowly, what role
do patent office processes play in the determination of patent quality? Chapters 3
and 4 contribute to addressing an overarching policy question in innovation eco-
nomics: Are current policy recommendations from academic sources appropriate
or optimal?
In regards to the first question, several previous studies have investigated fea-
tures of patent quality at either filing or at grant but have not analyzed how aspects
of quality evolve over prosecution process. Chapter 2 provides a framework for
studying a particular aspect of patent quality, patent scope, and its evolution over
the patent prosecution process. The chapter analyzes patent scope at the USPTO,
first studying the characteristics of scope at various points of the examination pro-
cess, including at filing, allowing for a better appraisal of incoming application
quality. We next examine how incoming scope influences examiner effort to reach
the patentability threshold, finding that broader applications at filing require more
actions and longer pendency before disposal. Then my coauthors and I estimate
the degree to which the prosecution process narrows patent scope, conditional on
incoming patent characteristics and office action counts. These results show that,
generally, patent prosecution improves at least one aspect of patent quality. How-
ever, the relationships estimated in this chapter are correlational and not causal. The
measures and analytical framework developed in Chapter 2, above and beyond the
results, will allow future researchers to further analyze the evolution of patent qual-
ity at the USPTO and advance research related to patent examination and patent
quality.
Chapter 3 contributes to the literature on patent office processes and patent
quality by reevaluating prior conclusions regarding examiner incentives and patent
examination quality at the USPTO, finding that binding time constraints (Frakes
and Wasserman 2017) may not fully explain why examiners grant “low-quality”
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patents. In fact, seniority nor experience do not seem to play a role in low-quality
examination, with the exception of the highest seniority level (GS-14). These results
further the understanding of how (or not) certain aspects of prosecution (specifically,
the influence of examiner characteristics) affect examination quality. Finally, the
implications of these contributions are twofold: First, the analysis in this chapter
demonstrates that the current understanding of patent prosecution by academics
may lack institutional knowledge and that academics should carefully consider the
complexity of the patenting process when conducting research in this area. Second,
more research is needed to isolate the increase in production requirements from
a lack of prosecutorial oversight (signatory authority) to determine the cause of
relative low-quality examination at GS-14.
The third chapter also evaluates the optimality of policy recommendations
from Frakes and Wasserman (2017, 2019) regarding increased time allocation per
application, suggesting that the policy proposal may be inappropriate or even coun-
terproductive. By providing counter-evidence to the binding time constraints hy-
pothesis, results from Chapter 3 demonstrate that proposed policies may reduce
incentives to conduct compact prosecution, increasing pendency with no improve-
ment to examination quality. There are several implications of this research: First,
the policy prescriptions advocated in the literature should be reconsidered. Second,
while this chapter provides counter-evidence to the existing literature, it does not
provide sufficient policy recommendations related to patent examination and patent
quality. In that vein, more research needs to be conducted to isolate the increase in
production requirements from a lack of prosecutorial oversight (signatory author-
ity), as stated above.
Though Chapter 4 focuses on firm patenting responses to validity shocks, this
research provides additional considerations to the debate surrounding ex ante and
ex post patent quality screening. Chapter 4 finds that rival firms may patent strate-
gically (defensively) in response to increases in the probability of a focal patent’s
validity, leading to unintended consequences of ex post patent screening. The em-
pirical evidence from Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrates that, given the complexity of
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the secondary effects, a simple cost-benefit analysis of ex ante and ex post patent
quality screening may be an inappropriate strategy to evaluate the optimality of the
recommended policies.
The chapters of this thesis are interrelated and together represent a broader
analysis of patent quality at multiple points of the patenting experience. Chapters 2
through 4 are linked by the analysis of patent processes and their effects on patent
quality, including ex parte reexamination, which is an auxiliary of patent prosecu-
tion occurring ex post (Chapter 4). Chapters 3 and 4, as discussed above, provide
additional analysis and a differing perspective on the ex ante and ex post patent qual-
ity screening debate. Finally, each chapter separately establishes that institutional
knowledge is key in conducting accurate analysis on patent quality.
Chapter 2
Patent Claims and Patent Scope
2.1 Introduction
For decades patent breadth—or scope—has been recognized by economists as one
of the primary levers in patent policy. By altering the length versus breadth of patent
rights, policy makers can influence patent value, the incentives for innovation, and
the welfare consequences from the resulting deadweight losses (Gilbert and Shapiro
1990; Klemperer 1990; Merges & Nelson 1990). In practice, the statutory patent
length is difficult to change, although it can be effectually shortened by charging
renewal fees for in-force patents (see Pakes 1986 and subsequent “renewal studies”
of patent value). Patent scope—on the other hand—is amorphous, and it is difficult
to know how to apply economic concepts of patent scope to policy-making. Con-
sequently, no international agreements seek to define or harmonize patent scope.
Nonetheless, all patent systems employ legal doctrines to regulate patent scope,
such as adequacy of the written description relative to patent scope, and scope of
embodiments of claim language for infringement. Exactly how, in practice, could
patent scope be widened or narrowed by statute across a patent system? Would one
increase the inventive step—and thus the scope of the average patent—by requiring
that the claimed invention be really, really non-obvious? So, despite the economic
importance of patent scope, the discussion of patent scope as a policy “lever” (Lem-
ley & Burk 2003) has remained largely theoretical and historical (Merges & Nelson
1990; Scotchmer 1991; Moser 2013). At the same time, patent scope is at the front
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and center of debates surrounding patent quality in legal and public policy commu-
nities. “Low quality” patents are often thought to be either overly broad relative
to the inventive contribution or to be unduly vague or ambiguous, irrespective of
whether they pass legal tests of validity. So, “low quality” may reflect either de-
cisional errors in granting patents or systemic errors in legally authorizing such
patents in the first instance. The economic effects of either kind of error may be
significant.
Further, recent debates over the effectiveness of the patent system have focused
on the central issue of “patent quality.” In 2002, then-former Assistant Secretary of
Commerce and Commissioner of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Ger-
ald Mossinghoff noted a “real concern that with the dramatic increase in the number
of patent applications filed and patents granted—and with the influx of new and un-
avoidably inexperienced examiners hired to handle the workload—compromises to
patent quality may be inevitable.” (Mossinghoff and Kuo 2002).
In turn, the purported decrease in patent quality supposedly led to diminished
innovation due to increased licensing and litigation costs as well as to reduced se-
quential innovation in various industries, particularly with regard to software patents
(Rai 2013; Choi and Gerlach 2015).
The scope and the clarity of patent claim language have been identified by re-
searchers as significant concerns for patent quality (Rai 2013; Churnet 2013; Pether-
bridge 2009; Zimmer 2008; Wagner 2009). This is, in part, because overly broad or
vague claims can be exploited for the purposed of rent seeking, particularly by non-
practicing entities, or NPEs (Schwartz and Kesan 2014; Allison and Mann 2007).
Legally invalid, overly broad, or vague claims are thought to impose deadweight
losses (Abramowicz & Duffy 2011), as well as to reduce sequential innovation in
various industries, particularly with regard to software (Rai 2013; Choi and Gerlach
2015). Given these concerns, the PTO has adopted many initiatives over the last
decade to address patent quality concerns, including the now-completed “Enhanced
Patent Quality Initiative.”1 As noted by the PTO in the 2011 “Adoption of Metrics
1See https://www.uspto.gov/patent/EPQI-complete.
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for the Enhancement of Patent Quality” report, its “previous focus on the correct-
ness of actions taken by an examiner in an individual application has been widened
to better encompass the entirety of the patent application and examination process.”
The agency has particularly focused on assuring the clarity of patent claims and of
other aspects of the examination record, even when less clarity would still be legally
valid. However, the PTO can only apply the law as enacted by the Congress and as
interpreted by the courts, and has limited authority to alter scope and validity doc-
trines (see Cuozzo Speed Technologies v. Lee, 136 S.Ct. 2131, 2143 (2016) (citing
Cooper Technologies Co. v. Dudas, 536 F.3d 1330, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) and has
no jurisdiction over infringement determinations.
The explicit focus on the patent examination process, or patent prosecution,
by the PTO highlights the relationship between patent quality, the quality of the
examination to which the patent application was subject, and patent scope. Recent
scholarship exploits new data sources to evaluate the quality of the patent examina-
tion processes more directly. For example, Frakes and Wasserman (2013) have used
information on application outcomes to test their hypothesis that under conditions
of resource constraints the PTO is more likely to grant applications in technology
areas of higher continuation application filings. Others have focused on theoretical
modeling of the examination process or on application filing behaviors (Comino
and Graziano 2015, Schuett 2013, Caillaud and Duchene 2011).2 Researchers have
investigated how purportedly “low quality” patents (variously defined) are treated in
litigation (Petherbridge 2009; Marco et al. 2015b; Koenen and Peitz 2015; Yelder-
man 2014). Additional work has focused on the patent allowance rate (grant rate) as
an indicator of leniency, either across technological fields (Carley et al. 2015), ex-
aminers (Frakes and Wasserman 2013), or international offices examining the same
inventions (de Rassenfosse et al. 2016). The allowance rate alone is an imprecise
measure of examination quality if one ignores what is being allowed. That is, if ap-
plications are sufficiently narrowed prior to grant, a grant rate close to 1.0 would not
necessarily have negative implications for patent quality. And none of these studies
2Comino and Graziano (2015) posit that “true innovators” are forced to patent more intensively
in the presence of “bad patents”.
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measures patent scope directly, as to do so would require evaluation of every claim
of each patent to determine the meaning of each claim and then to measure the full
set of existing and potential future embodiments relative to some specific reference
time frame (Sarnoff 2004a, 2004b).
Further, there has been little empirical analysis of initial application claiming
practices and of changes to patent claims and claim language (and thus changes to
patent scope, or “breadth”) during the examination process. Other legal analyses
(e.g., Merges and Nelson 1990; Sarnoff 2005; Collins 2008; Chiang and Solum
2013) note the substantial discretion that exists in interpreting (or construing) the
meaning and scope of patent claims for both claim validity and infringement de-
terminations, and note additional doctrinal and conceptual concerns in regard to
determining particular patent claim scope from claim language.
Comparatively little attention has been paid to developing and assessing direct
measures of patent scope, particularly in light of the difficulties of interpreting the
language of patent claims and the variety of technologies to which the language
of patent claims may apply. Further, many proposed measures of patent scope can
only be observed for the patent grant. Thus, they provide no way to estimate scope
changes during patent prosecution.
This chapter presents the first large-scale analysis of patent application and
granted patent scope changes during the examination process, using measures of
patent scope that are observable at filing and at grant. We define and validate two
claim-related metrics for patent scope based on independent claims. Specifically,
for each published application and patent in our dataset we calculate:
1. the number of words used in the shortest independent claim (which we call
independent claim length, or “ICL”);3 and,
2. the count of the number of independent claims (which we call “ICC”).
3We also considered alternative measures for ICL including the average independent claim length
and the length of the first independent claim. The shortest, first, and average independent claim
length are all highly correlated (see Table 2.2). We re-ran each validation regression performed in
Section 2.4 for both first and average independent claim length. The results are insensitive to the
definition of ICL.
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As discussed in more detail below, we expect that measures directly related to
claim language provide improved indicators of patent scope relative to other prox-
ies. Further, analyzing changes in claim language can be measured between publi-
cation and grant to provide insights into the examination process which can serve
as the basis for further research on patent quality.
We discuss in more detail in Section 2.2 our reasons for focusing on patent
scope measured by the word length of the shortest independent claim. In princi-
ple, the shortest claim should provide the broadest scope, because each extra word
should impose some additional restriction on the intensional set of embodiments
that limits its extensional application from the broader set of embodiments encom-
passed by the claim meaning without that word (Sheff 2017). This is based on the
assumption that all words have some meaning, as well as by applying the legal inter-
pretive principle that all words are to be given effect, rather than be treated as mere
surplusage (Llewllyn 1950).4 Because our scope metrics can be observed separately
for published patent applications and for patent grants, they provide an advantage
over other scope measures in evaluating the patent examination process. Our scope
metrics can be used to evaluate the behavior of applicants and of examiners during
the application process, and provide new means for assessing the quality of issued
patents and the effectiveness of patent examination.
Our results reveal several interesting features about the patent examination
process. First, we find that applications with narrower claims are more likely to
be granted than those with broader claims. Second, the examination process itself
tends to narrow the scope of patents by adding 45 words, on average, to the shortest
independent claim and by reducing the number of independent claims by 0.4 claims.
Third, we find that broader applications tend to have longer pendency times, both
for abandoned applications and granted patents. Further, longer pendency periods
4Of course, the scope of meaning of any particular word may not be directly comparable to the
scope of meaning of any other particular word, without first engaging in linguistic interpretation or
considering its extensional applications within the universe of possible embodiments. Accordingly,
direct comparisons of the scope of unrelated technological claims in different fields based on word
counts are likely to be problematic. Instead, claim counts provide more useful information in regard
to changes to the claim scope in particular applications, and through large-scale observations across
and within technology domains.
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tend to generate more significant narrowing of the patent between application and
grant. We also find significant variation over time in the breadth of patent applica-
tions and patent grants, contrary to conclusions drawn from some earlier analyses
that suggested a high level of stability in claim lengths of issued patents over longer
periods of time (Osenga 2012).
In the next section, we provide a background on patent scope. Section 2.3 dis-
cusses the patent examination process and discuss ICL and ICC as proxies for the
scope of patent applications and granted patents. Section 2.4 describes the claims
data, our parsing process, and the resulting public-use data set. We also describe the
econometric validation for using ICL and ICC as measures of patent scope. In Sec-
tion 2.5 we use ICL and ICC to analyze patent examination at the USPTO. We ex-
amine differences in the statistical distributions of ICL and ICC between abandoned
applications and applications that are later granted, and we quantify the evolution
of claims during examination for granted patents. We present trends in ICL and
ICC over time, and consider the relationship between patent breadth and pendency
using an econometric framework. Lastly, we examine cross-sectional differences
for many types of application characteristics, including technology and origin. Sec-
tion 2.6 concludes with recommendations for the research community to evaluate,
improve, and expand on the data and algorithms provided here, and to incorporate
patent scope metrics into their work.
2.2 Background on Patent Scope
2.2.1 Measuring Scope
Economists and other researchers have long used measurements of patent scope in
performing empirical work on patents. Often the purpose is simply to control for
scope in explaining patent value, patent litigation, investment, or patent strategy.
Indeed, because scope is an important component of patent value, these measures
are often swept up in the discussion of patent valuation (see van Zeebroeck 2011
for a survey). Less work has been done exploring the endogeneity of patent scope
that arises within the patent examination process.
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Measuring patent scope typically involves one of two approaches: (1) count-
ing the number of claims in the patent (e.g., Lanjouw and Schankerman 1997, 2004;
Frakes and Wasserman 2014); or (2) counting the number of technological classi-
fications assigned to the patent by the examination authority (class counts) (e.g.,
Lerner 1994). Claim counts historically rely on the total claim count (TCC) rather
than a count of independent claims, primarily as an artifact of the available data. To-
tal claim counts have been widely available to researchers for many years. However,
the USPTO does not officially publish separate counts for independent and depen-
dent claims. Distinguishing dependent claims from independent claims requires
parsing the claim text itself or relying on proprietary datasets. In earlier studies,
independent claim counts are used for smaller datasets where hand collection and
human evaluation and coding is not cost prohibitive. In recent years, the greater
availability of natural language processing software has made the parsing problem
less costly, though not without its problems, as we discuss in the working paper
(Marco et al. 2016). To our knowledge, independent and dependent claim identi-
fication is not available in a bulk public-use datafile-a problem that we address by
making our data and algorithms available freely available.
Mann and Underweiser (2012) focus on patent quality (understood as valid-
ity) for patents involved in Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) de-
cisions. They use both TCC and the number of independent claims (independent
claim count, or ICC), as well as the number of words in the patent abstract (which
has no legal significance) and the closeness of the alignment between words in the
patent specification and in the patent claims, as explanatory variables for patent va-
lidity as determined by appellate court cases. As they note, “[b]y allowing us to
quantify the extent to which the prosecution process reduces the number of claims
in the patent, these data should provide a measure of the rigor of the prosecution
process. Similarly, by allowing us to examine data about independent claims in
addition to total claims, we have a second and arguably more precise method for
measuring the aggressiveness of drafting reflected in the application.”
From a theoretical point of view, independent claims should represent a better
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measure of patent scope than total claims. By law and practice all dependent claims
necessarily should be subsets of the technologies that are already within the scope
of the independent claims from which they depend, particularly given the legal in-
terpretive principle of claim differentiation, i.e., that each claim should be treated
as distinct in its scope from other claims (Sarnoff & Manzo 2017). Thus, using
the total claim count (TCC) should normally result in over-estimating the measure
of a patent’s technological scope (because all of the technological embodiments of
every dependent claim are embedded in the independent claims, and as there may
be some overlap between different dependent claims). In practice, TCC and ICC
are correlated, as we show below in Table 2.2, simply because each independent
claim typically has one or more dependent claims. However, the correlation is much
stronger between total claims and dependent claims, indicating that ICC and TCC
are not substitutes. Additionally, our validation exercise below shows that ICC has
more predictive value.
Novelli (2015) argues that claim counts and technology class counts represent
two different dimensions of patent scope, where the total number of claims per
patent corresponds to “the number of variations to the core inventive idea that are
identified in the patent,”5 and the number of technological classes determine the
position of the invention variations in the patent space (Novelli 2015). She finds
that each dimension of patent scope has varying implications on further inventive
activity by the inventing firm.
In practice we expect both claims and technology classes to be useful (corre-
lated) indicators of patent scope; and, in principle multiple measurements are pre-
ferred where possible. However, claim-based measures have the advantage of being
able to measure scope consistently throughout the examination process. In addition
to ICC, other claim-based measures have also been proposed. Lichtman (2004) an-
alyzed the total changes to unique words used in patent claims between application
5However, as patents may claim the same invention as either structures or methods, and may use
different terms having similar meanings in different claims, additional claims will not always indi-
cate meaningfully different technological applications of the same inventive concept. For instance, it
is difficult to compare technological differences between a method claim for merely using a system
and the system itself.
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and issuance for a small sample of application-patent pairs. We adopt a similar ap-
proach by measuring the length of independent claims in terms of the number of
words (independent claim length, or ICL), which we discuss in more detail below
in Section 2.3. Both ICC and ICL are easy to measure and can be observed at the
beginning and the end of prosecution for patented applications.
In contrast, in an effort to assess changes to claiming practices over decades,
Osenga (2012) looked at average independent and dependent claim length, and at
grant alone, using small samples of randomly selected patents. She found that claim
length practices had remained surprisingly stable over five decades, notwithstand-
ing significant doctrinal and technological changes. In contrast, we find significant
variations in claim length from 1976 to 2014 for granted patents and from 2001 to
2014 for published applications.
As noted above, many scholars have used a count of total claims as a measure
of patent scope. For example, Allison and Lemley (2000) performed analyses on
the total number of claims at grant, based on the assumption that comparative in-
creases across unrelated patents in the total number of claims should reflect either
increased complexity or increased value of the technology sought to be protected,
given that additional claims will normally cost patent applicants additional filing
fees and drafting and prosecution costs. However, this approach treats the num-
ber of claims as an indirect signal of the willingness of the applicant to invest in the
technology, which may be correlated with breadth or more generally with value. We
believe that the number of independent claims is a better direct measure of patent
scope.
To understand the value of claims-related measurements of patent scope, it
is important to understand some details of the US patent examination process and
to provide a description of potential outcomes from examination. Even for ex-
perienced patent researchers, understanding the institutions behind the creation of
patent data is crucial for proper research design and proper interpretation of the
data.
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2.2.2 Patent Prosecution
The laws and procedures governing the patent examination process involve many
options and strategies that applicants and examiners employ to influence patent
scope.6 These behaviors lead to a natural relationship between the text of patent
claims and patent scope, and the way in which patent prosecution influences both.
We detail some of these institutional relationships below, and we validate them
econometrically in Section 2.4.
A complete patent application-in terms of substantive content-to the PTO con-
tains:
1. a title and abstract;
2. a written description of the nature of the invention made (which may demon-
strate that it is eligible subject matter), sufficient to inform those with ordinary
skill in the relevant technology how to make and use the invention;
3. optionally, the application may contain one or more drawings;
4. one or more claims, i.e., a formal “peripheral” description of the invention that
defines the legal scope of the invention (by specifying the necessary elements
or steps that intensionally define the invention) for which exclusive rights are
sought;
5. and a list of prior art references (documents describing the relevant technol-
ogy known to the inventor, relative to which the claimed invention should
represent a new and non-obvious advance).
Together, the written description and the drawings are commonly referred to as the
specification or “spec.”7 In addition to being fully enabled, the patent claims must
find adequate written description support in the spec (demonstrating objectively that
6For more detailed information about patent examination and examiner incentives, see
Marco et al. (2017) and Graham et al. (2018). A detailed description of the patent ex-
amination process can be found in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) at
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/.
7Technically the specification as defined by 35 U.S.C. §112 also includes the claims. However,
in workaday parlance the “spec” is distinct from the claims.
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the applicant mentally “possessed” or “recognized” the full scope of the claimed
invention, as its meaning is legally construed at the time of filing) in order to be
allowable (see Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc)). The negotiation over what has been disclosed and
has “written description support” is part of the evolution of claim language during
prosecution.
Patent claims are classified as either independent claims or dependent claims.8
From a legal standpoint, independent claims must be drafted to be complete sen-
tences that stand alone, without reference to any other claim. Many independent
claims may exist in the same patent, describing different embodiments or aspects,
uses, or methods of producing the invention.9 For each independent claim, ap-
plicants may add dependent claims, which incorporate the independent claim by
reference, but also add limitations. Applicants may wish to add dependent claims
for several reasons, including as a “fallback” position in case the independent claim
is rejected (during prosecution) or invalidated (post-grant). As noted earlier, adding
dependent claims should never increase patent scope, as each dependent claim
should already cover only a subset of the scope of embodiments of the independent
claim. In contrast, even with the potential for substantial overlap in the embodi-
ments of independent claims, adding an independent claim should tend to increase
a particular patent’s scope (because of the legal doctrine of claim differentiation),
and should never decrease the patent’s scope (as claim scope coverage should be
additive). In contrast, dependent claims can never be technologically broader than
the claims upon which they depend.
The submitted application will be assigned a set of initial technological classi-
fications by the PTO, and then will be routed to the most appropriate general art unit
835 U.S.C. §112(d). For example patent 8,000,000 has 12 claims. Of those four are independent
claims: two visual prosthesis apparatuses, and two methods for limiting power consumption to such
apparatuses. One dependent claim, dependent on the first apparatus reads “The visual prosthesis
apparatus of claim 1, wherein In this way the dependent claim can be seen to be a narrower (limited)
version of the independent claim.”
9What constitutes a single “invention” poses difficult level of generality considerations, which
are the subject of different legal approaches, including so-called “restriction” practice in the United
States which is discussed below in regard to divisional applications and “unity of invention” practice
in other jurisdictions.
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(GAU, or “art unit”) for examination. Once in the respective GAU, a Supervisory
Patent Examiner (SPE) will assign the application to a patent examiner, by placing
the application on an examiner’s docket.
Institutional incentives encourage the examiner to work on the applications in
filing date order; however, the patent examiner has some discretion. When con-
sidering an application, an examiner may issue a restriction requirement indicating
that the application contains claims to more than one invention and thus should be
separated into separate applications (with the payment of additional filing fees). In
response the applicant may restrict the claims of the application to limit it to a single
invention. The applicant may further choose to file a divisional (DIV) application
seeking examination on the claims that were removed from the original application
following the restriction requirement. The Patent Act also provides for continuation
or continuation-in-part applications, which claim the benefit of an earlier applica-
tion’s filing date for the purposes of determining its “priority date” with respect to
prior art.10 The claims made by the child application must be supported by the par-
ent application’s written description. Continuations enable the applicant to pursue
broader (or more questionable) claims without holding up the allowance of other
claims. In fact, often the continuation is filed immediately following the allowance
of some of the parent application’s claims. Indeed, we find below that continuation
applications are among the broadest applications receiving patent protection. Con-
tinuations themselves may have child applications, and this repeated process can
lead to long and complicated family trees. In fact, over a third of non-provisional
U.S. applications filed between 2001 and 2014 were child applications.11
The application will be examined by an examiner in the GAU to which it was
assigned. Of course, in response to any action by the office an applicant may aban-
don the application and end prosecution. Abandonment most frequently occurs by
failing to respond to an office action, intentionally or by missing deadlines (which
may not always be curable). Applicants may expressly abandon the application at
10If the continuation application contains additional written descriptive disclosure (“new matter”)
that is being claimed, the application is a continuation-in-part (CIP) application. The prior art is
evaluated based on whether the relevant claim is supported by the original spec or the new matter.
11Both PCT filings and filings with a foreign priority were excluded from this calculation.
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any time.
If the application is ready for substantive examination, the examiner will deter-
mine if the claimed invention described in the patent application meets the require-
ments of the patent statute (35 U.S.C.). These requirements include patent eligibil-
ity, utility, novelty, and non-obviousness. Additionally, the claims must be clear,
and there must be adequate support for them in the specification to enable a hypo-
thetical person having ordinary skill in the relevant art (technology), or PHOSITA,
to make and use the invention without undue experimentation. A patent examiner
will assess novelty and non-obviousness based on a search of prior art available
before the priority date. If the prior art indicates that the claimed invention is not
new or suggests that it is obvious, or if the examiner otherwise determines that the
invention does not meet statutory requirements, the examiner will issue a non-final
rejection. However, if the examiner finds that all statutory requirements have been
met for some or all claims, the examiner may allow the relevant claims. The appli-
cant may then seek to have the patent issued, and if only some of the claims were
allowed the applicant may seek to continue prosecution of the rejected claims in a
child application.
Following a non-final rejection, the applicant may proceed by: (1) abandoning
the application, (2) amending the claims (typically by narrowing them to avoid lack
of novelty or obviousness in light of the prior art), or (3) filing arguments about why
the unamended claims should not have been rejected. After the applicant’s response,
the examiner will re-examine the application and either allow the remaining claims
or issue a final rejection.
Following a final rejection, an applicant has several alternatives to continue
prosecution in the same application for a fee, usually involving a Request for Con-
tinued Examination (RCE) or, less commonly, by filing an appeal to the Patent Trial
and Appeals Board (PTAB) at the PTO. An RCE has the effect of enabling the appli-
cant to obtain a further round of examination before the same examiner. Typically,
the applicant will amend the claims in order to continue prosecution. If the appli-
cant appeals, the case is heard by the PTAB, with further appeals available in U.S.
2.3. The Relationship Between Patent Scope and Patent Prosecution 43
District Court or before the CAFC (35 U.S.C. §141 or §145). The RCE process
ensures that the PTO cannot issue a terminal rejection; prosecution ends only with
a granted patent or an abandoned application. That is, “final” rejections are by no
means final.
It is important to note that the specification in an application may not be sub-
stantively amended during patent prosecution to add new (inventive) matter (35
U.S.C. 132(a)). Further, continuation applications must share the same spec as their
parent application. In contrast, a CIP may contain new matter that will provide
a new priority date for any claims incorporating the new matter. While the back-
ground, detailed description of the invention, and figures in the specification do
not constitute the claimed invention, the claims are supposed to be interpreted by
reference to the specification’s description. Thus, the spec will have relevance to
claim interpretation and patent scope. In contrast, the multiple options available
to continue prosecution ensure that claims may be amended throughout the exam-
ination process. Depending on the costs of RCEs and other continuation options,
applicants may have little incentive to unnecessarily or pre-emptively narrow the
claims of patent applications. However, applicants have a greater incentive to invest
in drafting the rest of the specification to obtain priority.
The next section explores these incentives in greater detail. We describe typical
strategies used by applicants to amend claims, and how these strategies relate to
patent scope. Because of institutional features of patent prosecution, we argue that
patent scope is positively correlated with independent claim count and negatively
correlated with independent claim length.
2.3 The Relationship Between Patent Scope and
Patent Prosecution
As described above, the specification and the claims are two parts of a patent ap-
plication. The specification encompasses a background of the invention and a more
detailed written description of it, along with drawings or figures, whereas claims
represent the legal metes and bounds of the exclusive rights sought by the appli-
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cant. Applicants have incentives to file an application with the broadest claims to
which they think they are legally entitled (or to which they think they may be able
to obtain rights even if it is not clear that they are legally entitled to claims that
broad).12
Because patent prosecution generally involves several rounds of rejection and
amendment,13 there is little incentive for the applicant to voluntarily narrow the
claims before its examination; that would be the legal equivalent of leaving money
on the table. Broader claims on the patent grant translate to a larger set of technolo-
gies from which the owner can exclude others. Thus, amendments in the face of
an examiner’s rejection will typically be to narrow the scope of the claims. On the
other hand, when the cost of amendments is relatively high to particular applicants,
we should expect narrower applications, and fewer amendments.14
In order to circumvent the rejection applicants must argue that the rejection
was improper or must narrow or cancel claims. Infrequently, amendments may
result in broader claims when an applicant realizes during prosecution that it can
claim additional scope that was disclosed in the specification. Strategically, the
applicant may be able broaden claims through amendments rather than through the
initial filing: once an examiner indicates that the filed claims will be allowed, the
applicant may then negotiate to ask what (if any) additional, broader claims may be
allowed.
There are two primary ways in which applicants will narrow the scope of the
claims in an amendment: by canceling independent claims outright, or by adding
further limitations to existing claims. These strategies help us to define the two
scope measures that we rely on in this chapter.
12In fact, it has been suggested that applicants and their attorneys sometimes improperly seek to
claim broader scope than what they believe is legally justifiable (Liivak 2017).
13The correlation coefficient between the number of office actions and the number of claim
amendments in our sample is 0.82.
14The costs may be in the form of administrative fees or in the cost of delay. For instance, start-ups
seeking financing may value speed, which may induce applicants to claim less than they are entitled
and to file CONs to seek broader protection at a later date, so as to have prosecution proceed more
quickly to an issued patent.
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2.3.1 Independent Claim Count (ICC)
The principles of claim construction suggest that more independent claims broaden
a patent’s scope. The independent claims within a patent-while potentially
overlapping-are not generally construed to be identical. Additionally, the fee struc-
ture of the USPTO incentivizes fewer claims.15 Thus, as mentioned in Section 2.2,
any additional independent claim will represent a broader scope for the patent; con-
versely, additional independent claims cannot reduce the patent scope.
2.3.2 Independent Claim Length (ICL)
The process of claim narrowing almost always involves adding words to the claim,
such as modifiers, qualifiers, or other details, although applicants may also narrow
the scope of their application through argumentation regarding the meaning of the
claim words, generating so-called prosecution disclaimers and estoppels (Sarnoff
2005). Aside from responding to examiners’ rejections, applicants have little in-
centive to narrow claims. Accordingly, as we show below, the vast majority of
independent claims grow longer during prosecution, in response to examiner rejec-
tions. Thus, on an institutional basis we should expect a correlation between the
narrowness of claims and the length of claims, ceteris paribus.
A common practice is for applicants to include a broad independent claim,
along with narrower dependent claims. The examiner may reject the independent
claim while indicating approval for a dependent claim, which in theory must have
narrower scope because a dependent claim incorporates by reference the indepen-
dent claim language and adds a limitation to it (e.g., “The device as described in
claim 1, further comprising”). In that instance, the applicant may “roll up” at
least one dependent claim limitation into the original independent claim to form
a new, longer and narrower independent claim. For example, claim 1 of U.S. patent
7,769,690 incorporates the language from claim 1 in its original application, as well
15Excess claims fees apply after three independent claims (currently $460 per excess claim
for large entities) and 20 total claims (currently $100 per excess claim for large entities). See
USPTO Fee Schedule at https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/fees-and-payment/uspto-
fee-schedulePatent%20Misc%20Fee, accessed October 12, 2018. Excess claims fees are charged
at filing, but are also assessed if claims are added during prosecution. They are not refunded if
claims are canceled during prosecution. The office also charges excess page fees.
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as the limitations of dependent claims 5 and 6.16 This additional language nar-
rowed the scope of the independent claim such that, as modified, the claim was
allowable over the prior art. Rolling up the dependent claims necessarily requires
adding words to the independent claim, and unambiguously narrows the claim (as
compared to the original independent claim). According to interviews with examin-
ers and practitioners, dependent claim roll-ups are the most frequent form of claim
amendments.
Where claim language is unduly ambiguous or vague (as well as when it is
overbroad in regard to written description or enablement), the examiner may reject
the claim under section 112.17 Clarification by adding words normally narrows
the claim scope because it excludes a set of potential embodiments, whether by
restricting the meaning of the ambiguous or vague language or by specifying a
narrower conception of the things (or relevant properties of things) that the meaning
denotes.
There is one particular practice that provides an exception to our interpretation
of additional words in the claim text. This is the case when the claim contains
a list of possible embodiments, each separated by the word “or.” Adding another
possible embodiment to the list would add words and potentially add scope.18 We
consider these exceptions in our validation in Section 4.3 below. However, if the
list is contained within a limitation, then adding the limitation to an independent
claim should still make the claim narrower. As an example, consider three possible
claims: (a) a bicycle frame, (b) a bicycle frame made of steel, and (c) a bicycle
frame made of steel or aluminum. It is easy to see that (a) is broader than either (b)
or (c). However, (c) is broader than (b) even though (b) contains more words.
Altering the independent claim from (b) to (c) by adding “or aluminum” would
both lengthen and broaden the independent claim. However, in the case of a depen-
16See the full text claim language of application 10/495,059 as reflected in U.S. pre-grant pub-
lication 20050065799 (published March 24, 2005), available on Google Patents.) and U.S. patent
7,769,690 (issued August 3, 2010).
1735 U.S.C. §112.
18Similarly, a so-called Markush claim provides alternatives as being “selected from the group
consisting of A, B, and C” (MPEP 803.02). Adding more elements to the group would add words
and increase the scope.
2.3. The Relationship Between Patent Scope and Patent Prosecution 47
dent claim roll-up, the process invariably leads to a narrower independent claim for
the reasons explained above. A roll-up could yield change (a) into (b) or (a) into
(c); but, it could not change (b) into (c) because “aluminum” is not a limitation
of “steel.” Examiner interviews confirm that the most frequent use of the “selected
from” and “or” language in a independent claim is when that language is contained
within a further limitation. While we did not do an exhaustive search, we were un-
able to find a single example of a case where the language was not embedded in a
limitation.
2.3.3 Technological Complexity
The institutional features of patent prosecution indicate that adding words to the
independent claims or reducing the number of independent claims in a particular
application tends to reduce or otherwise restrict patent scope. However, those insti-
tutional features do not necessarily imply that it is appropriate to use the indepen-
dent claim count or independent claim length to make inferences about the relative
scope between two unrelated inventions, that is, the institutional features support
“within-application” comparisons more than “between-application” comparisons.
For instance, claim counts and word length may be correlated with technological
complexity, so that observing more claims and more words in a particular patent
may simply indicate that the invention is in a complex technology. Technological
complexity of inventions is not, of course, identical to patent scope (i.e., the range of
technological embodiments to which construed claim language applies). However,
if more words are required to describe complex technologies, we should expect that
relationship to hold especially for the specification, including the background and
written description. We might also expect more drawings to be used. Indeed, the
correlations presented in Table 2.2 show that the page length of the spec and page
length of drawings are highly correlated.19 Yet, page length and the number of
drawings are not highly correlated with our measures of patent scope. If technolog-
ical complexity is well reflected in the specification, then the claim-based measures
19The correlation coefficient is 0.53. Note that the page length of the spec does not include
drawings.
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are virtually independent from complexity.20
Our validation exercise in Section 2.4 also supports the interpretation of ICL
and ICC as measures of patent scope. Thus, we feel comfortable making some
comparisons across patents, especially with respect to time trends. Nonetheless,
comparing the claim text within narrow technology groups may be more appropriate
than across arbitrarily chosen technology classes.
Based on the discussion above and the validation exercise below, we proceed
under the propositions that ceteris paribus, a patent’s scope is correlated with (1)
fewer words in its shortest independent claim, and (2) a greater number of indepen-
dent claims. Therefore, as the length of the shortest independent claim increases,
and as the number of independent claims decreases, the scope of patent should nar-
row.
The analysis in Section 2.5 shows that narrower applications (as measured by
ICL and ICC at publication) have a shorter prosecution time and a higher probability
of grant on average. In the next section we describe the way in which we construct
our claims data and validate our scope measures.
2.4 Data and Validation
We build our claims data sets from publicly available full-text information on pre-
grant publications and patent grants.21 Machine-readable claims information is
readily available on published patent documents, including patent grants themselves
(since 1976), as well as pre-grant publications (since 2001).22 Both patent grants
and pre-grant publications are technically “publications” in the generic sense; thus,
we adopt the agency’s convention of calling pre-grant publications PGPubs.23 The
20The correlations between spec page length or drawings page length and various measures of
claim length and claim count are positive but very low: around 0.05-0.10, with the highest correlation
of 0.11 between the number of pages and the total claim count.
21The USPTO’s Patent Claims Research Dataset is available at www.uspto.gov/economics.
22The USPTO publishes a pre-grant publication eighteen months after filing, unless the appli-
cant files a non-publication request. See 35 U.S.C. §122. Each pre-grant publication contains an
application’s specification, claims, prior art references (both patent and non-patent literature), clas-
sifications, abstract, drawings, and other application data.
23The agency itself uses the term publications to include all published documents. However, some
writers and commentators use the term to mean pre-grant publications only.
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term can lead to some confusion because not all PGPubs are “pre-grant” in the sense
that PGPubs exist for non-granted (abandoned) applications.
Machine readable claims information is available only from official publica-
tions of the USPTO. However, the file wrapper (alternatively, image file wrapper
or IFW) of a published application comprises the full documentation of each in-
dividual application, including the initial filing, office actions by examiners, claim
amendments, disclosures, etc. Published applications are those that have been made
available to the public, typically coinciding with either the publication of the PGPub
or the patent grant. The individual claim amendments during prosecution are only
available as image files in the file wrapper. Incorporating the information from the
file wrapper would involve identifying each amendment, performing optical char-
acter recognition on each related document, and correcting for any errors. This is
perhaps fruitful work for future research; however, we also encourage the agency to
consider altering their document ingestion and distribution protocols to enable the
provision of full-text machine-readable versions of the file wrapper.24
The scope of the data work described in this chapter includes parsing the pub-
lished applications and patent documents themselves. The bulk data files incor-
porate the entire text of the PGPub or patent, not just the claims, and the claims
themselves are not individually parsed. Consequently, the claims are not individ-
ually identified or tagged as being independent or dependent claims. Our parsing
algorithm identifies each claim and its dependencies; the dependencies are included
in the public use datafile.
2.4.1 Claims Text
To develop the datasets, we first clean and identify the claims section of each bulk
file for published applications and patents. Second, we apply an algorithm to the
parsed files to identify individual claims, as well as the dependency relationships
between claims.
From the parsed claims text, we measure the length of each claim based on
24This has the further benefit of making the file wrapper searchable, which is of considerable
import given that those published documents constitute prior art.
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word count. We create data sets at the claim level and summary statistics at the
document level.25 Claim-level and document-level data are available for each PG-
Pub (available for applications filed between November 29, 2000 and December 31,
2014) and for each patent granted from January 1, 1976 to December 31, 2014. For
each PGPub, we distinguish between those that are later granted (PGPub-grants)
and those that are later abandoned (PGPub-abandonments), as well as those that
were pending (PGPub-pending) as of December 31, 2016.
We use the claims from the PGPub as a proxy for the claims at filing. The two
may not be identical because applicants may proactively file claim amendments
prior to the time of publication. And, in some instances patent prosecution may
begin prior to 18 months after filing. Two things mitigate any problems that might
arise from mis-measuring the claims at filing. First, the 18-month time frame ap-
plies to the filing date of the earliest parent application. So, in practice many CONs,
DIVs, and CIPs are published shortly after filing. Second, we find that only 8.1 per-
cent of applications in the dataset have a preliminary claim amendment filed before
the publication date. Normal office practice is to incorporate preliminary amend-
ments into the claims when they are published, and thus these claim amendments
(except for the possible few that are filed too close to publication to be incorporated)
are reflected in the publication data. We thus use the terms claims at publication or
the claims at filing, alternatively, to refer to the claims as published in the PGPub.
To analyze patent prosecution, we create publication-patent pairs.26 The
publication-patent pairs allow us to observe within-application changes in scope
due to patent prosecution. The available sources do not contain machine-readable
text for each amendment that is filed, nor do they contain the claims of abandoned
applications at the time of abandonment. Thus, we cannot create corresponding
matched pairs for pending or abandoned applications. Consequently, we only ob-
serve changes to patent scope during prosecution for published applications that
were later granted.
25More information about the methodology and the structure of the data sets can be found in the
Appendix.
26We define a publication-patent pair to be a pairing of the earliest PGPub (PGPub-grant) and the
corresponding patent grant for a given application number.
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Table 2.1: Sample summary for PGPubs (2001-2014) and patent grants (1976-2014)
For the publication-patent pairs we define ∆ICL and ∆ICC, which represent
changes in the values of ICL and ICC, respectively, between publication and grant.
Note that the shortest independent claim at grant may be a different claim number
than the shortest independent claim at publication. First, claims may be renumbered
at various times during prosecution. Second, amendments may cause the shortest
independent claim on the PGPub to grow longer than another independent claim.
2.4.2 Sample Summary
Table 2.1 summarizes our final sample, which represents 3.9 million PGPubs,
4.9 million granted patents (including those granted after 2000 and previously
published, those not previously published, and those granted prior to 2001), and
2.1 million publication-patent pairs. For PGPubs, the table shows that PGPub-
abandonments tend to have broader claims relative to PGPub-grants with respect
to ICL (75 words versus 90 words, respectively, at the median). Further, granted
patents are narrower at grant (136 words at the median) than at publication (90
words at the median). Granted patents also have one fewer independent claim at
grant than at publication. We discuss these differences in greater detail in Section
2.5, below.
Table 2.2 shows the correlation matrix for various measures of claim length,
claim count, and other relevant patent-level statistics. In practice the number of
independent, dependent, and total claims are highly correlated. However, because
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dependent claims are usually more numerous than independent claims, the correla-
tion between total claims and dependent claims is highest among the claim counts
(0.99). The correlation between independent claims and dependent claims is only
0.33. Further, the correlation between independent claims and the number of depen-
dent claims per independent claim is -0.33. Thus, a patent with more independent
claims, will have more dependent claims. But, the ratio of independent claims to
dependent claims will be higher. Independent claim length as measured by the
shortest, average, or first independent claim are also highly correlated, with shortest
and average being most highly correlated (0.93), and shortest and first being least
correlated (0.81). This suggests that one should not necessarily assume that the first
claim is the broadest.
Table 2.2 also presents the correlations between claim length and claim count
both at PGPub and at grant, which are negative in all pairwise cases. The neg-
ative correlations reflect the expectation that claim length is negatively correlated
with patent scope and claim count is positively correlated. Table 2.2 shows that the
strongest negative correlation (-0.20) is between the length of the shortest indepen-
dent claim (ICL) and the independent claim count (ICC) at PGPub, which are the
measurements on which we focus our analysis.
Lastly, as discussed in Section 2.3, Table 2.2 also includes the page length of
the specification and the number of drawings. Because those variables reflect tech-
nological complexity, they are highly correlated. But, they are not highly correlated
with our scope measures, especially for patent grants.
2.4.3 Validation
While the primary purpose of this chapter is to examine the trends in patent scope
and patent examination, it is also important to validate our ICL and ICC as measures
of patent scope. We employ several statistical tests to compare these measures with
post-grant outcomes and other variables traditionally correlated with patent scope,
as shown in Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix. The tests extend validation meth-
ods used in the previous literature (Lerner 1994) by examining the associations be-
tween ICL/ICC and (1) patent maintenance; (2) forward citations; and (3) the num-
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ber of Cooperative Patent Classification subclasses (CPCs)27 to which the patent
was assigned.
We use a variant of the validation method introduced by Lerner (1994), which
analyzes the relationship between the number of 4-digit International Patent Classi-
fications (IPCs - for which we substitute CPCs) to which a patent was assigned and
(1) the number of forward citations assigned to a given patent, and (2) the incidence
of litigation. In the Appendix, we present evidence that our measures of patent
scope explain traditional scope proxies in a way consistent with Lerner. We also
discuss how our measures relate to the results from the USPTO’s Patent Litigation
and USPTO Trials: Implications for Patent Examination Quality, which examined
the relationship between the incidence of litigation and ICL and ICC at grant. Our
results show that the relationship between our measures of patent scope and the out-
come variables above is consistent with other validation tests of patent scope in the
literature. Validation regression results and further discussion are provided in the
Appendix.
Finally, we validate our our scope measure against two particular claim formats
for which the addition of words may be more likely to expand than to narrow claim
scope: claims using the connecting word “or”; and claims using so-called Markush
format that use the words “selected from.” Using the validation methods described
above and further discussed in the Appendix, we empirically tested the relationship
between our measures of scope and existing measures of scope and value from the
literature. For each claim format type, we separated our sample into two groups by
identifying patents with and without the specified claim language (“or” or “selected
from”) in any of the patent’s independent claims. We then re-ran the validation
regressions on each of the four subsets and found that the results were generally
consistent across subsets for each claim format type.28
27The CPC classification system was jointly developed by the USPTO and European Patent Of-
fice (EPO) and is similar to the IPC classification. For more information on the CPC classification
system, please visit http://www.cooperativepatentclassification.org/. The USPC classification sys-
tem is the USPTO’s classification system, where each classification is comprised of a class and
subclass. The USPTO provides a statistical mapping between USPC and CPC via web interface at
https://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/index.htm.
28Results are not included in this thesis but are available on request.
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2.5 Patent Scope and the Examination Process
Our analysis starts with two basic stylized facts, as discussed in detail in Section
2.2 and validated in Section 2.4. First, inventors (or their attorneys) seek to claim
what they think will be the broadest scope for their inventions that they may legally
obtain in light of their disclosures. Broader scope can be observed, on average,
in more independent claims and shorter independent claims. Second, on the ba-
sis of broad incoming applications, the examination process will normally (and on
balance) result in a reduction of patent scope. This will result in a reduction in in-
dependent claims and longer independent claims, where additional words impose
additional limitations (such as when a dependent claim is rolled up into the inde-
pendent claim).
The analysis in this section explores the relationships between patent exam-
ination and patent (or patent application) scope. We focus on two basic compar-
isons: (1) for applications we compare applications that are later abandoned to
those that are later granted (PGPub-abandonments versus PGPub-grants), and (2)
for publication-patent pairs, we compare the change in scope between filing and
issuance (PGPub-grants versus patent grants).
In Section 2.5.1 we examine the overall distributions of ICL and ICC. In Sec-
tion 2.5.2 we describe the time trends in ICL and ICC. Section 2.5.3 explores the re-
lationship between examination intensity and patent scope. Lastly in Section 2.5.4,
we explore differences in patent scope based on observable application characteris-
tics.
2.5.1 Abandonments and Grants
Figure 2.1 shows the kernel densities for the distributions of ICL and ICC for all
pre-grant publications and patent grants for application years 2001-2014. PGPubs
are separated based on whether they resulted in abandonments or grants (pending
applications are not shown).
From the ICL distributions in panel (a), it is notable that: (1) applications
with narrower claims at the time of publication are more likely to be granted, and
(2) granted patents are narrower in scope at the time of grant than at the time of
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(a) Independent Claim Length
(b) Independent Claim Count
Figure 2.1: Distribution of (a) ICL and (b) ICC
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publication.29 These results imply that the prosecution process leads to narrower
claims. This is also consistent with the common practice of applicants to roll up
allowed dependent claims into rejected independent claims. Further, it shows that
applicants who file broad claims are more likely to abandon those applications. Or,
put another way, applicants with narrower applications are more likely to survive
the examination process with a granted patent.
The distributional characteristics of the ICL for PGPub-grants and for patent
grants indicate that examination significantly narrows patent scope between publi-
cation and issuance. The examination process increases the mean ICL from 106
words at publication to 156 words at issuance for application years 2001-2014. Un-
fortunately, we cannot observe the distribution of ICL for abandoned applications
at the time of disposal, which would provide more insight into the effects of exam-
ination relative to the initial filing choices by applicants. Nevertheless, the overall
distribution of ICL for PGPub-abandonments has the same general shape as that for
PGPub-grants, except that abandonments have a larger mass of shorter claims. This
confirms that allowances are less frequent for applications that have broader scope,
on average.
Figure 2.1(b) shows the kernel density for ICC distributions, separated by doc-
ument type. In contrast to the ICL distributions, the ICC distributions are much
more similar to one another (although they are still significantly different from a
statistical standpoint).30 Even so, the modal ICC for PGPub-grants is three indepen-
dent claims, compared to two independent claim for PGPub-abandonments.31 The
difference in means is small: the mean ICC at PGPub-abandonment (2.99 claims)
is slightly lower than the mean ICC at PGPub-grant (3.07 claims).
The distributions for ICC suggest (contrary to what might be expected based
29A t-test confirms a difference in the means for all distributions represented in Figure 2.1(a).
Further, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov non-parametric test for the equality of distributions confirms that
all ICL distributions are different from one another at the 1% significance level. With our sample
sizes, even very small quantitative differences will be statistically significant.
30A t-test reveals that the means are statistically different from one another at the 1% level. Sim-
ilarly, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov non-parametric test for the equality of distributions reveals that the
ICC distributions differ significantly at the 1% significance level.
31The kernel density generation obscures the modes to an extent.
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on the ICL results) that abandoned applications have slightly narrower scope com-
pared to allowed applications. However, two potential explanations are possible.
First, applications that have more than one independent claim are more likely to
be able to continue prosecution if one independent claim is rejected. As a conse-
quence, relative to an application with more independent claims, an applicant with
a single independent claim may be less willing or able to continue prosecution of
the application. Second, it is possible that applications that include only one claim
may be of lower quality, in a drafting sense. For instance, pro se applicants, who
prosecute applications without an attorney or agent, may not explore all possible
ways of formulating a claim (i.e. method format, apparatus format, etc.). Regard-
less of disposal type, however, the mean number of independent claims for PGPubs
is consistent with the maximum number of allowable independent claims per patent
application (three) before incurring additional fees. In comparing granted patents
between filing and issuance, the ICC distributions again show little difference, al-
though the difference is statistically significant. Even with the small difference,
the distributions show a shift towards narrower claims at grant. Patent grants have
fewer independent claims at issuance than at publication (2.70 at the mean for patent
grants and 3.08 for PGPub-grants according to Table 2.1). This is consistent with
the results for the ICL distributions: patent applications become narrower between
filing and grant.
2.5.2 Trends in Patent Scope
The majority of patent applications are filed by experienced patent attorneys or
agents, whose ability to practice is regulated by the PTO through an admissions
examination.32 Further, market pressures incentivize these attorneys and agents to
closely follow legal developments and PTO practices. Accordingly, we expect that
applicant behaviors will be sensitive to changes in legal doctrines and examination
practices. Changes in patent scope over time also may be attributed to changes in
office initiatives and examiner behavior (e.g. increased examiner effort, incentiviza-
tion schemes, examiner training and turnover, etc.). We would therefore expect that
3237 C.F.R. §11.7.
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Figure 2.2: Mean Independent Claim Length and Independent Claim Count at Grant (1976-
2014)
increased examiner effort or an emphasis on patent quality would generally de-
crease the average patent scope over time. In contrast, an elevated threshold for the
required “inventive step” may lead to patents of greater scope, and may dissuade
the filing of applications with narrow scope.
Figure 2.2 shows the trends over time in the mean ICL and ICC for patent
grants. As expected, these trends move inversely to each other, given the negative
correlation of ICL and ICC. The trends also provide some insights into applicant
filing behavior as well as potential changes in examination practice over the past
40 years. For patent grants, we observe claims information since 1976. Published
applications can only be observed since November 2000, with the implementation
of the AIPA.33
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 compare time trends between patent applications and is-
sued patents. We compute the annual arithmetic means for three different types of
documents, similar to those of the previous section: (1) PGPubs for applications
33The American Inventor’s Protection Act of 1999, implemented November 29, 2000.
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that are later abandoned (PGPub-abandoned), (2) PGPubs for applications that are
later granted (PGP-grants), and (3) patent grants. To identify the dates across which
we compare the means, we define two comparison groups.
First, we define disposition cohorts based on the year of an application’s final
disposition, whether the disposition was by abandonment or grant. That is, we com-
pare abandoned PGPubs, granted PGPubs, and patent grants based on the year of
their final disposition. This grouping (by time of disposition) is natural for granted
PGPubs and patent grants, because the set grants will necessarily contain the set of
PGPub-grants (in addition to grants that derive from unpublished applications). For
PGPub-abandonments, we use the disposal date in order to be sure the timing of the
comparison is approximately equivalent to that of patent grants.34 The disposition
cohort analysis is presented in Figure 2.3.35
Second, we examine publication-patent pairs, which we refer to as “paired
comparisons.” This permits us to measure trends over time in the change in claim
language during prosecution, by computing annual means of ∆ICL and ∆ICC within
applications that are granted in a given year.36 Because paired comparisons provide
an indication only of the changes to ICL or ICC of a given application, we believe
that this measure is the least likely to suffer from problems of comparing technolo-
gies from different fields or with for which different linguistic descriptors are used.
The paired comparisons are presented in Figure 2.4.
A few stylized facts emerge from examining the trends in Figures 2.2 to 2.4:
1. There have been significant long-term trends in ICL and ICC over time. Fig-
ure 2.2 shows the trend in ICL and ICC, respectively, for granted patents.
There is a notable shift towards broader patents from 1984-2004, after which
there is a shift towards narrower patents (2004-2014). The trend holds for
both ICL and ICC.
34Note that abandonments generally take less time than grants, so the comparison is not perfect.
Additionally, the disposition cohorts exclude pending applications, by definition.
35It is feasible to aggregate by the application date or initial publication, rather than by date of
disposition, which may better highlight applicant filing behaviors rather than examination behaviors.
Those comparisons are not presented here for the sake of parsimony but are available on request.
36The paired comparisons are aggregated based on the date of disposal (issuance). As with cohort
comparisons, it would be feasible to aggregate by date of application or initial publication.
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(a) Independent Claim Length
(b) Independent Claim Count
Figure 2.3: Disposition Comparison - Mean (a) Independent Claim Length and (b) Inde-
pendent Claim Count by Application Status (2001-2014)
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(a) Independent Claim Length
(b) Independent Claim Count
Figure 2.4: Mean Change in (a) Independent Claim Length and (b) Independent Claim
Count From Publication to Grant (2001-2014)
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2. Granted patents are narrower in scope than PGPubs. Granted patents have
a higher ICL as measured by the disposition cohorts (Figure 2.3(a)). Figure
2.3(b) also shows that patents have a smaller ICC than PGPubs; however,
that difference has been getting smaller over the last decade as measured by
the disposition cohorts. The publication-patent pairs confirm that the scope
is narrower across both ICL and ICC for patent grants relative to their scope
at publication (Figure 2.4). However, the paired comparison shows that the
difference is increasing in ICL and is decreasing in ICC over time.
3. The scope of applications is narrower for those that are granted relative
to those that are abandoned. This observation is based primarily on ICL,
which is higher at the mean for PGPub-grants than PGPub-abandonments
(Figure 2.3(a)). It confirms what we observed for the full distribution in
Figure 2.1(a). The mean ICC of PGPub-grants is very similar to that of
PGPub-abandonments (Figure 2.3(b)). Thus, PGPub-grants are narrower than
PGPub-abandonments at the mean based on differences in ICL, with roughly
equal ICC.
Overall, the trends reinforce the thesis that the examination process reduces the
scope of granted patents and that patent application scope affects the likelihood
of grant. On average, examination adds words to the shortest independent claim
and reduces the number of independent claims. Further, the trend over the last
decade has been towards narrower patents. In particular the mean ICL for granted
patents has increased significantly since 2004. This potentially indicates that the
examination process may have become more stringent, and that applicants may
have responded in turn. In particular, the change in the observed trends begin-
ning around 2004 may correspond to various PTO examination quality initiatives
adopted following the PTO’s 2003 21st Century Strategic Plan and July 2003 leg-
islative hearings on patent quality, including expanded reviews of primary exam-
iners’ work, “second-pair-of-eyes” reviews, and quality assurance reviews.37 We
expect that more recent initiatives, including the Enhanced Patent Quality Initiative
37See 21st Century Strategic Plan (2005).
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implemented in 2015, will continue the trend. In the next section, we explore the
relationship between pendency and scope in greater detail.
2.5.3 Patent Scope and Examination Intensity
In this section we investigate the relationship between patent scope and examination
intensity, by which we mean examination pendency and the number of examiner
actions to which an application is subject. For a given invention, one might expect
examination intensity to be reduced for applications containing claims with broader
scope. Such claims are more likely to be rejected without extensive examiner search
and analysis based on claim definiteness and claim breadth doctrines,38 such as
enablement and written description. And, such claims will apply to a broader range
of prior art embodiments and be more readily found unpatentable as anticipated or
as obvious with less search effort by examiners.39
On the other hand, broader claims may require additional evaluations that
could take examiners more time, such as when having to determine whether broader
independent claims constitute patent eligible subject matter,40 particularly given
that the PTO requires that all grounds for rejection be addressed in initial office
actions (so-called “compact prosecution”).41 Further, applicants who desire to con-
tinue prosecution in order to secure a patent may require more rounds of examina-
tion in order to whittle down the scope of initially broad claims. The impact will be
exacerbated if the applicant is willing to accept multiple rounds of examination in
order to ensure that it receives the broadest possible allowable scope. Such an ap-
plicant will make only incremental changes in scope with each amendment. Thus,
whether by adding additional issues to address, or by triggering more rounds of
amendments, applications containing claims with broader scope may increase the
initial and total time in examination. On balance, we would expect the latter effect
to dominate any initial reductions in examination time, particularly for applications
38See 35 U.S.C. §112(a)&(b).
39See 35 U.S.C. §102, 103.
40See 35 U.S.C. §101.
41See, e.g., PTO, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, §2103(I), 9th ed. rev 07-2015 (“Under
the principles of compact prosecution, each claim should be reviewed for compliance with every
statutory requirement for patentability in the initial review of the application, even if one or more
claims are found to be deficient with respect to some statutory requirement.”).
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resulting in grants.
The differences in scope as measured by ICL and ICC between patented and
abandoned applications suggest that there may be differences in patent prosecution
and examination outcomes based on the scope of the incoming applications. To
investigate this we consider examination pendency, which is an issue central to ap-
plicants, to the PTO, and to Congress (Mitra-Kahn et al. 2013). For the reasons
just discussed, we would expect that pendency, or the length of patent prosecution,
would increase with an application’s scope. Ceteris paribus, a broader application
will be more likely to require more rounds of prosecution and examination before
fulfilling the requirements for allowance, leading to a longer examination process.
These differences should manifest themselves in changes to the claim language be-
tween publication and grant. We complement the pendency analysis by analyzing
the number of examination actions actually performed on the application, in order
to ensure that observed examination pendency is not simply the result of adminis-
trative or applicant delays.42 In particular, we estimate the following equation:
ln(Intensity) = β0 +β1ln(ICLPGPub)+β2ln(ICCPGPub)+β3FE + ε (2.1)
where Intensity is measured, alternately, by months of total pendency or the
number of examiner actions. The explanatory variables ICL and ICC are for PG-
Pubs, so that they represent the incoming claim scope of the patent application. The
specification also includes fixed effects for filing year, technology class, application
type, and examiner fixed effects.43 We also segment the sample by abandonments
and patent grants.
42 The results are robust to other measures of pendency, including post-first-action pendency,
which removes the queuing time before the first action by the examiner. We define examiner actions
as all examiner allowances or rejections observed in the file wrapper of an application, including non-
final rejections, final rejections, and allowances. The correlation coefficient between total pendency
and the number of actions is 0.82.
43See Section 2.5.4 for application characteristics. Technology class is defined by NBER tech-
nology classification. Application type includes indicators for new applications, those with foreign
or PCT parent applications, and those with US parent applications (provisional, CONs, CIPs, and
DIVs).
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Table 2.3: Examination intensity on the basis of incoming claim scope - Regression Results
Table 2.3 presents the results of regressing examination intensity on incoming
patent scope. As one might expect from the earlier discussion, we find a positive
and significant correlation between application scope and examination intensity, for
both patented applications (PGPub-grants) and abandoned applications (PGPub-
abandonments). That is, applications with shorter independent claims and more
independent claims tend to have longer pendency and more examiner actions. The
coefficients on the logged values of ICL and ICC can be interpreted as elasticities.
For PGPub-grants, a one percent decrease in ICL is associated with a 0.066 percent
increase in total pendency, and a one percent increase in ICC is associated with a
0.048 percent increase in total pendency. With respect to the number of actions,
the elasticities are similarly small: -0.148 for ICL and close to zero (and insignifi-
cant) for ICC (broader applications are associated with more examination actions).
More reasonable changes in ICL and ICC show larger, but still modest, effects on
examination intensity. Because the distributions of ICL and ICC are skewed, we
consider interquartile increases (from the 25th to the 75th percentile) or decreases
(from the 75th to the 25th percentile) rather than a one-standard deviation change.
An interquartile decrease in ICL (-87% at the median) is associated with a 5.8%
increase in pendency and a 12.9% increase in actions. For ICC, an interquartile
increase (67% at the median) corresponds to a 3.2% increase in pendency, and no
2.5. Patent Scope and the Examination Process 67
substantial change in actions.
The results are similar for abandonments, with a few quantitative differences.
In particular, the examination intensity for abandonments tends to be more respon-
sive to ICC and less responsive to ICL, relative to grants.
If broad patents have more intense examinations, a natural question is the ex-
tent to which the additional intensity has any mitigating effect on the resulting scope
at the time of disposal. With our data, we cannot observe claim language at the time
of abandonment. However, we can investigate the relationship between intensity
and the claims at disposal for granted patents. More precisely, we are interested in
the relationship between examination intensity and the change in scope for granted
patents. For a given invention, broader patent applications have longer pendency
and more rounds of rejections and amendments between the examiner and the ap-
plicant. We should expect those rounds of examination to lead to more significant
changes in the claims, all other things being equal.
For our publication-patent pairs, we estimate the change in patent scope as a
function of examination intensity and other control variables. More precisely, we
estimate
∆S = β0 +β1ln(Intensity)+β3FE + ε (2.2)
where the change in scope, ∆S, is measured, alternately, by the change in ICL
or ICC between publication and issuance. About 25% of applications do not have a
change in ICL between publication and grant, and over 50% do not have a change
in the number of independent claims. Nonetheless, we expect examination intensity
to affect the change in scope, and thus, the ultimate scope of the granted patent. In
the regressions Intensity is measured, alternately, by examination pendency or the
number of examination actions. The specification includes a similar set of fixed
effects that we used in the previous estimation: technology class, application type,
and examiner fixed effects, but we replace filing year fixed effects with disposal
year fixed effects to control for trends in issuance Table 2.4 shows the results of the
estimation; the four columns show all combinations of scope and intensity variables.
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Table 2.4: Change in Claim Scope on the Basis of Examination Intensity - Regression Re-
sults
In all specifications we find that greater examination intensity is associated
with more extensive narrowing of scope during prosecution. Both pendency and
the number of actions have a positive and significant correlation with ∆ICL at grant.
Pendency and the number of actions have a negative effect on ∆ICC, but only the
pendency coefficient is statistically significant. Additionally, the magnitudes of the
effects are not unsubstantial. The coefficients in Table 2.4 can be interpreted as
semi-elasticities: a 1% increase in pendency adds 0.26 words to ∆ICL and subtracts
a small fraction of a claim from ∆ICC. However, an interquartile increase in pen-
dency (63% at the median) adds 16 words to ICL and subtracts a third of a claim
from ICC during prosecution. The number of examiner actions is statistically and
economically significant for ∆ICL: an interquartile increase in actions (100% at the
median-from 1 action to 3 actions) adds 30 words to ICL during prosecution. The
number of actions is not statistically or economically significant for ∆ICC. The
marginal effects in ICL (16 and 30 words, respectively) are quantitatively important
considering that the median ∆ICL is 27 for PGPub-grants (mean 44). Similarly, the
marginal effects in ∆ICC (-0.3 and zero claims, respectively) are almost identical to
the mean and median of ∆ICC (-0.37 and zero) for PGPub-grants.
In short, we find that broader applications are subject to greater examination
intensity, and more intense examinations are associated with more significant nar-
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rowing of patent scope during prosecution, both in the length of claims and the
number of claims. We can expect this relationship to hold for any given invention,
ceteris paribus. That is, for a particular invention, broader claims on an application
should extend prosecution, and longer prosecution should narrow the claims.
Our data include all published applications, and thus surely contain hetero-
geneity in the many characteristics of the underlying inventions and applicants.
Thus, it is instructive to consider how application and patent scope vary with re-
spect to application; we do this in the next section. In general, we find the same
pattern within application characteristics as we do across the population: (1) at
publication, granted applications are narrower than abandoned applications, and (2)
granted patents are narrower than published applications. However, the effects are
more significant for particular technological fields and for particular application
types.
2.5.4 Application Characteristics
We find that different characteristics of applications can lead to statistically signif-
icant differences in measures of scope. However, the general patterns about scope
discussed above hold for all groupings: narrower applications tend to be granted,
and the prosecution process tends to narrow applications.
Table 2.5 shows the ICL and ICC for PGPub-grants and PGPub-abandonments
grouped by various characteristics, including: entity size,44 examination unit (tech-
nology center),45 NBER technology category,46 and parent application type.47 The
44Entity status is based on fee payments at the time of filing. Small and micro entities are com-
bined as a single category relative to large entities.
45There are eight technology centers (TCs) used during our period of study, including Biotechnol-
ogy and Organic Chemistry (1600), Chemical and Materials Engineering (1700), Computer Archi-
tecture, Software, and Information Security (2100), Computer Networks, Multiplex Communication,
Video Distribution, and the Security (2400), Communications (2600), Semiconductors, Electrical,
and Optical Systems and Components (2800), Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce,
Agriculture, National Security and License & Review (3600), and Mechanical Engineering, Manu-
facturing and Medical Devices/Processes (3700).
46NBER technology categories, as defined by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) and Marco et al.
(2015a) are: Chemical (1), Computers and Communications (2), Drugs and Medical (3), Electrical
and Electronics (4), Mechanical (5), and Other (6).
47Parent application type or application status relative to the parent. If there was no parent (a
first time filing), we identified the application as having “no parent” (not applicable, or USNA). For
applications having a parent application, we identified the type of such application. These were
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technology center analysis was generally similar to that for the NBER technology
categories; thus, we restrict our discussion to the technology centers. For each char-
acteristic, the ICL is higher for PGPub-grants relative to PGPub-abandonments. The
number of claims is not substantially different between PGPub-grants and PGPub-
abandonments across application characteristics, which is consistent with the ag-
gregate results in Figure 2.1(b).
Of notable interest, there are some characteristics that differ substantially from
the general means. With regard to technology, applications in biotechnology and or-
ganic chemistry (TC 1600) have the largest difference in ICL between granted appli-
cations and abandoned applications: approximately 28 words. This is driven by the
very low values for PGPub-abandonments, which are about 12-15 words below the
overall PGPub-abandonment mean of 94 (from Table 2.1). However, these applica-
tions tend to have the most independent claims at filing. Further, biotechnology and
organic chemistry is the only technology center for which PGPub-abandonments
have more claims, on average, than PGPub-grants. TC 3600 (including transporta-
tion, construction, e-commerce, and agriculture) tends to have the longest claims
(125 words for PGPub-grants and 107 words for PGPub-abandonments, relative to
the means of 111 and 94, respectively). These applications also tend to have the
fewest independent claims.
Surprisingly, small and large entities look almost identical at the mean for ICL
and ICC at publication, which may suggest that differences in funding and experi-
ence may not have dramatic effects on drafted claims (although they may have some
effect on the degree of narrowing, as discussed below). Applications with foreign
parents tend to be narrower than the average at filing, having higher ICL and lower
ICC. This may reflect differences in foreign claiming and examination practices, as
well as differences in fee structures (assuming that relatively little change is made to
divided into applications having a parent that was: a foreign application (Foreign, or FOR); a Patent
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) application (which was further subdivided by the designated office of
the parent either PCT-foreign or PCT-US); a prior US non-provisional application (and if so, the
relationship to that parent application as discussed below), or a US provisional application (US-
provisional, or US-PRO). If the application had a prior US non-provisional application as its parent,
we denoted the application’s relationship to the parent as a continuation (CON), a divisional (DIV),
or a continuation-in-part (CIP) application to a US application.
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Table 2.5: Applications at publication by application characteristics (2001-2014)
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claims when such foreign applications are “nationalized” by filing a US application
claiming foreign filing priority).48 The broadest patents at filing tend to be those
with US provisional parents, which may reflect differential attention to claiming.
Table 2.6 provides the ICL and ICC by application characteristics for
publication-patent pairs.49 By comparing claims at publication to claims at grant,
we can identify the average change in claims during patent prosecution for granted
patents. There are several interesting facts that emerge from Table 2.6. Most no-
tably, for each group claims are narrower at grant than they are at publication, in
terms of the means of ICL and ICC. We also see interesting differences between
application types.
Small and large entity applications tend to be similar at filing, but small enti-
ties experience greater narrowing of patent scope during prosecution, leading to 5
more words and 0.25 fewer claims at issue relative to large entities. Some of this
difference could be a function of relative funding or legal expertise, particularly in
knowing how to draft claims that are more likely to be accepted or less in need of
narrowing amendment. Biotech applications again stand out relative to other tech-
nology centers: they are not significantly narrowed with respect to ICL (only 11
words), but they lose an average of 1.5 independent claims during prosecution. On
the other hand, computer-related patents are more subject to increases in ICL than
to decreases in ICC.
Parent types reveal some interesting facets about application sources. Appli-
cations that claim priority to a foreign parent or PCT-foreign parent are filed with
the longest independent claims (ICL of 123 and 120 words, respectively), yet they
are among the highest with respect to changes in ICL during prosecution (an ad-
ditional 44 and 48 words, respectively). This means that the mean ICL of the re-
sulting patents is over 165 words-more than 15 words higher than the next highest
parent type. This is perhaps surprising, because foreign applications may already
have been through an examination process in the home jurisdiction, and thus may
have been “pre-narrowed” prior to filing in the U.S. The other application types
4835 U.S.C. §119.
49The publication values in Table 2.6 match those found in Table 2.5 for granted applications.
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Table 2.6: Publication-Patent Pairs (2001-2014)
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with significant narrowing during prosecution are those with no parent (“progen-
itor” applications) and those with provisional parents, adding 51 and 48 words to
ICL at the mean, respectively). Those applications tend to be filed with the broadest
claims (99 words at the mean); so, it is not surprising that they are significantly nar-
rowed during prosecution. However, it is surprising that foreign applications and
new applications are narrowed by similar amounts.
Continuations and divisionals of regular US applications had the largest ICL
at publication of all domestic parent applications (112 and 109 words, respectively)
and had the smallest increase (29.6 and 31.5 words, respectively), suggesting that
they have the narrowest incoming scope and thus need the least amount of change
in scope to achieve patentability. It is intuitive that continuations tend to be nar-
rower when filed and require fewer changes from application to grant than other
applications, because continuations tend to have gone through at least one round of
US prosecution before the continuation was filed.50
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter presents the first large-scale analysis of patent claim characteristics
and patent prosecution as they relate to patent scope. The results provide ample
evidence that simple measurements of patent scope can be usefully exploited by
researchers.
We define two document-level measurements of scope that should be useful to
researchers interested in patent value and patent quality: independent claim length
(ICL) and independent claim count (ICC). Our hypotheses that ICL is negatively
correlated with patent scope and ICC is positively correlated with patent scope are
born out in our validation exercise in Section 2.4. The validation shows that ICL
and ICC independently explain other measures of patent scope that have been used
in the literature: patent maintenance, forward citations, and the breadth of patent
classes.
Simple measurements of word counts or claim counts do not capture the many
50Technically, continuations can be filed before any substantive examination on the parent has
occurred. However, it is common practice to file them after the first action.
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complex relationships between patent claim language and the technology space that
the language circumscribes. In fact, we expect that the use of natural language
processing (NLP) techniques is likely to produce more sophisticated measurements
of patent scope, particularly for comparisons between different technology sectors.
We release the parsed claims data to enable researchers to use ICL and ICC in their
research as well as to encourage the development of new text-based measures.
In Section 2.4, we discuss technological complexity. Scholars have argued
that measures of scope may be correlated with technological complexity. In fact,
linguists and computer scientists argue that word length should be correlated with
syntactical complexity (Szmrecsányi, 2004). Interestingly, we find that the length of
the specification (in terms of page length and the number of drawings) to be uncor-
related with independent claim length and the number of independent claims. Our
contention is that the length of the specification is a better measure of complexity,
which indicates that patent scope as measured by ICL and ICC is independent from
complexity.
One of the primary benefits in using claim text to measure patent scope is the
fact that it can be separately measured for patent applications and patent grants. As
a result, ICL and ICC are particularly useful in investigating the patent examination
process because they measure claim scope at the beginning and at the end of prose-
cution. Our results show that the examination process (as would be expected) tends
to add words to the shortest independent claim and to reduce the number of inde-
pendent claims, leading to narrower overall patent scope. This result holds across
time and across a variety of application characteristics including technology, entity
size, and the type of parent application.
Further, our results show that application scope and examination intensity-in
terms of duration and the number of examiner actions-are related. First, narrower
applications tend to have shorter examination times with fewer examination actions.
Second, longer examination times and more examiner actions tend to correspond to
more significant narrowing of application claims during prosecution. Further, quan-
titatively the effects are important. These two relationships imply an endogenous
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relationship between application scope, the intensity of the examination process,
and the final patent scope. This relationship is further complicated if applicants are
strategic with respect to the breadth of incoming applications. Our regressions do
not account for this endogeneity, and we see it as an important avenue for future
research.
Strategic applicants may fight for broad claims on an otherwise incremental in-
vention if they perceive that they may be able to successfully engage in rent-seeking
on such broad claims. This behavior will depend on applicants’ perceptions about
examination quality, the costs associated with a lengthy prosecution, and the ability
to enforce broad claims in the marketplace (and the courts). In fact, strategic be-
havior on the part of applicants should lower the correlation between the inventive
step of the invention and the incoming claim scope. In this case our measured re-
lationship between scope and examination intensity may well be understated. To
understand this, consider a pioneering invention that is due broader claims. If the
application is so-written, then we should not necessarily expect the prosecution
to take longer than normal. However, in our simple correlations, we have not at-
tempted to distinguish between pioneering and incremental inventions, focusing
solely on claim word length and claim counts. This heterogeneity in invention qual-
ity will show up as noise in the resulting pendency and number of actions, lowering
the observed correlation between incoming claim scope and examination intensity.
This argument suggests avenues for future research, especially with respect to how
patent applicants respond to changes in PTO rules, as well as changes in patent fees
regarding excess claims, extra time, and Requests for Continued Examination. The
passage of the America Invents Act (AIA) in 2011 gave the PTO fee setting author-
ity effective in March 2013. We hypothesize that higher RCE fees incentivize not
only fewer actions and shorter pendency, but also narrower applications at the time
of filing, as applicants “pre-narrow” their claims prior to filing. Indeed, preliminary
results show this to be the case. We expect that applicants are sensitive to patent-
ing fees in ways that can impact overall patent examination and potentially patent
quality.
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Applicant behavior is only the demand side of the examination “market.” The
PTO should also continue to study examiner incentives, and to make available
prosecution-related data. The count system and examiner performance appraisal
(Marco et al. 2017 and Simmons 2017) largely govern examiner incentives. We
hope that our analysis will provide some guidance for future studies on patent scope
and the examination process, including both applicant and examiner behaviors.
Understanding these complex relationships requires institutional knowledge as
well as an understanding of how to model endogeneity within the patent examina-
tion process. To this end, we encourage the USPTO to continue to improve data
transparency, to improve digital data ingestion (and to use more routine data coding
during examination, including of any claim amendments and claim constructions)
in order to provide machine-readable text of the documents involved in patent pros-
ecution, and to make confidential data available through the already established
Federal Statistical Research Data Centers. These efforts will ensure that external
researchers can both expand the research frontier and validate the agency’s internal
estimates.
Our continuing research agenda includes more in-depth analysis into the exam-
ination process, as well as exploring how natural language processing techniques
can be applied to claim text. By making our data on claims widely available we
hope to stimulate more research into the usefulness of analyzing claim text in order
to understand patent scope and its relationship to examination quality and patent
quality, and the incentives that influence those relationships.
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Chapter 3
Debunking the Myth of the Rubber
Stamp Patent: Impact of Examiner’s
Amendment on Patent Office
Outcomes and the Innovation
Ecosystem
3.1 Introduction
“Low quality” patents may reduce innovation and produce other adverse economic
outcomes.1 A large portion of the patent quality literature is centered on patent
examination quality and patent office outcomes.2 Since Jaffe and Lerner (2004),
this literature has focused on high patent allowance rates at the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) as an indication of low quality patent ex-
amination (Lemley and Sampat 2008; Frakes and Wasserman 2013, 2017; Schuett
2013). Frakes and Wasserman (2013) explain high grant rates from the perspective
of USPTO financial incentives (“higher granting propensities” and “shorter wait
1See Scotchmer, 1991; Bessen and Meurer 2009; Choi 2010; Galasso and Schankerman 2015;
Sampat and Williams 2019; Choi and Gerlach 2015.
2See Alcácer et al. 2009; Cockburn et al. 2002; Cotropia et al. 2013; Frakes and Wasserman
2016a, 2016b; Kovács 2017; Langinier and Marcoul 2012, 2016; Lei and Wright 2017; Lemley
2001; Mann and Underweiser 2012; Tabakovic and Wollmann 2018; and Whalen 2018.
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times” increase user fees for the patent office), whereas Schuett (2013) sees a “bias
toward granting patents” since USPTO examiner incentives may appear to reward
production over quality.
The USPTO varies examiner incentives across seniority levels and technolo-
gies to account for the impact of experience and technological complexity on the
expected time required to examine an application. Researchers have analyzed these
differential incentives, and the resulting impact on patent examination quality (Lem-
ley and Sampat 2012; Frakes and Wasserman 2017). The patent examination pro-
cess typically allows for two rounds of review before the applicant needs to pay ad-
ditional fees to reopen prosecution but Lemley and Sampat (2012) finds that more
experienced examiners cite fewer patents as prior art and are more likely to al-
low a patent application after just one round of review. The authors interpret these
“first-action allowances” as lower quality examination, arguing that if examiners
of varying experience receive applications from the same distribution of incoming
quality, less resistance could lead to lower quality patents. With an application-level
analysis, Frakes and Wasserman (2017) finds that with the increasing production
requirements imposed by the USPTO with seniority, the quality of examination de-
creases, as measured through citations from the examiner and rejection rates. In
particular, examiners face “binding time constraints” and are unable to adjust to the
increased production requirements with increased examination efficiency. Finally,
this literature discusses policy implications. Lemley and Sampat (2012) suggests
that since “human resource policies have important effects on PTO outcomes ... the
tenure system, the count system and examiner recruitment and retention policies
should be a more prominent part of current patent reform deliberations.” Frakes
and Wasserman (2017) goes further, suggesting that if “all examiners were allo-
cated as many hours as are extended to GS-7 examiners, the Patent Office’s overall
grant rate would fall by roughly 14 percentage points, amounting to roughly 40,000
fewer patents issued per year.”
We find that this prior literature fails to account for an examiner learning mech-
anism, and therefore draws inappropriate operational and policy conclusions related
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to USPTO examination and patent quality. In particular, we find that with experi-
ence and seniority, examiners increasingly and successfully negotiate with the ap-
plicant before the first round of official review (the first-action).
The procedure is called an examiner’s amendment and is designed to expedite
the patent prosecution process. Its use is consistent with USPTO policy, as one of
the stated goals of the USPTO is to decrease patent pendency (the amount of time
between filing an application and decision) and “enhance compact patent prosecu-
tion initiatives”.3 After accounting for this examiner learning mechanism, we find
that, counter to prior literature, first-action allowance rates no longer increase with
experience, and increase only for the highest seniority level (GS-14). Further, the
increase in first-action allowance rates for GS-14 examiners is significantly reduced
from the increase in rates observed in previous studies. While our results do explain
the increase in first-action allowance rate, we find also that examination quality
does not deteriorate with the use of the examiner’s amendment. Specifically, we
find there is no significant difference in examination quality between a first-action
allowance with an examiner’s amendment and a single office action rejection that
leads to an allowance. Further, the quality of examination when using an examiner’s
amendment does not deteriorate with grade and experience.
Despite the benefits of patent protection to innovators and firms, patent grant
delay remains a significant source of uncertainty (Gans, et al. 2008). Uncertainty
reduces both investment (Dixit et al. 1994) and revenue opportunities through li-
censing (Gans et al. 2008; Hegde and Luo 2018). As literature on markets for
technology has shown, transaction costs are high in markets where property rights
are uncertain. This is particularly acute for small businesses and individual en-
trepreneurs, as “without the prospect of being able to capitalize on their innovations
by trading the property rights protecting the innovation, many small technology-
based firms would not invest in creating new and useful technologies” (Arora et al.
2004). Often higher transaction costs are due to the need to validate claimed IP
rights, which is necessary in the absence of a granted patent.
3USPTO Strategic Plan 2014-2018, https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/USPTO_2014-2018_Strategic_Plan.pdf
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Examiner’s amendments are a means to alleviate intellectual property uncer-
tainty for patent applications by providing a path to allowance without requiring
multiple rounds of examination and by expediting communication with the appli-
cant. Reducing uncertainty in the patent examination process through the use of
pendency-shortening examination mechanisms (such as the examiner’s amendment)
is likely beneficial to innovators and firms by reducing frictions in the markets for
technology. We find that the examiner’s amendment, compared to a single office
action rejection, reduces post-first-action pendency by over 50 percent.
Our results suggest refocused policy conclusions on the relationship between
USPTO examiner incentives, patent quality, and economic outcomes. In particular,
researchers and policy makers should reconsider the re-configuration of time allo-
cations for every examination seniority level (initially proposed after prior research
found evidence of increasingly “binding time constraints” with seniority and expe-
rience) for two reasons: First, the studies on which these prescriptions are based
ignore an important examiner learning mechanism, and therefore their policy pre-
scriptions are not supportable by empirical evidence. Second, increasing the amount
of time allocated to examiners may actually reduce the incentive to use examiner’s
amendments, and therefore reduce the benefits firms and innovators receive from
this pendency-reducing mechanism.4 Instead, researchers and stakeholders should
focus on the variation in outcomes between junior (GS-13 and below) and senior
examiners (GS-14), including the USPTO’s signatory program.
Our findings in part overturn prior literature, and in part open up new oppor-
tunities for study. Since examiner’s amendments explain away the effects of prior
studies, we find that the examiner’s amendment is a little studied, yet impactful
mechanism of patent prosecution. The paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2
provides an overview of first office actions at the USPTO and examiner’s amend-
ments, specifically detailing the institutional background, the content of examiner’s
4It should be noted that some applicants may prefer to extend pendency to allow the modifications
of claims in light of updated information on technological direction and value. Therefore, the benefit
of pendency does not necessarily extent to all innovators. Assuming pseudo-random allocation of
applications, however, an applicant’s willingness to delay related to a particular application should be
uncorrelated with examiner characteristics. Thank you to my Ph.D. Viva examiners for identifying
this issue.
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amendments, and the proposed examiner learning mechanisms. Section 3.3 de-
scribes the data construction process and our sample. Section 3.4 explains our iden-
tification strategy and empirical methodology and Section 3.5 describes the results.
Section 3.6 details our robustness checks and Section 3.7 describes the policy im-
plications of our analysis. Finally, Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 The First Action and Examiner’s Amendments
This section provides a description of the USPTO examination process, discusses
and provides examples of examiner’s amendments, and describes and the underly-
ing examiner learning mechanism of the paper.
3.2.1 Institutional Background
The USPTO employs patent examiners who are assigned patent examination re-
sponsibilities. The role of the patent examiner is to assess the patentability of patent
application claims as well as conform each examined application to existing rules
and regulations. The first round of the patent examination process (see Figure 1)
may result in either an allowance (“first-action allowance”), where the application
claims are deemed patentable without further revision, or in a denial of the claims
as filed.
A denial of the claims can take the form of a non-final rejection, where an
examiner may reject one or several claims, or a restriction, which identifies multiple
claimed inventions within a single patent application. If the application meets the
statutory requirements, the examiner may allow the application without a rejection.
This type of response, also referred to as a “rubber stamp” allowance, has been
studied extensively in the prior literature and constitutes the first-action allowance
utilized in Lemley and Sampat (2012).
However, there is another category of patent examination response that has not
been explored in the literature: examiner’s amendments. Examiners may identify
patentable subject matter in the patent application and discuss potential changes to
the claims with the applicant in order to render the application allowable. Any aspect
of the claims may be changed in an examiner’s amendment. From the Manual of
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Figure 3.1: First Round of Patent Examination Outcomes
Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP), “An examiner’s amendment may be used to
correct informalities in the body of the written portions of the specification as well
as all errors and omissions in the claims,” (MPEP section 1302.04). If the applicant
agrees to such changes, the examiner will draft an examiner’s amendment detailing
changes made, which is included in the notice of allowance. Examiners utilize
examiner’s amendments to effectively perform the same operations as the first office
action rejection, without requiring another round of review, and thus expediting the
process. The examiner’s amendment process is detailed in the Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure (MPEP) section 1302.04.
A review of the incentive system for USPTO examiners is essential for un-
derstanding the underlying examiner learning mechanism of this paper. Examiner
seniority levels are determined by the federal grade scale,5 and a few other relatively
rare categories of examination (for example, senior and expert examiners). These
seniority levels are assigned “position factors”, which determine how much time an
examiner is given to complete activities relative to a GS-12 in the same technology.
5Typically, the GS-levels for a patent examiner include 5, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15. Depending
on prior experience, an examiner may start at a higher GS-level.
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Specifically, the amount of time an examiner is given to examine an application
decreases with seniority level. For example, GS-12 examiners in the bridge tech-
nology area (USPC 14) are given 17.5 hours per balanced disposal (Marco, Toole,
Miller, and Frumkin 2017). Using the examiner’s expectancy formula, GS-7 and
GS-14 examiners have 27.5 and 15.46 hours, respectively, to complete a single
balance disposal, a difference of over twelve hours. Examination activities are as-
signed “counts”, and, currently, an examiner will receive 1.25 counts for a non-final
rejection, 0.75 counts for an allowance or final rejection after the initial non-final
rejection, 0.75 counts if the applicant abandons the application after the first action,
or the full 2 counts for a first-action allowance (Marco, Toole, et al. 2017). After
the first two rounds of prosecution, the application may result in an allowance, an
abandonment by the applicant, or filing of a Request for Continued Examination
(RCE). The completed round of examination (ending in either a disposal or an RCE
filing) is called a balanced disposal (BD).
Finally, we briefly describe the USPTO’s “compact prosecution” policy, de-
scribed in Section 2173 of the MPEP. According to the policy, “The goal of exam-
ination is to clearly articulate any rejection early in the prosecution process so that
the applicant has the chance to provide evidence of patentability and otherwise reply
completely at the earliest opportunity.”6 In other words, the examiner is encouraged
to provide all the grounds for rejection at the earliest opportunity. In an examiner’s
amendment, the examiner provides the grounds for rejection to the applicant before
the first action, and both parties successfully agree to modifications of the claims
to immediately bring the application to allowance on the first action. The use of an
examiner’s amendment reduces pendency by eliminating further rounds of formal
prosecution, and therefore satisfies the Office’s policy of “compact prosecution”.
3.2.2 The Content of Examiner’s Amendments
Before turning to the underlying examiner learning mechanisms of this paper, we
provide several examples of examiner’s amendments. By analyzing these exam-
iner’s amendments, we provide a deeper understanding of this understudied as-
6https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2173.html#d0e219183
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Variables N Mean St. Dev. p5 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95
∆ICC 75,098 -0.207 1.635 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0
∆ICL 75,079 21.95 59.86 -2 0 0 0 20 20 124
Cos. Sim. 75,020 0.964 0.0957 0.789 0.898 0.981 0.998 1 1 1
Table 3.1: Examiner’s Amendment Summary Statistics
pect of examination, specifically examining how examiners have used examiner’s
amendment to modify claims. We argue that the use of this examination technique is
consistent with substantive examination and should be differentiated from a “Rub-
ber Stamp” allowance. In this section, we use Term Frequency-Inverse Document
Frequency (TF-IDF) cosine similarity, a natural language processing technique, to
identify the degree of change within a patent application that is due explicitly to
the use of an examiner’s amendment. After calculating the statistics, we analyze a
sample of documents at various percentiles of the TF-IDF cosine similarity distri-
bution to contextualize the types of semantic changes that were made through this
patent examination tool. Our qualitative analysis using this method is expositional
because the degree of change within a patent document does not precisely correlate
to examination quality. However, sampling this distribution allows us to analyze the
types of changes one might see with an examiner’s amendment and the degree to
which this changes relate to patent examination quality.7
The TF-IDF cosine similarity method is becoming increasingly popular in the
innovation economics literature. The use of similarity measures in the analysis of
patent text was introduced by Kuhn and Younge (2016), and validated further in
Arts, Cassiman and Gomez (2018). Term frequency was first used in information
retrieval (Sparck 1972) as a means to compare texts; inverse document frequency
re-weights down the terms that are common across documents. Specifically, Cosine
Similarity is defined as:
7Summary statistics are provided in Table 3.1. In addition to the TF-IDF cosine similarity, we
provide additional patent examination quality measures that have been used in the literature, ∆ICC
and ∆ICL. These variables measure changes in scope that occur during patent prosecution. In
this section, we use TF-IDF cosine similarity to identify claims modifications due to an examiner’s
amendment over the scope measures because we would like to identify the changes to the all claims
and not changes to scope.
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where X ,Y are two vectors of the same dimension n and n is equal to the number
of words in the patent corpus. The vectors X and Y comprise the TF-IDF-weighted
counts of words appearing in the claims of a particular application, A, at filing (X)
and after the text has been modified through an examiner’s amendment (Y ). The
elements of each vector correspond to a weighted word count from the set of all
words that appear in the patent corpus. If a word appears in document i’s claims
(i ∈ {A,B}), the word count is weighted by the term-frequency-inverse-document-
frequency of the particular word. If the word does not appear in the document’s
claims, the value for the corresponding element is equal to zero. The combination
of term frequency and inverse document frequency is the standard method of pro-
cessing the similarity between texts (Wu et al. 2008), and is appropriate for our
purposes since we use it to identify documents with varying degrees of changes to
the application on the examiner’s amendment.
To understand how examiner’s amendments modify the claims of a patent
application, we first compute the TF-IDF between the pre-examiner amendment
claims and the allowed claims.8 We then sample the amendments from the distri-
bution of actual differences between pre-examiner amendment claims and granted
claims, or the claims that incorporate the changes from the examiner’s amendment
(TF-IDF statistic). Table 3.1 contains summary statistics for the examiner’s amend-
ment similarities. Cosine similarity, represented by TF-IDF Cos. Sim., varies be-
tween 0 and 1, where a similarity of 1 represents identical texts, and a similarity
of 0 represents no overlap. The similarity values identify the degree of change ne-
gotiated on the examiner’s amendments, and, after manual inspection, are therefore
useful in obtaining a qualitative understanding of their use. Despite this, examiner
amendment similarity values do not provide any information about the change in
8The full sample for our paper is described in the data section. Also described in the data section,
for this exercise, we identify applications with pre-grant publication before the examiners amend-
ment, and where a new claim submission was not submitted before the examiner’s amendment. This
restriction ensures that the pre-grant publication is the set of claims available to the examiner when
negotiating the examiner’s amendment.
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patent quality with the examiner’s amendment, so we chose not to use the similarity
measures for any further analysis. To understand examiner’s amendments further,
we supplement the summary statistics Table 3.1 with manual inspection of example
amendments from our sample. These examples show that examiner’s amendments
can lead to important changes in the claims, including creating new claims and
dropping other claims, removing and adding several terms which modify the scope
of the invention, and, in some cases, subtle changes such as modifying a single
word, but which greatly changes the scope of the claimed invention. We present
four examples of examiner’s amendment selected from various segments of the TF-
IDF statistic distribution and discuss how the examiner’s amendment modified the
claims and to what degree. Two examples are provided in the text, and two more
examples are in the Appendix.
The first example, application 13/077,181, has a similarity value of 0.79 taken
from the 5th percentile. The examiner’s amendment for the first independent claim
is shown in appendix figures B.3, B.4 and B.5. From the examiner’s amendment in
the notice of allowance, the examiner states the amendment was to “clarify features
and bring out additional features and distinctions of the invention in the independent
claims, to overcome prior art discovered by the Examiner in the course of examina-
tion.” For example, elements of claims 2, 3 and 15 are added to the first independent
claim, narrowing its scope. For brevity, all additional figures of examiner amend-
ments are in the appendix.
Next, the examiner’s amendment from application 13/085,015 has a similar-
ity value at the mean, of roughly 0.96. The examiner’s amendment is contained in
appendix figures B.6, B.7, B.8 and B.9. In the Examiner-Initiated Interview Sum-
mary9 published on the same day as the Notice of Allowance for this application, the
examiner states “It was agreed to alter the language of claim 1 as a formality to fur-
ther clarify the constituents required by the instant claims. It was further agreed to
allow the addition of claims to further elaborate on these particular features.” Here,
instant claims refer to the claims of application 13/085,015, rather than any other
9This document summarizes what was discussed during the telephone interview for the exam-
iner’s amendment.
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claims in prior art. For example, in claim 1, “which may include” is removed and
“selected from” is added. Even though this appears to be a simple change, and min-
imally affects the similarity value, it actually greatly narrows the scope of the claim
since before the change neither amphoteric or zwitterionic surfactants are required
to be in the invention, but afterwards one or the other must be. Additionally, the
applicant agreed to move several “preferably” limitations to new dependent claims
9 and 10, further limiting scope, as in dependent form, the “preferably” conditions
become requirements. This was done to clarify the invention in the first indepen-
dent claim,10 and all these substantive changes were made through an examiner’s
amendment rather than a lengthier rejection-response cycle.
Two additional examples are provided in the appendix. In the first appendix
example of an examiner’s amendment, all of the claims are cancelled and one new
claim is added. In the second appendix example, a single yet important term is
modified to clarify the scope of the claims.
This section used the similarity between the pre-examiner’s amendment claims
and the granted claims to discuss the use of examiner’s amendments at the USPTO.
Critically, substantive changes in the claims may come from examiner’s amend-
ments that have numerous edits, or modifications that change a single, key, word.
For this reason, the similarity measure will not be used to measure the quality of
an examiner’s amendment. The similarity values are however very useful to gain
insight into the nature of the examiner’s amendment. In the next section, we discuss
why an examiner might issue a first-action allowance with an examiner’s amend-
ment over a rejection and how this decision may be related to both grade and expe-
rience.
3.2.3 Mechanisms
This section identifies two main behavioral mechanisms that could lead to variation
in patent examination outcomes on the first action. The first mechanism is examiner
learning. As an examiner becomes more experienced, the examiner might be more
10Recall the examiner stated above, “to further clarify the constituents required in the instant
claims.”
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likely to issue an examiner’s amendment on the first action for a variety of reasons.
First, after gaining experience in both prosecuting patents and acquiring significant
knowledge of her technical domain, the examiner might be able to quickly iden-
tify eligible subject matter in the patent claims, or the specification more broadly.
Second, through repeated interaction with applicants, a more experienced exam-
iner may have higher negotiating ability. Third, a more experienced examiner may
be more likely to have the confidence necessary to avoid the full patent prosecu-
tion process and negotiate an examiner’s amendment on the first action to expedite
prosecution. These explanations lead to the first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. Examiners are increasingly likely to issue examiner’s amendments
on the first office action with experience.
The second mechanism through which examiners might issue more examiner’s
amendments on the first office action relates to examiner incentives. Recall from
the institutional background section that examiners are given less time to prosecute
patent applications at higher seniority levels. Successfully negotiating an exam-
iner’s amendment before the first action significantly reduces the amount of time to
prosecute an application. This leads to the second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. Examiners with higher seniority levels are more likely to issue an
examiner’s amendment on the first office action.
If you recall, the previous literature uses allowance rates, and in particular, first-
action allowance rates to examine the impact of examiner incentives on patent qual-
ity. For example, Lemley and Sampat (2012) find that first-action allowance rates
increase with experience, and suggest this relationship is consistent with lower qual-
ity examination. The prior literature misclassified first-action allowances with an
examiner’s amendment as “rubber stamp” allowances without substantive examina-
tion. However, the use of an examiner’s amendment demonstrates both substantive
examination and learning. Because of this, we define a true rubber stamp allowance
to be a first action allowance without an examiner’s amendment. If learning rates are
properly aligned (i.e. learning increases are commensurate with increased produc-
tion requirements), then we should not see an increase in the true “rubber stamp”
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allowance rate with either grade or experience. If this is true, then increased first-
action allowance rates are indicative of examiner learning, rather than low quality
examination. This leads to the next hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3. If examiner learning rates are properly aligned, then the “true rub-
ber stamp” first-action allowance rates should increase neither with experience nor
seniority.
The final hypotheses relates to pendency, and describes the channel through
which innovators and firms benefit through the use of examiner’s amendments at
the USPTO. At the first-action decision, an examiner can choose to issue a non-final
rejection or attempt to negotiate with the applicant. Ceteris paribus, the use of an
examiner’s amendment at this juncture should lead to shorter pendency, benefiting
the applicant.
Hypothesis 4. Patent applicants achieve lower pendency through the use of exam-
iner’s amendments relative to an office-action rejection.
The remainder of this paper attempts to empirically identify these mechanisms
in USPTO patent examination data. Additionally, we explore the implication of
examiner’s amendments for the literature that assumes increasing first-action al-
lowance rates in grade and experience results in a reduction of patent quality. Fi-
nally, we examine the impact of examiner’s amendments on pendency.
3.3 Data
The sample, summary statistics for which are shown in Table 3.2, is comprised
of 4.64 million public patent applications filed at the USPTO with a first action
completed between 2001 and 2017. These data were made publicly available in a
bulk downloadable format by the USPTO’s Office of Chief Economist (OCE) in the
Patent Examination dataset, called PatEx (Graham, Marco, and Miller 2018). The
application data includes overall prosecution outcome, filing and disposal dates,
anonymized USPTO examiner identification numbers, U.S. patent classification
(USPC), technology center (TC), and other patent application characteristics. In
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addition to the application data, PatEx includes a history of all patent office events
(both by the applicant and the USPTO) for each application from filing to disposal,
disposal type, and expiration date (if expired). The transaction history includes a
list of all USPTO office actions, including rejections, notice of allowances, restric-
tions, and Quayle actions.11 We assume that the examiner’s first action is the first
instance of a non-final rejection, final rejection, notice of allowance, restriction or
Quayle action in the PatEx transaction history. Additionally, occurrence and date
of examiner’s amendments are obtained from the PatEx transactions data, identified
using the transaction code “Ex.a”.
Variables N Mean St. Dev. p25 p50 p75
FA allow 4.642e+06 0.0883 0.284 0 0 0
RS allow 4.642e+06 0.0649 0.246 0 0 0
Bal. Sample Ind. 4.642e+06 0.282 0.450 0 0 1
Exam Amend 4.642e+06 0.0234 0.151 0 0 0
Exper 4.642e+06 97.51 71.72 39 83 143
ICC 4.642e+06 2.876 3.221 2 3 3
ICL 4.641e+06 108.6 104.2 58 90 135
3-year 4.642e+06 0.600 0.490 0 1 1
USPC Special. 4.612e+06 73.78 60.57 34 62 97
Avg. Cos. Sim. 4.276e+06 0.0713 0.0386 0.0471 0.0619 0.0865
Var. Cos. Sim. 4.276e+06 0.00838 0.00881 0.00431 0.00665 0.00982
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
Examiner promotion and grade data at first action were taken from inter-
nal USPTO databases, and observations with examiner GS-levels 5 and 15 were
dropped from the sample (due to infrequency).12 Examiner experience was calcu-
lated using the examiner promotion data by measuring the length of time, in months,
between the first action and the examiner’s start date. Additionally, we only kept
applications where the examiner was assigned to a technology center at the time
11The MPEP states that, “Under the decision in Ex parte Quayle, 25 USPQ 74, 1935 C.D. 11; 453
O.G. 213 (Commr Pat. 1935), after all claims in an application have been allowed the prosecution
of the application on the merits is closed even though there may be outstanding formal objections
which preclude fully closing the prosecution,” (MPEP 714.14).
12In a small number of cases, two examiners were assigned to a particular application at the data
of first action, where application was transferred and re-docketed to another examiner on the first-
action date. In these cases, we assume that the examiner to whom the application had been assigned
completed the first action. Please see Figure 3.2 for the GS-level distribution at first action.
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of first action, excluding the Patent Training Academy (TC 4100). This restriction
drops applications where examiners are on a detail (on loan to a unit where they
perform non-examiner duties), and those examiners prosecuting applications on a
part-time basis since they have different incentives.
To control for additional application-level heterogeneity, we include scope and
parent type variables in our sample. According to Marco et al. (2016),13 patent
scope can be measured simultaneously by the length of the shortest independent
claim (ICL) and the independent claim count (ICC). These scope measures can
be calculated both at publication and at grant14 and are computed from the text
of the pre-grant publication (PGPub) and issued patents provided by USPTO.15 To
determine the type of parent application, we combine two variables (foreign priority
and parent type) from the PatEx data to create a modified parent type variable (see
Figure 3.2). From this variable, we can differentiate by type of parent application
(Patent Cooperation Treaty, continuation, continuation-in-part, or divisional) and
whether an application had been filed previously within another jurisdiction.
We construct two sets of examiner specialization measures used in robustness
checks, both of which are computed at the examiner and year level. The first is the
number of technology (USPC) subclasses on first actions submitted by an examiner
in the previous year. The second set includes the average and variance of TF-IDF
cosine similarity between pairs of claims from first actions submitted by the exam-
iner in the previous year. When using the similarity measure of specialization, we
also control for the standard error of the mean similarity.
In our robustness checks, we use two text-based variables to assess changes
13Kuhn and Thompson (2017), forthcoming in the International Journal of Business and Eco-
nomics, measures patent scope by the length of the first independent claim instead of the shortest.
Although both methods capture patent scope, we prefer the Marco et al. (2017) measures because
they are already computed and available both publicly (through 2014) and internally (through the
present) at the USPTO.
14The USPTO’s Office of Chief Economist parsed the PGPub and patent text and calculated the
measures. Data through 2014 are available publicly on the USPTO’s Office of the Chief Economist
website. We also utilized a yet-to-be-released USPTO data product that contains the updated mea-
sures through the end of 2017 because the publicly-available patent scope data only contains the
measures through 2014.





Figure 3.2: Distribution of (a) GS-Level and (b) Parent Type at First Action
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in patent claim scope. Specifically, we use the change in independent claim count,
and the change in shortest independent claim length between the PGPub claims and
the granted patent claims. Marco et al. (2016) show that these variables capture
patent scope, and that patent claims narrow during the course of patent prosecution.
Because of this direct link between patent scope and patent quality, we use the
change in scope variables to proxy for the quality of examination, conditional on
incoming scope.
3.4 Empirical Methodology
We first run the following patent application-level empirical specification:
FA Alloweit = β0 +β1Experi +β2ICLi +β3ICCi +β4Parenti + γt + γe + γg + εeit
(3.2)
where FA Alloweit = 1 if the application was allowed on the first action (with or
without an examiner’s amendment), and FA Allowi = 0 if the application was re-
jected on the first action.16 γt are first-action year fixed effects, γe are examiner
fixed effects, and γg are examiner grade at first-action fixed effects, relative to GS-9.
We include claim scope measures at PGPub (ICLi and ICCi), application parent type
(Parenti), and examiner experience (Experi) in months at the application first-action
date. Additionally, when noted we include a technology fixed effect γu. The first
set of regressions aim to demonstrate consistency between our approach and prior
research on patent examination, GS-level, and experience. Specifically, we verify
the positive relationship between the first-action allowance rate and both examiner
grade and experience (Lemley and Sampat 2012; Frakes and Wasserman 2017).
Our models closely resemble those used in the literature, but deviate from Frakes
and Wasserman (2017) in the choice of dependent variable (overall allowance ver-
16The FA allow variable is equivalent to the “Rubber Stamp” allowance from Lemley and Sampat
(2012). The “True Rubber Stamp” allowance, defined in this paper, incorporates the spirit of the orig-
inal “Rubber Stamp” allowance definition, i.e., a first-action allowance without substantive examina-
tion. The updated allowance variable groups first-action allowances with an examiner’s amendment
with first-action rejections as both outcomes represent substantive examination. An alternative ap-
proach would implement a multinomial logit framework where we could separate the three outcomes
and estimate a single model. That framework could distinguish between the grade/experience effects
associated with each outcome type. Thank you to my Ph.D. Viva examiners for this suggestion.
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sus first-action allowance). The reasoning behind this change is discussed in detail
during the identification section below.
Exam Amendeit = β0+β1Experi+β2ICLi+β3ICCi+β4Parenti+γt +γe+γg+εeit
(3.3)
The second set of regressions explores the relationship between examiner grade
and experience, and the likelihood of an examiner’s amendment. In equation
(3.3), the dependent variable, Exam Amendi, is equal to one if the examiner is-
sued an examiner’s amendment on the first action (only available for allowances),
Exam Amendi = 0 otherwise. The independent variables are the same as in equa-
tion (3.2) above. The purpose is to assess the degree to which the likelihood of an
examiner’s amendment at first-action varies with grade and experience. An increas-
ing rate of examiner’s amendment on the first action with experience would validate
hypothesis 1, while an increasing rate of examiner’s amendment on the first action
with grade would validate hypothesis 2.
We run an additional specification, replacing first-action allowance rate,
FA Allowi with the “true rubber stamp” allowance rate, RS Allowi. For this re-
gression, we define RS Allowi = 1 if the application was allowed on the first action
without an examiner’s amendment, and RS Allowi = 0 if the application was either
allowed with an examiner’s amendment, or rejected. The purpose is to examine
how grade and experience impact the probability that an application is a “true rub-
ber stamp” allowance. We are interested in the degree to which examiner’s amend-
ments influence the correlation between first-action allowance rate and examiner
grade/experience described in the literature. If learning rates are properly aligned
with increases in production requirements (i.e., 1 and 2 hold), then the correlation
between grade/experience and the “true rubber stamp” allowance rate should be
insignificant. The regression is specified in the following specification:
RS Alloweit = β0 +β1Experi +β2ICLi +β3ICCi +β4Parenti + γt + γe + γg + εeit
(3.4)
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For each of the regressions, we subset the data in several ways. First, we run
the regression on the entire sample. Second, we limit the applications to only new
applications. By new, we only consider new regular utility applications (no contin-
uations or continuations in part) without a foreign priority filed at the USPTO. The
purpose of examining this subset is to exclude applications with any prior exami-
nation. If an application has a foreign priority or U.S. parent application, it may
have been examined in a foreign jurisdiction or through the USPTO. Applicants
may modify the set of incoming claims in a subsequent and related patent appli-
cation after the initial round of prosecution, which can affect the allowance rate.
Typically, though not always, a continuation will be assigned to the same exam-
iner that prosecuted the parent application, so it is not surprising that continuations
make up a higher percentage of a higher grade examiner’s docket relative to the
docket of a junior examiner. Without excluding these applications, our regressions
could be susceptible to bias if examiners with varying grade and/or experience were
deferentially likely to receive these types of applications.
Finally, we restrict our sample to applications with an examiner less than three
years removed from her most recent promotion at the time of first action.17 In some
cases, examiners will forego or delay promotion and stay at a lower grade for an
extended amount of time. For example, some examiners stay at GS-12 for several
years but were eligible for promotion after one year at GS-12. The examination
behavior after an examiner delays or foregoes a promotion may be qualitatively
different from those on the promotion path. Therefore, subsetting our sample to
first-action decisions within three years of the most recent promotion allows us to
examine any differences between examiners on and off the standard promotion path.
3.4.1 Identification Strategy
Our identification strategy is based on the pseudo-random assignment of patent ap-
plications to examiners within art units at the USPTO. Researchers have used the
pseudo-random assignment of patent applications to address research questions re-
lated to the patent system (Lemley and Sampat 2012; Frakes and Wasserman 2017;
17These restricted samples correspond to columns (3) and (4) of Tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5
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Williams 2013; Farre-Mensa, Hegde, and Ljungqvist 2017). This research design is
validated through discussions with patent examiners (Lemley and Sampat 2012) and
empirical research (Righi and Simcoe 2019) suggesting that patent applications are
generally pseudo-randomly assigned within USPTO art unit by technology groups.
However, Righi and Simcoe (2019) also find evidence that more specialized ex-
aminers have lower grant rates. We argue that non-random assignment based on
examiner technological specialization could be absorbed by the examiner and tech-
nology fixed effects. As a robustness check, we add measures to proxy for examiner
specialization directly in Section 3.6.
As noted by Lemley and Sampat (2012), any non-random assignment corre-
lated with grade/experience and patent quality would be problematic for identifi-
cation, but this is unsupported by both the literature on random assignment and
interviews with examiners (Lemley and Sampat 2012). Additionally, office policy
effects on grant rates are absorbed in the year fixed effects (Frakes and Wasserman
2013, 2014). Since examiner cohorts (Frakes and Wasserman 2016a) and initial
ability might impact prosecution behavior, we note that the examiner fixed effects
control for both starting grade and starting cohort since neither vary within exam-
iner. We also note that our micro-level data allows us to identify both the GS-level
and experience of the examiner at first action simultaneously. Experience and grade
do not increase in lockstep because starting grades and time to promotion for each
grade vary across examiners.
Consistent with Lemley and Sampat (2012), we analyze examination behav-
ior at the first-action decision. Our reasoning for this choice is twofold: First, the
first-action decision allows us to isolate an examiner’s decision from the influence
of subsequent applicant behavior. Second, grade estimates in allowance rate re-
gressions may suffer from unobserved variable bias due to the varying timing of
application disposals based on application quality in relation to promotion dates.
For the overall allowance rate, the allowance decision depends on both exam-
iner negotiating ability and applicant behavior (the persistence of applicants after
rejections, the willingness of applicants to narrow the claims to meet patentability
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requirements, etc.), which increases the complexity of identifying examiner behav-
ior. The first-action decision does not suffer from this weakness. We demonstrate
in Section 3.5 that first-action allowance rates are increasing in grade and expe-
rience, which is consistent with the results of Lemley and Sampat (2012). Once
the examination process has begun, the examiner conducts the first round of sub-
stantive examination and typically does not interact with the applicant prior to the
first-action decision.18 Therefore, the influence of the applicant on the first-action
decision, other than through the quality of the incoming patent application, is lim-
ited. By isolating examiner behavior at the first action, we allow for the cleanest
look at examination behavior.19
Even under the pseudo-random assignment assumption, examiner grade and
patent quality may be correlated, leading to omitted variable bias. Under the as-
sumptions of random assignment, the quality of an incoming application should not
be correlated with grade but the quality of existing applications on an examiners
docket may become correlated with grade as the examiner climbs the GS scale. For
example, take the set of randomly assigned applications docketed to a new exam-
iner. Only a fraction of these applications will be disposed before the examiner’s
next promotion.20 Applications that are disposed before the next promotion date
18An applicant and examiner may interact in some ways prior to first-action decisions, but these
actions are limited. For example, an applicant or examiner may request an interview prior to first
action or the examiner may contact the applicant for an examiner’s amendment.
19Applicants are typically unaware of the identify of the examiner until after the first action, with
some exceptions including examiner’s amendments. This structure limits the ability of applicants to
influence the first-action decision. However, recent work by Tabakovic and Wollmann (2017) sug-
gests that some applicants and examiner’s may collude, leading to preferential treatment of certain
applicants in exchange for later employment opportunities. This study does not determine the timing
of the influence, i.e., at what point of examination does collusion contaminate the process. If appli-
cant influence extends to first-action decisions (i.e., examiner’s become more lenient with repeated
actions), then this bias might reflect the results. An examiner may identify the law firm/applicant
and be predisposed to grant the application after repeated interactions. This omitted variable would
be positively correlated with both the allowance decision and grade/experience, leading to an up-
ward bias of our results. This bias would only strengthen the counterevidence to existing results on
patent examination and patent quality. Repeated interactions could be the driving force behind the
use of examiner’s amendments, changing only the mechanism, not the general results. It should be
noted, However, that Tabakovic and Wollmann (2017) does not provide any evidence nor indicate
that collusion begins before first action. Our methodology only considers first-action decisions, so
if collusion occurs after the first action, then the point is moot. Therefore, we assume that collusion
would occur after the first action.
20Average total pendency for an application in our sample is just under three years for all applica-
tions and 3.4 years for a new U.S. application (non-continuation) but an examiner can be promoted
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may exist in the extremes of the patent application quality distribution, i.e. very
low- and high-quality applications. The quality of these applications (disposed) rel-
ative to the remaining docketed applications assigned at the previous GS-level is
ambiguous. This ambiguity prevents us from determining the direction of the po-
tential bias. Therefore, we mitigate this endogeneity problem by concentrating on
the first-action allowance decision.
Finally, we note that the promotion path for examiners within the USPTO is
standardized, based on performance metrics, and, once an examiner is hired, does
not depend on the availability of positions at the next GS-level. An examiner may
advance from their starting grade to GS-14 based on satisfying production and qual-
ity requirements among other training and certifications. To advance to GS-13,
an examiner must pass the certification examination and, to advance to GS-14, an
examiner must pass the signatory authority program. These promotions are well
regimented but production and quality requirements may be correlated with unob-
served examiner characteristics. Therefore, we control for examiner-level, first-
action year, and TC-by-year fixed effects (the last of which is presented in the Ro-
bustness Checks section).
3.5 Results
3.5.1 First-action Allowance Rates
In this section, we first demonstrate that our analysis is consistent with the prior
literature on USPTO patent examination quality. Table 3.3 shows that the probabil-
ity of a first-action allowance is increasing in GS-level and experience (labeled as
Exper), which is consistent with the literature (Lemley and Sampat 2012; Frakes
and Wasserman 2017). This result is robust to a number of different specifications,
including sub-setting the sample to include only new applications without a foreign
priority or U.S. parent application. Even in the case of new applications, the first-
action allowance rate is increasing in the GS-level. Columns (2) and (4) in Tables
3.3 to 3.5 represent our preferred regressions. Column (2) limits the sample to only
from GS−7 to GS−12 in only a little more than two years.
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new applications and column (4) limits the applications to only those within a three-
year window of the examiner’s most recent promotion. By excluding first-action
decisions occurring more than three years after promotion, the column (4) regres-
sions mitigate the issue of behavioral changes by examiners who have plateaued at
a certain grade.21 In column (4), we dropped any application outside of a 3-year
window after an examiner’s most recent promotion. In this case as well, GS-level
exhibits a positive and statistically significant relationship with the probability of
first-action allowance.
Notice the coefficients in Table 3.3 that are very low for grades GS-7 to GS-
11. Despite this, first-action allowance is a relatively rare event so the effect is
much larger as a percentage of overall first-action allowance rates. The experience
coefficient is small in magnitude, but recall that experience is measured in months,
therefore the variable has a relatively large effect. In particular, with the point es-
timate in column 4, an additional year of experience leads to a 0.19 percentage
point increase in the first-action allowance rate. Broader incoming claims (smaller
ICL and larger ICC) are associated with a lower chance of receiving a first-action
allowance. This result is intuitive, because, as the count of independent claims in-
creases, the complexity of the examination and the likelihood that at least one aspect
of the patent will overlap with prior art increases.
3.5.2 Examiner’s Amendment Rates
We delve further into the usage of examiner’s amendments by studying the relation-
ship between the incidence of an examiner’s amendment and experience/grade. In
Table 3.4, we find that the probability of a first-action examiner’s amendment is in-
creasing in both grade and experience. Column (4) demonstrates that the probability
of a first-action allowance with an examiner’s amendment is increasing from GS-9
through GS-14, providing further evidence that higher grade examiners are more
likely to use this tool to prosecute patent applications. From column (4), relative to
a GS-9 examiner, the probability of an examiner’s amendment associated with a first
21Column (3) limits the sample to applications with a first-action decision less than three years
after promotion but includes all types of applications and is included only for completeness.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES All New Apps 3-year New Apps/3-year
Grade: GS-7 -0.00641*** -0.00183* -0.00577*** -0.00215**
(0.000897) (0.00107) (0.000945) (0.00109)
Grade: GS-11 0.00687*** 0.00313*** 0.00586*** 0.00366***
(0.000789) (0.00101) (0.000874) (0.00105)
Grade: GS-12 0.0129*** 0.00277** 0.0103*** 0.00406***
(0.00106) (0.00137) (0.00141) (0.00157)
Grade: GS-13 0.0188*** 0.00498*** 0.0158*** 0.00780***
(0.00138) (0.00177) (0.00197) (0.00226)
Grade: GS-14 0.0567*** 0.0376*** 0.0436*** 0.0328***
(0.00208) (0.00269) (0.00297) (0.00326)
Exper 0.000178*** 0.000189** 0.000251*** 0.000161*
(4.45e-05) (7.59e-05) (5.85e-05) (8.56e-05)
ICC -0.00134** -0.00201*** -0.00139*** -0.00114***
(0.000613) (0.000214) (0.000243) (0.000145)
ICL 0.000360*** 0.000638*** 0.000344*** 0.000534***
(3.38e-05) (1.53e-05) (3.92e-05) (1.35e-05)
Constant 0.0508*** -0.0531*** 0.0312*** -0.0485***
(0.00552) (0.00400) (0.00673) (0.00588)
Observations 4,647,312 1,036,155 2,786,385 677,632
R-squared 0.029 0.041 0.032 0.038
Examiners 13,765 13,499 12,989 12,683
Parent Type FE YES NO YES NO
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions include first-action year and
examiner fixed effects. GS-level coefficients are relative to GS-9. Columns (1) and (3) include
parent type fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by examiner and are reported
in parentheses. Column (1) contains all applications in Public Pair with an observed first-
action decision between 2001 and 2017. Column (2) includes only new applications without a
priority. Column (3) includes applications where the first-action decision occurred within the
first 3 years of promotion to the examiner’s current grade. Column (4) includes the intersection
of the samples used in Columns (2) and (3). Regressions in this table correspond to equation
3.2.
Table 3.3: First-action Allowance Regressions (Dependent Variable: FA Alloweit)
action is 0.27, 0.42, 0.7 and 1.4 percentage points higher for GS-11, GS-12, GS-13
and GS-14 examiners, respectively. This confirms hypothesis 2, that because of ex-
aminer incentives, examiners increasingly use examiner’s amendments with higher
seniority levels. Additionally, the coefficient on experience is positive and statisti-
cally significant in all regressions. For example, with the point estimate in column
(4), each additional year leads to a 0.16 percentage point increase in the probability
of using an examiner’s amendment on the first action. This verifies hypothesis 1,
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES All New Apps 3-year New Apps/3-year
Grade: GS-7 -0.00122*** -0.000186 -0.00107** -0.000105
(0.000467) (0.000600) (0.000492) (0.000628)
Grade: GS-11 0.00330*** 0.00287*** 0.00288*** 0.00273***
(0.000427) (0.000579) (0.000465) (0.000622)
Grade: GS-12 0.00600*** 0.00428*** 0.00494*** 0.00419***
(0.000552) (0.000734) (0.000730) (0.000891)
Grade: GS-13 0.0101*** 0.00726*** 0.00866*** 0.00740***
(0.000706) (0.000883) (0.00100) (0.00126)
Grade: GS-14 0.0162*** 0.0136*** 0.0143*** 0.0141***
(0.00106) (0.00132) (0.00149) (0.00185)
Exper 0.000198*** 0.000149*** 0.000181*** 0.000137***
(2.43e-05) (4.33e-05) (3.22e-05) (4.94e-05)
ICC -0.000228*** -8.44e-05 -0.000186*** 6.98e-05
(8.00e-05) (5.63e-05) (6.39e-05) (6.46e-05)
ICL 8.74e-05*** 0.000161*** 9.57e-05*** 0.000153***
(8.28e-06) (5.01e-06) (1.10e-05) (5.38e-06)
Constant -0.0123*** -0.0169*** -0.00159 -0.00674**
(0.00153) (0.00134) (0.00244) (0.00271)
Observations 4,640,782 1,031,126 2,783,587 675,470
R-squared 0.008 0.011 0.010 0.011
Examiners 13,764 13,498 12,988 12,682
Parent Type FE YES NO YES NO
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions include first-action year and exam-
iner fixed effects. GS-level coefficients are relative to GS-9. Columns (1) and (3) include parent
type fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by examiner and are reported in paren-
theses. Column (1) contains all applications in Public Pair with an observed first-action decision
between 2001 and 2017. Column (2) includes only new applications without a priority. Column
(3) includes applications where the first-action decision occurred within the first 3 years of pro-
motion to the examiner’s current grade. Column (4) includes the intersection of the samples used
in Columns (2) and (3). Regressions in this table correspond to equation 3.3.
Table 3.4: Examiner Amendment Regressions (Dependent Variable: Exam Amendeit)
that ceteris paribus, more experienced examiners are more likely to use examiner’s
amendments. As for the magnitudes of these estimates, as you recall, examiners
only use examiner’s amendments on first-action allowances, which are a relatively
rare event. Because of this, the marginal increase in examiner’s amendment rates
with grade and experience are a far larger percentage of first-action allowances.
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3.5.3 “True Rubber Stamp” Allowances
Recall hypothesis 3 about the relationship between examiner experience and senior-
ity and first-action allowance rates. Since examiners increasingly use examiner’s
amendments on the first action, we expect the difference in first-action allowance
rates across grade and experience to diminish after accounting for the examiner’s
amendment. To assess this hypothesis, we explore the probability of issuing a “true
rubber stamp” allowance (see equation (3.4)). Table 3.5 shows these results. In
Columns (2) and (4), the significance of examiner grade disappears for all but GS-7
and GS-14, and completely disappears for experience. From column (4) in Table
3.3, GS-14 examiners are 3.28 percentage points more likely to issue a first-action
allowance, but from column (4) in Table 3.5, GS-14 examiners are only 1.95 per-
centage points more likely to issue the application without any changes. These
results demonstrate that even when the outcome variable accurately represents the
“True Rubber Stamp” allowance, GS-14 examiners are more likely to allow applica-
tions without substantive examination compared to GS-9 examiners. The magnitude
of this coefficient, reduced by 40.5 percent compared the results in Table 3.3, can
attributed to the use of examiner’s amendments. Although the GS-7 first-action al-
lowance rate without an examiner’s amendment is negative and significant relative
to a GS-9 examiner, we show in the robustness checks section that this result is not
robust. Despite this result, it’s reasonable that very new examiners are less likely to
issue first-action allowances without any change to the claims. For this reason, and
the overall lack of robustness, we do not emphasize these GS-7 results.
These results generally verify hypothesis 3 since the “true rubber stamp” al-
lowance rate only increases for GS-14 examiners. Table 3.5 demonstrates that the
earlier results from the literature (Lemley and Sampat 2012) are generally over-
turned, by taking the learning mechanism (examiner’s amendment) into account.
Additionally, these results show that, at least at the first action, examiners exhibit
learning behavior and adjust to the increased production requirements through more
efficient prosecution and not “true rubber stamp” allowances.
There are several possible explanations for the increased “true rubber stamp”
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES All New Apps 3-year New Apps/3-year
Grade: GS-7 -0.00523*** -0.00174** -0.00475*** -0.00215**
(0.000721) (0.000849) (0.000750) (0.000856)
Grade: GS-11 0.00358*** 0.000479 0.00303*** 0.00121
(0.000619) (0.000806) (0.000668) (0.000830)
Grade: GS-12 0.00693*** -0.00109 0.00545*** 0.000395
(0.000859) (0.00109) (0.00108) (0.00121)
Grade: GS-13 0.00866*** -0.00214 0.00726*** 0.000864
(0.00117) (0.00150) (0.00156) (0.00172)
Grade: GS-14 0.0405*** 0.0243*** 0.0295*** 0.0195***
(0.00181) (0.00219) (0.00235) (0.00251)
Exper -2.22e-05 2.68e-05 6.51e-05 6.53e-06
(3.86e-05) (6.52e-05) (4.73e-05) (7.17e-05)
ICC -0.00111** -0.00192*** -0.00120*** -0.00121***
(0.000541) (0.000194) (0.000186) (0.000120)
ICL 0.000273*** 0.000479*** 0.000249*** 0.000381***
(2.57e-05) (1.22e-05) (2.84e-05) (1.06e-05)
Constant 0.0633*** -0.0346*** 0.0331*** -0.0401***
(0.00465) (0.00338) (0.00532) (0.00500)
Observations 4,647,312 1,036,155 2,786,385 677,632
R-squared 0.023 0.031 0.023 0.027
Examiners 13,765 13,499 12,989 12,683
Parent Type FE YES NO YES NO
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions include first-action year and
examiner fixed effects. GS-level coefficients are relative to GS-9. Columns (1) and (3) include
parent type fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by examiner and are reported
in parentheses. Column (1) contains all applications in Public Pair with an observed first-
action decision between 2001 and 2017. Column (2) includes only new applications without a
priority. Column (3) includes applications where the first-action decision occurred within the
first 3 years of promotion to the examiner’s current grade. Column (4) includes the intersection
of the samples used in Columns (2) and (3). Regressions in this table correspond to equation
3.4.
Table 3.5: “True Rubber Stamp” Allowance (Dependent Variable: RS Alloweit)
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grant rate for GS-14 examiners relative to GS-9 (although far less severe than the
overall first action allowance rate). The difference could be driven by examination
time incentives, as described in earlier literature (Frakes and Wasserman 2017),
although this is not the only possibility. In particular, the USPTO signatory program
or risk aversion could also drive this result. We discuss this further in the policy
discussion section below.
Finally, increased use of examiner’s amendments and generally flat “true rub-
ber stamp” allowance rates across grade and experience further suggest that time
constraints are not necessarily binding at the first action (Frakes and Wasserman
2017), although our results may not extend to the full examination process. We
argue that our models better capture the quality of examination as it relates to al-
lowance. Specifically, we focus solely on the examiner’s behavior at the first action
and eliminate endogeneity due to unobserved applicant behavior after the first ac-
tion. As a consequence however, we cannot extend our results directly to the entire
examination process.
3.6 Robustness Checks
3.6.1 General Robustness Checks
We include general several robustness checks to the examiner amendment and true
rubber stamp allowance regressions, many of which are similar to those run in
Frakes and Wasserman (2017). First, to eliminate the possibility that examiner
sorting is driving the results, we run specifications that include technology-by-year
(technology center), United States Patent Classification (USPC) fixed effects22 and
several proxies for examiner specialization. The technology-by-year fixed effects
account for examiners who switch technology centers, and allow also for the tech-
nology effect to change over time. The USPC fixed effects regressions account for
technology at a more dis-aggregated level. Second, we subset the data to include
only first-action decisions for examiners who begin at GS-7, and are GS-14 by the
22Frakes and Wasserman (2017) use NBER categories (37 groups) for technology-by-year fixed
effects. We use technology center (7 groups) because the NBER concordance relies upon USPC,
which is only publicly available through 2014.
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end of our sample. Running each regression on this subset accounts for possible
selection due to examiners that start at a higher grade, leave the USPTO before be-
coming GS-14, or decide to not be promoted at some point within the grade scale.
Finally, we further explore the contribution of experience by running specifications
that include experience fixed effects (at the month level), and 6 month experience
bands. The purpose of these regressions is to examine any non-linearity between
experience and the probability of issuing an examiners amendment. The regres-
sion results are contained in Tables B.1 and B.2, where the dependent variables are
the probability of receiving an examiner’s amendment and the probability of allow-
ing the application without any changes to the application in Tables B.1 and B.2,
respectively.
Table B.1 shows that after accounting for these additional factors, the exam-
iner’s amendment rate increases with both grade and experience. For the “balanced
sample”, we note that there is a loss of statistical significance for the GS-11, GS-
12, and experience coefficient. Whereas the experience coefficient is insignificant
in this regression at the 5 percent level, it is still significant at the 10 percent level
(p-value not shown). A possible explanation for this loss of significance is the
large decrease in the number of observations due to enforcing the balanced panel
restriction for this table.23 Columns (3) and (4) from Tables B.1 and B.2 allow for
non-linearities in the examiner experience variable. Figure 3.3 shows that the linear
and increasing contribution of experience to the probability of issuing an examiner’s
amendment holds when we allow for more flexibility in the experience variable (in
particular, by allowing a different experience effect for each month of experience).
Table B.2 further verifies the results on the probability of issuing a “true rubber
stamp” allowance. In particular, the results are even stronger since with the addi-
tional robustness checks, the only grade that affects the probability of issuing an
allowance without any change to the application is GS-14.24
Finally, the results from Tables B.3 to B.8 of the appendix further confirm that
23By balanced panel, we follow Frakes and Wasserman (2017) to mean that the sample consists
only of examiners experiencing all of the grades.
24With the earlier specifications, GS-7 was slightly, but significantly, less likely than GS-9 to issue
a first-action allowance without any change to the application
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our results are robust to quasi-random assignment based on technological special-
ization. In particular, the results do not change after controlling for both the USPC
sub-class and similarity measures of examiner specialization. Interestingly, consis-
tent with Righi and Simcoe (2019) and with additional examiner characteristics not
included in that study, we find that more specialized examiners have lower first-
action allowance rates. Overall, the robustness checks confirm the results of our
analysis.
Figure 3.3: Examiner Amendment Experience Fixed Effects
3.6.2 Examiner’s Amendment and Examination Quality
In this subsection, we examine the impact of the use of an examiner’s amendment
on patent examination quality. While we have previously shown that the propensity
to use an examiner’s amendment generally accounts for the disparity in allowance
rates by grade and experience, it is unknown how this learning mechanism affects
the quality of examination. For example, suppose an examiner issues a first-action
allowance with an examiner’s amendment on an application. In the process, the
examiner’s amendment modifies the quality of the application by some observable
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and quantifiable amount, ∆q.25 Now suppose that the examiner had issued a non-
final rejection on the same application instead of allowing the application with an
examiner’s amendment. The applicant modifies the claims to be allowable in re-
sponse to the rejection, increasing the quality of the application to ∆q′. If ∆q > ∆q′,
then the learning mechanism leads to both higher quality examination and shortened
pendency. If ∆q ≈ ∆q′, then the examination quality is the same but the applicant
enjoys the benefits of shortened pendency and the examiner was able to obtain the
full production counts with fewer hours. Finally, If ∆q < ∆q′ then the examiner is
sacrificing examination quality for expediency, potentially leading to lower patent
quality. In this section, we explore how the decision to allow a patent with an ex-
aminer’s amendment affects the relative quality of examination. Specifically, we
test for differences in examination quality between those applications allowed af-
ter a first-action allowance and those applications that required only one non-final
rejection before allowance.
Since patent prosecution generally narrows the claims (Marco et al. 2016),
we use the change in patent scope during prosecution to analyze one component of
patent examination quality. According to Marco et al. (2016), changes in patent
scope can be measured by the difference between the scope measure (ICL or ICC)
at two successive points in time (∆ICL or ∆ICC).26 Using ∆Scope as a dependent
variable allows us to estimate the relative change in scope due explicitly to an ex-
aminer’s amendment, where ∆Scope is measured as the simple difference between
the patent scope measures (ICL and ICC) at grant and at PGPub. In particular, we
estimate the following specification
∆Scopeeit = β0+β1Experi+β2ICLi+β3ICCi+β4Parenti+νExam Amendi+γt +γe+γg+εeit
(3.5)
where ∆Scopeeit is either ∆ICLeit or ∆ICCeit , e indicates the examiner, t is the first-
25Where ∆q is equal to the difference in patent quality over patent prosecution.
26In Marco et al. (2016), the authors analyzed the change in patent scope over the entirety of
patent prosecution, or, in other words, from filing to grant.
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action year, g indicates the USPC and the remaining variables are described above.
We restrict the underlying sample only to those granted patents with a first-action
examiner’s amendment and those applications receiving a single non-final rejection
followed by an allowance decision. Because of this sample restriction, we are care-
ful to interpret our estimates only for incoming applications similar to those in the
selected sample. In particular, our sample does not contain high-quality incoming
applications that were allowed on the first action (without an examiner’s amend-
ment), nor very low incoming quality applications that required multiple rounds
of review before either being granted, or ultimately abandoned. Despite this, the
restricted sample is not overly limiting since we are interested in the patent qual-
ity trade-off between first-action examiner’s amendments, and longer prosecution
through the non-final rejection to allowance examination route.
The examiner’s decision to use a first-action examiner’s amendment rather than
more traditional patent prosecution is likely positively correlated with incoming
patent quality, leading to omitted variable bias. Therefore, we utilize two additional
empirical approaches to overcome this issue. The first is directly controlling for in-
coming patent scope by including the PGPub ICL and ICC. Despite this, additional
components of incoming patent quality may reside in the error term. To account
for this, we turn to an instrumental variables framework. In particular, we use the
examiners leave-one-out first-action examiner’s amendment rate to instrument for
the examiner’s first-action decision on the current application. In particular, for
each application i examined by examiner e, we compute the fraction of examiner
e’s earlier first-action decisions that resulted in a first-action examiner’s amendment
relative to the total number of first-action decisions that resulted in a first-action
examiner’s amendment or non-final rejection to allowance (that is, relative to all ex-
aminer e′s earlier first-action decisions in the sample). This IV approach is similar
to the leave-one-out examiner grant rate utilized in the literature (Farre-Mensa et al.
2017, Sampat and Williams 2019). As before, to control for examiner technological
specialization (Righi and Simcoe 2019), we use examiner and USPC fixed effects,
along with our direct measures of examiner specialization discussed earlier.
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Finally, we first consider applications with first-action examiner’s amendments
where the pre-grant publication (PGPub) directly precedes the examiner’s amend-
ment, without a claim amendment submitted between the PGPub and examiner’s
amendment. This ensures that the examiner used the PGPub text when considering
the examiner’s amendment. After issuing an examiner’s amendment an allowing
the application, the claim changes resulting from the examiner’s amendment are
published in the patent’s claims. Therefore, we compute the text measures on the
PGPub and grant text for only those applications where the examiner’s amendment
satisfies this condition. This is also the sample we used earlier to compute the TF-
IDF similarity values. As a robustness check, we run additional regressions that
include all examiner’s amendments and the results are consistent between the two
samples.
The regression results are shown in Tables B.9 through B.12 in the appendix.
To isolate the effect of an examiner’s amendment, observations with applicant
amendments after pre-grant publication were dropped for the set of regression re-
sults in Tables B.9 and B.10. Tables B.11 and B.12 include the set of all first-
action allowances with an examiner’s amendment and allowances with a single
non-final rejection. In Table B.9, we first regress ∆ICL on a binary indicator, where
Exam Amend takes value one if the application was allowed on the first action with
an examiner’s amendment and zero if the application was allowed after a single
non-final rejection, and a set of controls. We repeat this regression in column (3) but
only include applications without a parent (i.e. U.S. new applications). In columns
(1) and (3) we find that the use of an examiner’s amendment is associated with 15
fewer words added to the shortest independent claim from filing to grant compared
to those applications with a single non-final rejection. However, as noted above, it
is likely that the examiner’s amendment decision is endogenous. Therefore, we turn
to the instrumental variables regressions in columns (2) and (4).
Instrumenting for examiner’s amendment using 2SLS, the leave-one-out ex-
aminer’s amendment rate for each examiner should be correlated with the first-
action decision but uncorrelated with the quality of the examined application. The
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F-statistic for the first stage (results not shown) is above 45 for column (1) and
13.13 for column (2), satisfying the F-statistic cutoff of 10 for weak instruments
suggested in Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002). The IV estimates are insignificant
but much less precise than the OLS estimates. Following the interpretation of in-
significant IV estimates in Sampat and Williams (2019), we rule out relative de-
creases in scope narrowing (scope narrowing is increasing in ∆ICL) of greater than
7.45 to 10.4 words compared to a single non-final rejection. The results in Table
B.10 are similar. The IV estimates are insignificant, ruling out relative decreases
in scope narrowing (scope narrowing is decreasing in ∆ICC) greater than .258 to
.345 claims. These IV estimates demonstrate that examination quality, to the ex-
tent described above, is not significantly different between issuing an examiner’s
amendment and extending examination to a single non-final rejection. Therefore, to
a certain extent, examination quality is unaffected by the decision to issue an exam-
iner’s amendment. Finally, these results are robust to the inclusion of applications
that had been modified by the applicant after publication.
3.6.3 Examiner’s Amendment Quality By Grade and Experi-
ence
While our main results demonstrate that the likelihood of an examiner’s amend-
ment is increasing, and the previous robustness check shows that patent quality
doesn’t generally deteriorate with the use of examiner’s amendments, we have not
directly explored variation in examiner’s amendment quality across examiner grade
and experience. This distinction is importance since a deterioration in examiner
amendment quality across grade and experience (given that examiner’s amendment
rates increase in these variables) would likely indicate that examiner learning rates
are not properly aligned with examiner incentives.
In this section, we investigate whether more experienced examiners or examin-
ers with different seniority incentives show any variation in their tendency to narrow
claims with first-action examiner’s amendments. To test this relationship, we run
the specification in equation (3.2), where we replace the dependent variable with
∆Scope. Decreases in narrowing by grade/experience demonstrates that the quality
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of examination through the issuance of an examiner’s amendment is also decreas-
ing in grade/experience. This deterioration in examiner’s amendment quality, along
with increased use of examiner’s amendments would likely indicate that patent of-
fice examiner incentives are not properly aligned with the actual rate of examiner
learning. We run the regression on the subset of first action examiner’s amendments
where the PGPub directly precedes the examiner’s amendment. As described ear-
lier, this ensures that the examiner used the PGPub when negotiating the examiner’s
amendment.
The results are shown in Tables B.13 (∆ICL) and B.14 (∆ICC). First, in both
tables, broader patent claims are narrowed by examiner’s amendments.27 Table
B.13 shows that neither grade nor experience have a significant effect on the change
in the number of independent claims modified by an examiner’s amendment, across
all specifications. The same holds for ∆ICC in Table B.14. Although the results
do not prove there is no effect, since an insignificant result does not prove there is
no relationship, we find the results are suggestive that the substance of examiner’s
amendments across both grade and experience is largely the same. These results
demonstrate that examiner amendment quality does not deteriorate with experience
or seniority. As described in more detail earlier, any deterioration would have sug-
gested that patent office incentives are not properly aligned with the actual rate of
examiner learning. Additionally, as expected, larger incoming scope is generally




While our analysis focuses on the relationship between examination quality and the
use of examiner’s amendments, examiner’s amendments provide additional ben-
27In particular, more incoming independent claims lead to a greater reduction in independent
claims on examiner’s amendments, and a shorter minimum independent claim word count leads to a
smaller reduction in minimum independent claim word count. These results are always statistically
significant.
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efits to the applicant in the form of compact prosecution, shorter pendency, and
longer effective patent term. To quantify these benefits, we estimate the effect of
a first-action examiner’s amendment on post-first-action pendency. The empirical
specification for this regression is:
ln(PENDeit)= β0+β1Experi+β2ICLi+β3ICCi+β4Parenti+νExam Amend+γt +γe+γg+εeit
(3.6)
where PENDeit is defined to be post-first-action pendency (issue month - month of
first action) and the covariates are similar to those defined for the previous set of re-
gressions. For these regressions, the sample is the same as the examination quality
regressions described in Section 3.6, where we compare first-action allowances with
an examiner’s amendments to allowances with a single non-final rejection. Simi-
larly to the examination quality regressions in Section 3.6, the unobserved quality
of the application will be correlated with both the decision to issue a first-action
allowance with an examiner’s amendment and the length of prosecution, leading
to omitted variable bias. Therefore, we again instrument for the examiner’s amend-
ment decision by using the leave-one-out examiner’s amendment rate. In addition to
the full sample, we also run models on the sub-sample restricted to granted patents
with no parent application (i.e., U.S. new applications).
The results are shown in Table B.15. In specifications with a logged depen-
dent variable and a dummy independent variable, one cannot interpret the coef-
ficient on the dummy variable as the percentage change. To obtain the percentage
change in pendency from a single rejection to a first-action allowance with an exam-
iner’s amendment, one must transform the coefficient using the following formula:
100∗(eβ−1). We find that relative to those granted patents that received at least one
office action rejection, a first-action allowance with an examiner’s amendment de-
creases pendency by more than 50 percent, confirming Hypothesis 4. Interestingly,
the results are consistent across method (OLS and IV) and sample (full sample and
U.S. new applications).
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Our results demonstrate that increased examiner’s amendment use, ceteris
paribus, leads to shorter pendency without sacrificing examination quality. The
literature on pendency and firm outcomes provide evidence that the reduction in
pendency could benefit both innovators and firms in several ways. For example,
decreased patent grant delays will hasten the resolution of (some of the) uncer-
tainty regarding granted patent scope and intellectual property rights conferred to
assignees (Gans et al. 2008). This reduction of uncertainty should in turn mitigate
frictions related to technology transfer.
3.7.2 Patent Office Policy
In recent years, the USPTO has received considerable criticism from academia,
journalists, practitioners, and policy-makers over the impact of examiner incentives
on patent quality, and related economic outcomes. In 2016, the GAO concluded
that the “USPTO has not fully assessed the effects of the time allotted for appli-
cation examinations or monetary incentives for examiners on patent quality.” Fur-
ther, based upon survey evidence, the GAO estimated that 70 percent of examiners
do not have enough time to thoroughly examine patent applications (GAO 2016).
Frakes and Wasserman (2017) go further, suggesting that if “all examiners were al-
located as many hours as are extended to GS-7 examiners, the Patent Office’s overall
grant rate would fall by roughly 14 percentage points, amounting to roughly 40,000
fewer patents issued per year.” Utilizing estimates in their earlier work, Frakes and
Wasserman (2019) perform a cost-benefit analysis, and find that doubling examina-
tion time would increase the social welfare of the patent system.
The debate over examiner incentives, patent quality and economic outcomes
has several dimensions. First, as discussed in this chapter, patent examiners face
different incentives based on seniority and complexity of the technology being ex-
amined. If these incentives across examiners are improperly aligned with learning
rates and the variance in complexity across technology, then average patent qual-
ity will likely vary across examiners. A related, yet different question, is whether
society would be better off spending additional resources on patent examination.
The fundamental trade-off here is between ex ante screening and ex post screening
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(Lemley 2001). Ex ante screening refers to screening patents before grant, while
ex post screening refers to screening patents for validity after grant in the litigation
system. Lemley (2001) argues with a cost-benefit analysis that since patent value
is highly skewed (Pakes, 1986), society is better off spending additional resources
screening valuable patents ex post, rather than screening all patents ex ante in the
patent examination system. Using a similar method, and estimates from Frakes
and Wasserman (2017), Frakes and Wasserman (2019) comes to the opposite con-
clusion. In particular, doubling the amount of time provided to examiners would
increase the welfare of the patent system.
Our results primarily contribute to the first question, although indirectly con-
tribute to answering the second question. First, previous literature suggests that ex-
aminer incentives are improperly aligned with learning rates based upon seniority
and experience. These authors suggest that improperly aligned examiner incentives
contribute to the “crisis in patent quality” (Frakes and Wasserman 2017). Addition-
ally, they suggest that examiner incentives should be re-aligned, and in particular,
more senior examiners should be given relatively more time. This solution would
be very costly. As Frakes and Wasserman (2019) notes, doubling the amount of
examination time provided to examiners would cost 800 million dollars a year.
Our results suggest a different view. After accounting for several features of
the data, and misconceptions about patent prosecution, we find that examiner time
incentives are generally not misaligned with examiner learning rates. In particular,
the variation in examination outcomes disappears for experience and every seniority
level except for GS-14. Despite the remaining gap for GS-14 examiners, the dif-
ference is significantly less than previous studies. Therefore, any policy response
should be restricted to GS-14 examiners. To determine the appropriate response
however, more research is needed.
In addition to receiving less time to examine patent applications, GS-14 ex-
aminers also receive full signatory authority. This allows them to sign off on their
own cases. We can think of three reasons why GS-14 examiners might allow more
applications on the first action. First, as studied in previous literature, the time
3.8. Conclusions 117
adjustment for GS-14 may be particularly steep. Second, GS-14 examiners may
become more lenient with less oversight provided by the full signatory program.
Third, without signatory authority, risk averse junior examiners might allow too
few applications on the first action. This could be the case since an examiner does
not generally get another look at allowed applications, or if the repercussions for al-
lowing an invalid patent are particularly severe. The precise mechanism driving the
variation in GS-14 first-action allowance rates will determine the policy response,
which we leave for further research. Our results provide counterevidence to studies
advocating that examiner incentives should be modified across all seniority levels.
Further, if based on prior literature, examiners may have less of an incentive to
utilize the pendency-reducing examiner’s amendment mechanism. As noted, the
use of examiner’s amendments may reduce pendency by approximately 50 percent,
and therefore innovators and firms may face longer pendency on average through a
modification of examiner incentives for all seniority levels.
3.8 Conclusions
We identify a new outcome measure to the patent examination literature, specifi-
cally, the use of examiner’s amendments. Examiner’s amendments are used in lieu
of an office action rejecting claims by providing a set of changes to the applicant
which will, either by restricting or by clarifying the claims, place the patent appli-
cation on a path to a notice of allowance. We employ natural language processing
techniques as well as an internal USPTO dataset on examiner promotions and expe-
riences to revisit prior literature suggesting that promotion and experience are both
associated with lower patent quality. We find that by accounting for examiner’s
amendments, the results are mostly overturned. Therefore, far from being a rubber
stamp, we find that more experienced examiners provide more value to the patent
system by more quickly tailoring otherwise un-allowable applications into patented
inventions. This behavior is encouraged by the Office’s emphasis on compact pros-
ecution, and reduces uncertainty in patent grant delay; the latter of which increases
efficiency in the markets for technology (Gans et al. 2008; Hegde and Luo 2018).
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We find that higher grade examiners, or examiners with more stringent incen-
tives, are more likely to use examiner’s amendments. Further, conditional on incen-
tives, examiners with more experience are more likely to use examiner’s amend-
ments. These results suggest that examiners both use examiner’s amendments
through increased learning about patent prosecution, and through USPTO exami-
nation incentives. Additionally, we do not find significant differences in the quality
of examination between the examiner’s amendment, and the use of office action
rejections. These results, coupled with the USPTO’s emphasis on compact prose-
cution imply that the examiner’s amendment is an effective tool to expedite patent
prosecution, increasingly used by the patent examination core with both experience
and grade. In particular, we find that use of the examiner’s amendment may reduce
pendency by over 50 percent.
While this study investigated the effects of examiner’s amendments on patent
allowability and found that more seasoned examiners and examiners with more
stringent incentives utilize examiner’s amendments as a tool to enable inventions
to more quickly obtain patent rights, the overall impact of USPTO examination on
patent quality, and economic outcomes need to be further explored. Our paper pro-
vided counter evidence to the previous literature which contends that examination
incentives are misaligned across examiners. Our results suggest that the proposed
policy advocating for increased time allocations across all grades to align examiner
incentives (because of increasingly “binding time constraints”) should be recon-
sidered. Before modifying existing policies, researchers and stakeholders should
further explore the variation in outcomes between junior (GS-13 and below) and
senior examiners (GS-14) and the impacts of the signatory program, examiner risk
aversion, and variation in time allocations. Finally, we note that our research does
not disprove the notion that overall changes in examination time across the board
may lead to greater efficiency in the patent system, which may be a fruitful avenue
for further research.
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Chapter 4
Patent Validity and Follow-on
Patenting: Evidence From Ex Parte
Reexamination at the USPTO
4.1 Introduction
As the number of patents granted at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
has skyrocketed over the last three decades, the issuance of low-quality patents has
become a growing concern (FTC 2003; Hall and Harhoff 2004, Hall et al. 2004).
Low-quality patents, typically granted with overly broad scope or questionable va-
lidity, cause reduced innovative activity by firms, market failures, and sub-optimal
economic outcomes, including limited competition and increased costs (FTC 2003;
Hall et al. 2004; Galasso and Schankerman, 2015a, 2015b). Low-quality patents
lead to economic inefficiencies in the following ways: first, low-quality patents
lead directly to greater uncertainty regarding the validity and scope of the prop-
erty rights, leading to underinvestment in new technologies and a diminished rate
of innovation, especially in cumulative technologies. Second, the increase of the
low-quality patents is associated with fragmentation of ownership and the creation
of patent thickets. Increased fragmentation can also lead to ex ante contracting
failures through an increase in transaction costs for licensing agreements (Ziedo-
nis 2004), resulting in lower innovative activity (Cockburn et al. 2010). Finally,
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within patent thickets, firms with weaker patent portfolios face increased costs of
production because they cannot adequately insulate themselves from potential in-
fringement lawsuits from competitors. These higher expected litigation costs can
cause firms with weaker patent portfolios to exit the market, effectively erecting
barriers to entry. The exit of these firms is coupled with decreased entry from in-
creased barriers to entry (UKIPO 2013).
The USPTO has adopted a number of initiatives, including the introduction
of the “Enhanced Patent Quality Initiative”, to address the issue of low-quality
patents. These initiatives focus on patent examination (work quality, patent qual-
ity measurements, and customer service),1 increasing the quality at each stage of
the patent prosecution process and providing accurate measurements to evaluate the
USPTO’s progress. While these quality initiatives aim to improve the quality of
granted patents going forward, several procedural avenues are also available to in-
validate erroneously-granted patents ex post, including reexamination (ex parte and
inter partes), post-grant review, inter partes review, and the U.S. federal court sys-
tem. Patent litigation in the U.S. court system is costly; in 2013, the median cost
of a “low-stake” case (less than $1 million at risk) reached $700,000 and the me-
dian cost “high-stakes” case (greater than $25 million at risk) exceeded $5.5 million
(AIPLA 2013; Vishnubhakat et, al. 2016). The other methods to invalidate a patent
are housed within the USPTO and are less expensive than invalidation through lit-
igation, but vary procedurally. In this paper, I focus on ex parte reexamination,
which essentially re-opens prosecution at the USPTO between the assignee and a
specialized reexamination unit. Section 4.3.2 provides a thorough discussion of this
process.
The discussion on patent quality also extends to the strength of the intellectual
property right afforded to each granted patent. Until the last decade or so, there was
little empirical research on the effect of intellectual property rights on follow-on in-
novation and patenting. Several recent papers though have investigated the effects
of intellectual property rights on follow-on innovation, including Gaessler et al.
1https://www.uspto.gov/patent/EPQI-complete
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(2017), Galasso and Schankerman (2015a, 2015b, 2018), Moser and Voena (2012),
Murray and Stern (2007), Sampat and Williams (2019). These papers explore how
the existence or varying degrees of patent protection may affect follow-on inno-
vation, positively or negatively. Notably, three papers (Galasso and Schankerman
2015a, 2015b; Gaessler et al. 2017) study how the revocation of patent rights, or
patent invalidation, can lead to both increases and decreases to follow-on innovation
(measured principally in forward citations to a focal patent) in certain contexts. In
each of these papers, the authors compare a set of invalidated patents, from the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Galasso and Schankerman 2015a, 2015b)
and post-grant oppositions at the European Patent Office (Gaessler et al. 2017), to
a set of patents that survived each respective process. These papers aim to measure
the effects of invalidation but I argue in this paper that the estimated invalidation
effect from the aforementioned papers captures both an invalidation effect and a
separate validation effect, i.e., the effect of validation on follow-on innovation.
This paper aims to disentangle the validation and invalidation effects and di-
rectly estimate the effect of validation on follow-on patenting. I concentrate on
follow-on patenting rather than follow-on innovation because firms do not always
patent to appropriate returns to R&D. In fact, studies have shown that firms also
patent for strategic purposes in certain technology areas (Cohen et al. 2000; Hall
and Ziedonis 2001). Section 4.4 presents mechanisms for changes in follow-on
patenting behavior by both the assignee and rivals in response to validation. Fol-
lowing patent validation, the assignee may increase its follow-on patenting due to
lower costs of innovative activity or decrease its follow-on patenting because of
lower expected competition. The considerations for rivals are similarly ambiguous.
The validation effect for them is ambiguous because validation should theoretically
raise innovation costs, lowering innovative activity (and thus patenting). However,
the validation should also raise the expected litigation costs for the rival, induc-
ing an increase in strategic patenting. A more thorough discussion of the possible
mechanisms is provided in Section 4.4.
Utilizing the ex parte reexamination process, this paper estimates the effect of
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validation on follow-on patenting. First I collect a set of patents that were reex-
amined and confirmed through ex parte reexamination between 1999 and 2010. I
then match 702 validated patents to a corresponding set of non-reexamined patents,
where the control group has similar observable patent and technology character-
istics, went through the same initial prosecution process, but did not receive the
additional scrutiny of the reexamination process. To reduce selection bias, the reex-
amined patents are matched to the patent corpus on patent value, technology, scope,
and other patent characteristics and the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT)
is estimated. To calculate the ATT, I control for time-invariant, patent-level, un-
observed heterogeneity by implementing a variant of the difference-in-differences
matching estimation (DiD-matching) strategy (Heckman et al. 1997). While DiD-
matching mitigates some portion of the potential selection bias, the identification
for the DiD-matching estimator is violated if the pre-treatment conditional paral-
lel trends between the treatment and control groups diverge, among other assump-
tions. Therefore, prior to estimating the ATT, each relevant assumption is discussed
(Chabé-Ferret and Subervie 2013, and Wooldridge 2010) and tested (when appli-
cable). Most notably, I find that the parallel trends assumption is violated when
implementing a standard difference-in-differences framework with the entire sam-
ple, but is satisfied after the matching procedure (see Appendix).
The DID-matching results show that validation increases overall follow-on
patenting and generally increases follow-on patenting for both the patent assignee
and rivals, but this result depends on the characteristics of technology (complex
versus discrete). This paper, to the best of my knowledge, is the first to empirically
indicate the direct effects of validity confirmation through ex parte reexamination
(or any other post-issue review proceeding) on follow-on patenting. The results fur-
ther demonstrate that while confirmation of the focal patent may increase follow-on
innovative activity by the assignee, it also encourages increased strategic patenting
by rivals, which may be sub-optimal. Further research should explore the efficiency
and optimality of these proceedings relative to other means of increasing patent
quality, including increased fees (de Rassenfosse and Jaffe 2018), higher quality
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examination (Frakes and Wasserman 2019), among other alternatives.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 presents a literature
review on patent rights and both follow-on innovation and patenting. Section 4.3
provides a brief description of patent prosecution and the reexamination process at
the USPTO. Section 4.4 provides theoretical considerations for how an increase in
the probability of patent validity modifies follow-on patenting behavior. Section
4.5 describes the data and presents summary statistics. Section 4.6 describes the
estimation strategy and Section 4.7 discusses results and robustness checks. Section
4.8 concludes.
4.2 Literature Review
A number of recent papers have delved into the relationship between follow-on in-
novation or research and both the existence and strength of intellectual property
rights. Murray and Stern (2007) examines how the issuance of patent rights for
patents linked to academic papers leads to a modest anti-commons effect, or the
reduction in expected journal citations for the related academic research. Sampat
and Williams (2019) investigates how patents rights affects follow-on innovation in
human genome research, comparing follow-on scientific research and investment
activity in genomes with and without patent protection. The paper concludes that,
although the patented genomes are more valuable prior to granting decisions, there
is no significant patent rights effect on follow-on innovation. Moser (2013) provides
an excellent literature review of the effects of patent rights on innovation from a his-
torical context. Zobel et al. (2016) analyzes the link between patenting by entrants
and subsequent open innovation relationships. The paper argues that an entrant’s
accumulation of patents both protects its innovative activity and signals innovative
capability to potential collaborators, leading to more open innovation relationships.
Finally, Moser and Voena (2012) exploits weakened patent laws under the Trading
with the Enemy Act of 1917 (40 Stat. 411) which granted compulsory licenses to
firms after World War I. The issuance of compulsory licenses led to a twenty percent
increase in “domestic innovation”, or the number of patents granted by the USPTO
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within a U.S. Patent Classification subclass in a given year.
Several papers have been written on the relationship between revocation of
patent rights, or “invalidation”, and follow-on innovation, measured principally
by follow-on patenting (Galasso and Schankerman, 2015a, 2015b; Gaessler et al.
2017). Galasso and Schankerman (2015a) analyzes a set of nearly 1,400 patent va-
lidity decisions at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) and
estimates the effect of invalidation on the number of forward citations within five
years of the validity decision for each relevant patent. To address the endogeneity
of the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator for the invalidation dummy variable,
the authors construct a “propensity to invalidate” index for the set of CAFC judges
randomly assigned to each case. The index, the paper argues, is correlated with
the validity decision, but uncorrelated with unobserved characteristics affecting the
dependent variable. The main result of Galasso and Schankerman (2015a) suggests
that patent invalidation leads to a fifty percent increase in forward citations to the
invalidated patent, but the effect is heterogeneous and depends on the bargaining
environment. Gaessler et al. (2017) utilizes a large dataset of “opposed” European
Patent Office (EPO) patents granted between 1993 and 2011. The authors construct
an instrument from the participation of the “opposed” patent’s examiner at grant in
the post-grant opposition proceedings. The main results in Gaessler et al. (2017)
are consistent with the main findings of Galasso and Schankerman (2015a): patent
invalidation leads to more total and external citations. However, the Gaessler et al.
(2017) results differ from Galasso and Schankerman (2015a) in invalidation effects
in discrete versus complex technologies, in the presence of patent thickets, and in
other environments. Finally, Galasso and Schankerman (2015b) builds on their pre-
vious work (Galasso and Schankerman 2015a) and finds that the invalidation effect
is driven by smaller firms in specific technologies but the patenting rate for larger
firms is mostly unaffected.
These papers (Galasso and Schankerman, 2015a, 2015b; Gaessler et al. 2017)
compare the set of invalidated patents to a set of “validated” patents (validated by
either the CAFC or in post-grant opposition proceedings). In the ideal economic
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experiment (which is obviously infeasible), one would study the effects of invali-
dation on follow-on innovation by first taking a random sample of granted patents
from the patent corpus. Then the patent rights would be removed randomly from
a subset of the sample, allowing the claimed invention to enter the public domain.
One could then compare the forward citation rates between patents with intact in-
tellectual property rights and patents whose rights had been invalidated. The papers
discussed above deviate from this setting. In these papers (Galasso and Schanker-
man, 2015a, 2015b; Gaessler et al. 2017), the estimates of the invalidation effect
capture two effects: the invalidation effect from the revocation of patents rights, but
also the validation effect which affects the comparison group, or “validated” patents.
The use of this comparison group prevents proper estimation of the invalidation ef-
fect. Lemley and Shapiro (2005) argues that patents are probabilistic in nature and
do not necessarily guarantee the right to exclude a potential competitor from using
or producing a protected invention; Rather, assignees are granted the right to try and
exclude potential competitors from the patented technology space. If one accepts
the premise of probabilistic patents (Lemley and Shapiro 2005), validation signals
to both the patent owner and potential competitors that the patent is enforceable
(although it does not guarantee a ruling of infringement if a competitor enters the
technology space). This signaling effect would be more pronounced in patents with
a lower probability of validity compared to more “certain” patent rights. Further
discussion of how this validation effect might affect follow-on patenting decisions
by the patent holder and rivals is presented in detail in Section 4.4.
4.3 Institutional Background
4.3.1 Patent Examination and Patent Quality
Once an application is submitted to the USPTO by the applicant, the office will
docket the application to an examiner skilled in the relevant art. The examiner then
begins to review or prosecute the application. The prosecution process is complex
but the examiner typically begins the process by determining if the patent contains
a single invention, performing a double patenting search, searching and evaluating
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existing literature or “prior art”, and, depending on the outcome of the previously
mentioned tasks, drafting either a rejection or allowance.2 Unless the examiner
determines that the patent application does not meet the standards described in 35
USC 101 (patentability), 35 USC 102 (novelty), 35 USC 103 (obviousness), and 35
USC 112, the assignee is entitled to an allowance. However, if the examiner believes
that the standards have not been met, she will typically issue a non-final rejection.
At this point, the applicant has multiple options to respond. In the simple case, the
assignee will modify the metes and bounds of the claimed invention (patent claims)
in an attempt to overcome the examiner’s non-final rejection. The examiner will
then evaluate the new set of claims and determine if the standards have now been
met. If allowed and subsequently issued, the patent rights are held by the assignee
and are transferable. The typical patent term is 20 years beginning with the priority
date3 but may be adjusted because of office or regulatory delays.4
The examiner is time-constrained in prosecuting each patent. Marco et al.
(2017) provides an example for a GS-125 level examiner examining in U.S. Patent
Classification class 14, bridges. This type of examiner has just 17.5 hours to reach
a balanced disposal of the application (please see Marco et al. (2017), for a thor-
ough description of balanced disposals). Within this time, the examiner must per-
form all initial checks (double patenting search, verification of single invention,
etc.), research all relevant prior art, including both patent and non-patent literature
(i.e., academic publications, existing products, etc.), and draft up to two office ac-
tions6 before reaching a balanced disposal. Additionally, the examiner may reject
the application only if the patentability standards are not met. This requirement
2Marco et al. (2017) provides an in-depth overview of the patent prosecution process.
3MPEP 211
4MPEP 211
5General Schedule Level, or GS-level, refers to the seniority of a U.S. government employee.
Within the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, patent examiners can obtain the following GS-levels:
5, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15. Examiners typically start at either GS-7 or GS-9 depending on their
level of education and experience. Production requirements at the USPTO increase with seniority.
Historically, within the production requirement, all seniority factors are normalized to the GS-12
rate. For example, a GS-9 has a seniority factor of 0.8, meaning that a GS-9 examiner must produce
80% of the production counts of a GS-12 examiner in the same art. Examiners receive production
counts for allowances, office-action rejections, abandonments, and other examination actions.
6There are exceptions. Please see Marco et al. (2017) for more detail.
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is potentially problematic because time-constrained examiners may not be able to
thoroughly evaluate the literature to find the appropriate prior art on which to draft
a rejection. Previous research on the patent examination process has found that
time-constraints are binding and examiners are therefore likely to perform lower
quality examination and to allow low-quality patents (Frakes and Wasserman 2017;
Jaffe and Lerner 2004; Lemley 2001; Lemley and Sampat 2012).7 In performing
a lower quality examination, the examiners may allow overly broad or potentially
invalid patents. Additionally, examiners may make mistakes and miss relevant prior
art that would have led to an office action rejection. Some researchers argue that
limiting the amount of time spent prosecuting each application is rational because a
relatively small number of patents are litigated and validity decisions may be made
more efficiently by the courts (Lemley 2001). Therefore, under this theory, the
USPTO at times should be rationally ignorant in allowing some “bad” patents.
4.3.2 Ex Parte Reexamination at the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office
According to the literature on uncertain patent rights, the boundary of a patent’s
claimed invention is often unclear (Merges and Nelson 1990), and there is some
“uncertainty about the validity and scope of the legal right being granted,” (Lemley
and Shapiro 2005). Although 35 U.S.C. 282 states that all granted patents are pre-
sumed to be valid,8 a patent’s validity may be challenged in various venues after it is
granted by the USPTO.9 This section presents an overview of one of those venues,
ex parte reexamination proceedings at the USPTO, and describes how a success-
ful patent reexamination (for the patent holder) would increase the probability of a
7Although, research in this thesis provides counter-evidence to this literature.
835 U.S.C. 282: “A patent shall be presumed valid. Each claim of a patent (whether in indepen-
dent, dependent, or multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid independently of the validity
of other claims; dependent or multiple dependent claims shall be presumed valid even though de-
pendent upon an invalid claim. The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof
shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.”
9At other patent offices, the invalidity rate is non-trivial for challenged patents. For example, the
EPO, in its 2017 Annual Report, provided statistics for its opposition process (similar to reexami-
nation), noting that only 3.7 percent of patents were opposed after grant, where 32 percent of the
oppositions were rejected outright. Of those patents for which the EPO issued a final decision, 27
percent had their monopoly rights revoked.
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patent’s validity.10 According to Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 771 F.2d 480 (Fed.
Cir. 1985), the benefits of ex parte reexamination include the less expensive and
faster resolution of patent validity suits than through the U.S. court system, utiliza-
tion of the technological expertise of examiners at the patent office to ensure the
accuracy of the validity decisions, and the correction of improperly granted patent
applications from the USPTO (Vishnubhakat et al. 2016). However, the process
excludes third parties from participating in the reexamination process (hence, ex
parte). Inter partes reexamination was introduced in 1999 but was never widely
adopted as a means of patent validity challenges (Vishnubhakat et al. 2016). Inter
partes review (IPR) was only established by the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
of 2011, precluding its use in this paper because of the limited initial number of IPR
filings and limited post-decision time frame.
Once the USPTO issues a patent, various parties (including the patent assignee,
third parties, or the Director of the USPTO) may elect to file an ex parte reexam-
ination request. Ex parte reexamination, introduced by the U.S. Congress via the
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980,11 requires the request for reexamination to contain a sub-
stantial new question of patentability to be approved by the USPTO.12 If USPTO
grants the request, the Central Reexamination Unit (CRU) will assign the patent to
a primary examiner (other than the original examiner) who is most familiar with
the claimed subject matter.13 The examiner then reopens patent prosecution on
the challenged patent claims and “reexamination will be conducted according to
the procedures established for initial examination.”14 There are no limitations on
who can file a request for reexamination but only the office and the assignee may
participate in the reexamination process. During the reexamination process, the
examiner may confirm the validity of claims or find that the claims, as stated, are
10For a thorough description and history of post-issue proceedings, please read Vishnubhakat et
al. (2016), from which, among other papers, this description is based.
1135 U.S.C. 200
1235 USC 302; 35 USC 303(a)
13MPEP 2236
1435 USC 305; Additional post-grant review proceedings include inter partes review (address-
ing 35 USC 102 (novelty) and 35 USC 103 (obviousness) concerns), Covered Business Methods
(challenging a patent’s validity) post-grant reviews, and inter partes reexamination (now defunct).
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Figure 4.1: Reexamination Outcomes
invalid. However, assignees can amend challenged claims in response to an adverse
patentability decision. If the assignee decides to amend its claims, it cannot enlarge
the scope of the patent during the reexamination process. At the end of the reexam-
ination process, a reexamination certificate is issued. The reexamination certificate
details which challenged claims have been amended, canceled, or confirmed. In
this case, the set of “treatment” patents include the case where all challenged claims
have been confirmed. The distribution of reexamination outcomes (1999-2010) for
which a certificate was issued is presented in Figure 4.1.15 As can been seen, the
most frequent outcome was that all reexamined claims were confirmed.
Ceteris paribus, the additional scrutiny given to a patent during the reexamina-
tion process, relative to only participating in the initial patent examination process,
should provide a credible signal regarding the patent’s validity. In fact, according
to Vishnubhakat et al. (2016), “[c]ertain Federal Circuit cases have indicated that
patents that survive reexamination should be viewed even more deferentially by the
courts than ordinary patents,” suggesting that the reexamination process provides
an expert opinion on the patent in question to the court which must be taken into ac-
15This graph shows the proportion of reexamination outcomes by outcome type: amended claims,
cancelled claims, confirmed claims, or combinations of these outcomes.
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count when ruling on validity. Therefore, if a patent has survived the reexamination
process with all of its claims intact (without amendments), the probability of patent
validity, all else equal, should be non-decreasing in claim confirmation by ex parte
reexamination.
There are two obvious selection biases here: (1) an agent (assignee, third party,
or the Director of the USPTO) must request patent reexamination; and (2) the patent
must survive the reexamination process. In (1), reexamined patents are likely to
differ from the rest of the patent corpus because assignees and third parties alike
may target these patents based on their characteristics, including quality, value, and
strategic importance. Patent owners and third parties have different motivations for
filing an ex parte reexamination request. Patent owners seek reexamination to vali-
date existing patent claims or modify existing claims to ensure validity (Baughman
2007). Third parties, according to Baughman (2007), use ex parte reexamination to
challenge the validity of a patent in lieu of challenging the validity of the patent in
U.S. Federal Court. The article describes the various trade-offs between using each
venue: (1) the burden of proof required to invalidate a patent is lower in ex parte
reexamination, “in litigation an alleged infringer faces the challenge of proving in-
validity by clear and convincing evidence, but a third party does not face this burden
in reexamination.” Additionally, in ex parte reexamination, the examiner interprets
the claims using the “broadest reasonable interpretation” standard, which allows for
broader interpretation of the claims against prior art than would be allowed in fed-
eral court. The article argues that a third party may choose reexamination depending
on the strength of the “invalidity arguments”. (2) Reexamination is a much cheaper
process than invalidation through the court system. (3) Reexamination may lead
the patent owner to narrow the claims of the patent to avoid invalidity decisions,
providing more space for rivals to operate in the technology space. The author de-
scribes several more reasons for why a third party might use ex parte reexamination
but these additional reasons are far less broadly applicable.
In (2), the likelihood of the surviving reexamination typically depends on time-
invariant characteristics of the patents (claim construction, prior art at the time of
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filing, etc.). These issues are addressed in section 4.6.
4.4 Theoretical Considerations
The decision to follow-on patent in a probabilistic patent setting is influenced by a
number of factors. This section presents the theoretical considerations regarding the
effects of a patent’s validation through reexamination on follow-on patenting. First,
I examine follow-on patenting incentives in an environment with uncertain validity
and scope for both the patent holder and its rivals. Then, I discuss how an increase
in validity modifies the follow-on patenting incentives for both the patent holder and
its rivals. I also argue that validation effects should be larger in complex relative to
discrete technologies.16 Finally, I present additional and alternative mechanisms
for the modification of follow-on patenting behavior after validation. This section
proposes and discusses several potential mechanisms for the observed patenting
responses, but the precise mechanism is not directly tested in this paper.
4.4.1 Considerations for Follow-on Patenting
Firms are often sensitive to two technology market inefficiencies when deciding to
invest in R&D and innovative activities: ex post hold-up and the complements prob-
lem (Hall and Ziedonis 2001; Noel and Schankerman 2013; Shapiro 2001; Ziedonis
2004). Hold-up refers to the ability of one firm to expropriate rents from another
firm, while the complements problem, first introduced by Cournot, suggests that
transaction costs are increasing in the number of licensors (Shapiro 2001). In the
context of technology and innovation, hold-up occurs when a competitor undertakes
investment in innovative activity without a license for the relevant intellectual prop-
erty (bargaining failure or lack of awareness), or the terms of the licensing agree-
ment are unclear and the patent owner asserts the patent ex post (Shapiro 2001).
This bargaining failure typically arises in a cumulative innovation setting where the
ownership of the patented technology space is fragmented and the patent boundaries
are fuzzy, commonly referred to as a patent thicket (Bessen and Meurer 2008; Far-
16The definitions of complex and discrete technologies was first introduced by Cohen et al.
(2000).
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rell and Shapiro 2008; FTC 2003, 2011; Hall et al. 2016; Noel and Schankerman
2013; von Graeventiz et al. 2013).17 These fuzzy boundaries within patent thickets
are the result of unclear patent claims allowed by patent offices and contribute to
overlapping patented inventions (UKIPO 2013), which are often of questionable va-
lidity. The complements problem and hold-up are closely intertwined, but the com-
plements problem refers to ex ante bargaining failures due to increased ownership
fragmentation and thus to increase transaction costs. These increased transaction
costs lower returns on R&D, entry, and investment in R&D (Shapiro 2001).
While facing the threat of hold-up, the conditions in a patent thicket lead firms
to patent strategically. A large literature exists on strategic patenting (Arundel et
al. 1995; Arundel and Patel 2003; Blind et al. 2006; Blind et al. 2009; Cohen et
al. 2002; Hall and Ziedonis 2001; Noel and Schankerman 2013; among others),
which, according to Noel and Scankerman (2013), consists of two distinct aspects:
defensive patenting and patenting to combat the complements problem. A defensive
patenting strategies is defined as, “the accumulation of patents to use as bargaining
chits to preserve the freedom to operate and to improve the bargaining position
of the firm in resolving patent disputes when they arise,” (Noel and Schankerman
2013). This strategy allows firms to mitigate the risk of ex post hold-up (Hall and
Ziedonis 2001; Ziedonis 2004; Noel and Schankerman 2013). Hall and Ziedonis
(2001) and Ziedonis (2004) also found evidence that the threat of ex post hold-
up increases with fragmentation, showing an intersection between hold-up and the
complements problem in complex technologies with fragmented ownership. Ziedo-
nis (2004) further argues that within the context of fragmented ownership rights,
certain ex ante bargaining solutions may be unattainable. Before investing in R&D
and patenting, firms in fragmented technology space will therefore consider and
evaluate the validity of each relevant patent, the likelihood that proposed innova-
tions are covered by existing patents, and the probability that the corresponding
assignee will sue for infringement if the firm’s invention does infringe on existing
patents. These considerations demonstrate the hold-up risk if the firm fails to secure
17These conditions are typically found in complex but not discrete technologies (Shapiro 2001).
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a licensing agreement.
The firm, after evaluating the relevant set of patents, may attempt to negotiate
ex ante licensing agreements, proceed without an agreement, or refrain from invest-
ing in the innovative activity. If the transaction costs are too high to secure an ex
ante licensing agreement (complements problem) or the claim boundaries are suf-
ficiently unclear, the firm may invest in innovative activities without an agreement
to relevant patents or reduce innovative activities to a sub-optimal level. The sheer
number of patents and unclear boundaries can lead to difficulties in identifying the
relevant set of patents, especially for certain technologies. The literature on defen-
sive patenting (see set of papers above) suggests that firms continue to invest in
innovative activities in the presence of patent thickets, but also amass a patent port-
folio to offset the risk of hold-up from fragmentation-induced bargaining failures
and lack of awareness of the patent landscape due to the density of the technology
space. With defensive patent portfolios, firms are able to bargain, threaten a coun-
tersuit, cross-license their patents, etc., to protect the firm from the risk of hold-up
(Arundel et al. 1995; Cohen et al. 2002; Noel and Schankerman 2013).
4.4.2 External (Rival) Follow-on Patenting, Validity, and Reex-
amination
As discussed in section 4.3.2, the reexamination process reopens patent prosecu-
tion by the CRU. If no patentability issues are discovered by the patent examiner,
a reexamination certificate will be issued with no amendments or cancelled claims,
effectively providing further validation for the reexamined patent. This increase
in the probability of a patent’s validity should affect the rival’s follow-on patent-
ing decisions in a number of ways. First, the higher probability of validity should
decrease follow-on innovation and therefore patenting due to increased costs of in-
novative activity. When the probability of validity increases, the rival modifies its
original assessment of hold-up risk for the reexamined patent, increasing the rival’s
incentive to seek an ex ante licensing agreement, if one did not already exist. Li-
censes, which can incorporate the probability of validity and infringement into the
licensing fees, become relatively more expensive as the probability of validity in-
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creases (Sherry and Teece 2004). Therefore, when the rival seeks an ex ante licens-
ing agreement, the cost of innovative activity increases and the level of innovative
activity should decrease because it is now more costly to undertake innovative ac-
tivity.18 This reaction is consistent with Cockburn et al. (2010), which established
the empirical link between reduced innovation performance in fragmented technol-
ogy and licensing agreements. The authors also find that firms operating without
licensing agreements in fragmented technologies achieve relatively higher innova-
tive performance. Finally, in lieu of a licensing agreement, firms may reduce their
innovative activity because the risk of hold-up increases expected litigation costs.
Second, if the firm foregoes a licensing agreement or already has invested in
the relevant technology space, the firm may seek to increase defensive patenting
to mitigate the increased risk of hold-up, which is consistent with the literature on
defensive patenting described above. This should increase patenting. Therefore,
the effect of an increase in the probability of validity on external follow-on
patenting is ambiguous and the direction of this effect (i.e., which influence
dominates) must be determined empirically.
To summarize, following an increase in the probability of validity for a patent,
follow-on patenting by rivals may increase because of increased defensive patent-
ing. However, the increased cost of innovative activity may dampen innovative
activity by rival firms, decreasing follow-on patenting related to the innovative ac-
tivity. Therefore, the direction of the effect is ambiguous.
4.4.3 Internal (Incumbent) Follow-on Patenting, Validity, and
Reexamination
Patent assignees face many of the same patenting incentives as the rivals described
above. In a patenting environment with fuzzy patent boundaries and fragmented
ownership, assignees are at risk for ex post patent hold-up (Hall and Harhoff 2004)19
and will patent strategically to protect their inventions (Hall and Ziedonis 2001;
Ziedonis 2004). Patent-holding firms operating within a thicket lack certainty re-
18If a licensing agreement already exists, the rival should be unaffected.
19The risk of patent predation and ex post hold-up are higher for assignees with sunk costs and
patents belonging to a technology standard (Hall and Harhoff 2004).
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garding the validity of their patent portfolio because the boundaries demarcating
these and other patents in the technology area are often unclear. In a similar man-
ner to rivals, assignees, when facing the decision to invest in follow-on innovation,
will evaluate patents in nearby technology space for validity, claim overlap, and the
probability that the rival patent owners might sue if their patents were infringed.
Though the assignees may already have patented defensively to mitigate the risk
of ex post patent hold-up, rivals may also have undertaken subsequent innovative
activity and patented in the related space, potentially hindering future follow-on
innovation for the assignee. Rival firms may also have patented in the assignee’s
technology space to improve their bargaining position with the assignee (Blind et
al. 2006; Blind et al. 2009).20 The assignee may decide to conduct follow-on
patenting to strengthen the defensive barrier around its inventions, patent strategi-
cally to improve its bargaining position with rivals, or conduct innovative activities
and subsequently patent them.
After an increase in the probability of validity, the assignee’s incentives to
follow-on patent will differ from those of firm’s rivals. First, the increase in the
probability of validity will lead to lower expected costs of innovative activity. This
cost reduction occurs due to a lower expected probability of infringement suit
against the assignee (i.e., reduced risk for ex post hold-up). The higher probability
of validity strengthens the patent portfolio because the probability of successful en-
forcement is increasing in the probability of validity, ceteris paribus. Strong patent
portfolios assist firms in avoiding costly litigation by inducing settlements and li-
censing agreements and providing possible counterclaims (Parchomovsky and Wag-
ner 2005). Therefore, leveraging a stronger patent portfolio should lead to a lower
probability of litigation, reducing the expected costs of innovative activity. Second,
the relative value of the validated patent may increase, inducing the assignee to
engage in strategic patenting to defend the intellectual property (Blind et al. 2009).
From a theoretical perspective, the increase in the probability of validity does
not lead to an unambiguous increase in follow-on patenting. Aghion et al. (2009)
20This type of defensive patenting is also called exchange patenting.
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finds a positive relationship between entry and incumbent innovative activity (in-
cluding patents), especially those firms near the technological frontier. As the prob-
ability of validity increases, the assignee may expect a reduction of both entry into
the focal patent’s technology space and rival innovative activity (discussed above).
The results from Aghion et al. (2009) suggest that the incumbent, in response to
the lower expected competition, may reduce its innovative activity and follow-on
patenting. Therefore, similar to external follow-on patenting, the effect of an
increase in the probability of validity on internal follow-on patenting is am-
biguous and the direction of this effect (i.e., which influence dominates) must
be determined empirically.
To summarize, following an increase in the probability of validity for a patent,
follow-on patenting by the incumbent may increase because of lower expected costs
of innovative activity and increased strategic patenting. However, reduced com-
petition may decrease innovative activity by the incumbent, decreasing follow-on
patenting related to the innovative activity. Therefore, the direction of the overall
effect is ambiguous.
4.4.4 Complete Versus Discrete Technologies
The majority of the discussion within this section has focused on patent validity
effects in fragmented technologies with fuzzy patent boundaries, which typically
occur in complex technologies (Shapiro 2001; UKIPO 2013) and has not delved
into the potential effects within discrete technologies. This discussion is limited
to complex technologies because patent characteristics and, as a result, patenting
behavior, are heterogeneous across the two technology types. According to Co-
hen et al. (2000), complex technologies are characterized by “numerous separately
patentable elements” where inventions within discrete technologies is characterized
by “relatively few” separately patentable inventions. Cohen et al. (2000) argues
that patent protection is sufficient to earn monopoly rents in some, but not all, dis-
crete product industries (e.g., the pharmaceutical industry). In discrete technology
industries with “weaker” patent protection, firms may engage in patent blocking
or fencing strategies, which prevent entry into the technology space surrounding a
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firm’s invention. These firms, however, do not generally utilize their patent port-
folios for negotiations. It should be noted, that the increase in the probability of
validity should increase the value of the intellectual property through an increase
in the enforceability of the patent or through increased licensing revenue. The in-
creased relative value may prompt the incumbent firm to increase patent fencing
activities, which results in higher follow-on patenting by the incumbent.
Issues associated with overlapping claims, fuzzy claim boundaries, and frag-
mented ownership are not typically present, or are at least less severe, in discrete
technologies. As a result, the complements problem and hold-up are not typically
associated with discrete technologies. Additionally, discrete product firms “will
file stronger individual patents, meaning patents more likely to be held valid if
opposed,” (Alcácer et al. 2009), on average, especially in technologies where a
single patent is sufficient protection. These characteristics of discrete technologies
(incentives for stronger patents, minimal granted patent overlap, and clear bound-
aries) minimize the effects of an increase in the probability of patent validity for
this grouping of technologies relative to complex technologies. Therefore, an in-
crease in the probability of validity should result in a weaker effect on follow-on
patenting in discrete technologies compared to complex technologies.
4.4.5 Theoretical Considerations Summary and Other Consid-
erations
This section aims to provide context and theoretical considerations to how and why
firms (rivals and assignees) may alter follow-on patenting behavior in response to an
increase in the probability of a patent’s validity. However, this question is not a sim-
ple one and deals with numerous economic considerations. For example, Egan and
Teece (2015) and deGrazia et al. (forthcoming) demonstrate that economic interac-
tions within complex technologies, specifically patent thickets, are complicated and
are not limited to a single economic consideration. Therefore, this section provides
plausible mechanisms for how firms might react given the existing literature.
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4.5 Data
4.5.1 Patent Examination Research Dataset
Information on the entire patent corpus (granted patents since 1976 and patent ap-
plications since 2001) was taken from the Patent Examination Research Dataset
(PatEx). PatEx, provided by the USPTO’s Office of the Chief Economist, con-
tains publicly-available, application-level data, including filing date, issue date, U.S.
Patent Classification, and other patent prosecution data for 9.2 million patent appli-
cations and granted patents through November 2017.21 Though the PatEx con-
tains applications filed and patents granted through 2017, the sample was limited to
patents granted through 2007 for two reasons: (1) to allow for at least three years
pre- and post-reexamination; (2) to avoid issues with the increased use of alterna-
tive post-issue review proceedings (inter partes review) created by the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act (AIA) of 2011.22 The AIA introduced the Patent Trials and
Appeals Board and with it, additional avenues for the post-issue review of patents.
However, the number of new filings for these proceedings were limited in the first
few years after enactment.
4.5.2 Patent Reexamination Data
Ex parte reexamination requests, where each request is assigned a new application
number beginning with the numbers “90”, can be filed only after a patent has been
granted by the USPTO. The ex parte reexamination applications were retrieved from
the PatEx continuity dataset and linked with the corresponding parent patent data.
Once the original patent numbers were identified, Google Patents was scraped us-
ing R to obtain the “Legal Events” section for each reexamined patent. The “Legal
Events” section contains all pre- and post-grant legal events, including maintenance
payments, reexamination requests, assignment, etc. From this information, ex parte
reexamination outcomes can be identified. When a reexamination certificate is is-
sued, Google Patents captures the outcomes in free form text. For example, the





USPTO issued a reexamination certificate on patent 7479949, where the free form
text reads: “THE PATENTABILITY OF CLAIM 11 IS CONFIRMED. CLAIMS
1-10 AND 12-20 WERE NOT REEXAMINED.”23 Each reexamination was parsed
and categorized based on outcome type, including only confirmed, only cancelled,
only amended, and a group for multiple simultaneous outcomes (see Figure 4.1).
The sample of reexamined patents used in this paper contains all reexamina-
tions with populated outcome data24 between 1999 and 2010. Similar to the set of
pre-match patents, the sample is right-truncated at 2010 to provide an appropriate
timeframe for the observation of follow-on innovation and to avoid potential is-
sues stemming from the passage of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Acts of 2011
(AIA). The “treatment” set of patents is comprised of patents which were reexam-
ined and confirmed by the CRU at the USPTO (other outcomes are excluded to
allow for a clean estimation of the validation effect). However, patents with either
a single or multiple consistent reexamination confirmation are kept in the sample
(over 900 unique reexamined patents). These restrictions, along with the timing of
the treatment described below, assume that only the initial reexamination outcome
will provide a reduction of uncertainty. I test the robustness of this assumption in
Section 4.7.2.
4.5.3 Citation and Family Size Data
Citation and family size data were taken from the Google Patents Public Data
dataset,25 provided by Google and IFI CLAIMS Patent Services. For this paper,
both pre-grant publications and issued patents are included in the backward and
forward citation counts. Family size is measured as be the number of jurisdictions
associated with each family identification number. Family size is a proxy for patent
value (Harhoff et al. 2003; Lanjouw et al. 1998; Putnam 1996; Sapsalis and van
Pottelsberghe 2007; and van Zeebroeck 2011), where the implied value of the in-
tellectual property right is increasing in the number of jurisdictions (countries, or
23https://patents.google.com/patent/US7479949





rather different patent and trademark offices) to which the applicant applies. If an
applicant does not believe the value of obtaining intellectual property rights to be
high, it will not submit an application to additional jurisdictions due to the increas-
ing costs of doing so. There are different variants of this measure, but family size in
this paper is defined to be the number of individual countries to which an applicant
applies.
4.5.4 Patent Scope and Technology Classes
Recent work regarding the measurement of patent scope argues that scope at grant
can be measured by both the length of the shortest independent claim in words and
the count of the independent claims in a granted patent (Marco et al. 2016; Kuhn
and Thompson, forthcoming).26 The USPTO’s Office of the Chief Economist pro-
vides publicly-available patent scope data for all patents granted between 1976 and
2014. PatentsView27 provides various technology class data including the NBER
patent classifications for all patents issued through mid-2015. The NBER classi-
fications,28 originally introduced in Hall et al. (2001) and derived from the inter-
nal U.S. Patent Classification system (USPC), provide broader patent technology
classes than the original USPCs.
4.5.5 Technological Similarity
Researcher Jeffrey Kuhn has provided technological similarities (T S ∈ [0,1]) be-
tween cited and citing patents, described in Kuhn et al. (2018). The authors used
a vector space model of patent text (full text, including the specification, abstract,
claimed invention, etc.) similarity and calculated the “angular distance” between
each citing-cited patent pair. The comparison included vectors of more than 700,000
dimensions for patents and publications issued between 1976 and 2017. The techno-
logical similarity of a citing-cited pair measures the proximity of the two inventions
in technology space. Unfortunately, the authors did not provide technological sim-
26Kuhn and Thompson (forthcoming) argue that patent scope can also be measured by the length
of the first independent claim instead of the shortest independent claim.
27www.patentsview.org
28There are six main classifications and numerous hierarchical sub-classifications. The main clas-
sifications include chemical, computers and communications, drugs and medical, electrical and elec-
tronics, mechanical, and other.
4.5. Data 142
ilarities from pre-grant publications (PGPubs) to their respective backwards cita-
tions and only granted citations can be used for the comparison set (i.e., abandoned
or pending applications are not included in the sample). To increase the coverage,
I replaced cited PGPub numbers with the corresponding patent number if the ap-
plication was later granted. Therefore, I assumed that each issued patent contains
similar technological content to its PGPub.
4.5.6 Data Set Construction
To construct the pre-match sample, I first collected all ex parte reexamination pro-
ceedings between 1999 and 2010 with at least three years between grant and re-
examination to allow for the observance of a pre-trend. These reexamination cer-
tificates were subsetted by outcome and only confirmed reexamined patents were
kept. These patents, issued between 1990 and 2007, were combined with the set
of all non-reexamined patents granted during the same time period. Ex parte re-
examination outcomes cases with amended or canceled claims29 were dropped for
two reasons: (1) amended claims alter the metes and bounds of the claimed in-
vention. While the USPTO cannot expand the scope of a claim during ex parte
reexamination, the altered language may have an effect on the underlying value,
quality, and strategic importance of the reexamined patent. These changes could
alter the follow-on behavior of both the patent holder and third parties. (2) Simi-
larly, the set of partially or fully invalidated patents would potentially contaminate
the comparison group because it would be difficult to distinguish between the ef-
fect of an increase in the probability of legal enforceability and the invalidation
of the property rights on follow-on innovation (the latter of which was studied by
Galasso and Schankerman, 2015a, 2015b; and Gaessler et al. 2017). Therefore, the
pre-match sample is limited to those patents confirmed through reexamination and
those patents for which a reexamination request was not filed.
29Other types of cases were also dropped, including reexaminations filings that were rejected
because the request did not meet the standard of substantial new question of patentability.
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Variable N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Small Entity 2,246,485 0.240 0.427 0 0 0 1
Family Count 2,249,891 2.760 2.127 1 1 4 16
ICC 2,249,891 2.828 2.395 0 1 3 130
ICL 2,249,756 144.786 99.372 0 85 182 20,085
Backward Citations 2,249,974 11.418 16.477 0 4 13 777
Log Fwd. Cites (5 yrs - File) 2,249,974 0.248 2.582 −4.605 0.010 1.947 6.628
Log Fwd. Cites (3 yrs - Grant) 2,249,974 −0.881 2.728 −4.605 −4.605 1.102 6.801
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics - Pre-match Sample
Variable N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Small Entity 702 0.308 0.462 0 0 1 1
Family Count 702 3.593 2.854 1 1 6 14
ICC 702 3.392 3.339 1 2 4 35
ICL 702 141.983 90.812 1 82 174.8 965
Backward Citations 702 18.714 30.069 0 5 20 413
Log Fwd. Cites (5 yrs - File) 702 1.385 2.233 −4.605 0.698 2.709 5.361
Log Fwd. Cites (3 yrs - Grant) 702 0.190 2.656 −4.605 0.010 2.081 6.620
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics - Successfully Reexamined Patents
Variable N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Small Entity 702 0.308 0.462 0 0 1 1
Family Count 702 3.452 2.580 1 1 5 12
ICC 702 3.386 2.998 1 1 4 25
ICL 702 144.333 87.616 7 83 187.5 700
Backward Citations 702 16.500 22.863 0 5 19 188
Log Fwd. Cites (5 yrs - File) 702 1.587 1.972 −4.605 0.698 2.773 5.247
Log Fwd. Cites (3 yrs - Grant) 702 0.308 2.416 −4.605 0.010 1.793 4.395
Table 4.3: Summary Statistics - Control Group Patents
4.5.7 Descriptive Statistics
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 display summary statistics for those patents in the “non-
reexamined” and “confirmed by reexamined” groups, respectively. There exists
a stark difference in the distribution of several variables between the two groups:
(1) There is a larger percentage of small entity patents in the “treatment” group
than in the patent corpus as a whole (0.308 compared to 0.240); (2) Patents in the
“treatment” group tend to be more valuable than those in the set of non-reexamined
patents, where both family size (2.76 to 3.59 countries) and three-year forward cita-
tions are indicators of underlying value (Harhoff et al. 2003, van Zeebroeck 2011);
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Figure 4.2: Matched Sample Q-Q Plots
(3) Patents in the “treatment” group also tend to be broader than those in the general
patent corpus, as measured by ICC and ICL. An increase (decrease) in the number
of independent claims (length of the shortest independent claim) is indicative of a
broadening of patent scope. Therefore, a higher (lower) value for ICC (ICL) would
indicate a broader patent, all else equal (Marco et al. 2016; Kuhn and Thomp-
son, forthcoming). Patents confirmed by the CRU are, by both ICL (144.79 words
to 141.98 words) and ICC (2.83 claims to 3.39 claims), broader on average than
non-reexamined patents. There are also stark differences between the pre-match
distribution of technological classes (NBER categories) by group (see Figure 4.3),
indicating a possible difference in patenting strategies and uses across technology
classes, leading to higher attempted invalidity rates.
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Figure 4.3: NBER Classification - By Group
4.5.8 Selection into Reexamination and Matched Sample Char-
acteristics
The differences in averages and distributional characteristics for the each of the vari-
ables mentioned above indicate differences in composition between the two groups.
In order to use claim confirmation by the CRU as an appropriate treatment, one
must understand how pre-matching differences in these characteristics might affect
selection into reexamination. There have been several studies on the determinants
of EPO opposition proceedings (including Harhoff and Reitzig 2004; Harhoff et al.
2006; Schneider 2011; Gaessler et al. 2017), a process similar to ex parte reexami-
nation at the USPTO. These studies focus on the firm- and patent-level characteris-
tics that are associated with the incidence of an opposition filing for a given patent
at the EPO. Harhoff and Reitzig (2004) found that the number of designated coun-
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tries, grant lag, number of claims, backward citations, forward citations, “crowded”
patenting areas, and technology classes, and nationality of assignee were statisti-
cally significant determinants of oppositions at the EPO. They also found that PCT
application status, scope variables (Lerner 1994), non-patent literature, and assignee
type (individual inventor or firm) did not have a significant effect on incidence of
opposition. This strand of research is relevant to this study because it presents a set
of variables associated with selection into a procedure that is similar to the ex parte
reexamination. To mitigate the selection effects, I matched (described in the section
4.6) on characteristics similar to those described in Harhoff and Reitzig (2004), in
addition to pre-treatment citations (Biasi and Moser 2018; Calel and Dechezleprêtre
2016).
After completing the matching process, the treatment and control groups show
improved balance. Comparing Tables 4.2 and 4.3, the averages for the control group
variables (family count, ICC, ICL, and backward citations) are much closer to the
corresponding averages of the treatment group variables. This improvement in bal-
ance is also shown graphically in Figure 4.2. The q-q plots, which plot the quantiles
of the treatment group against the quantiles of the control group for backward cita-
tions, family count, ICC, and ICL, show good balance between the two groups in
each variable. Balance is improved as the data points approach the 45 degree line.
These q-q plots demonstrate that observable value and scope characteristics are sim-
ilar between the two groups in an effort to mitigate the selection bias. In addition to
the q-q plots, Figure 4.3 depicts the distribution of NBER technology classifications
by confirmed patents and those patents that were not reexamined (pre-match). In
the matching algorithm, the patents were matched directly on the NBER technology
category and therefore have the same technological distribution.
4.6 Estimation Strategy
When estimating a treatment effect using a quasi-natural experiment, it is natural to
first examine a difference-in-differences framework. However, the conditional par-
allel trends assumption, the main assumption on which the identification of the DiD
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estimation relies, requires the pre-reexamination trends in the dependent variable
(log forward citations, log self-citations, and log external citations) to be parallel
prior to the date of the reexamination certificate. In this case, the conditional par-
allel pre-trend assumption is violated when the assumption was tested on the entire
sample (see Appendix). Therefore, to overcome these econometric issues, I use a
variant of the DiD estimator, DiD-matching, which first matches treated patents to
a set of control patent candidates. Patents are matched on observable patent-level
characteristics to mitigate selection effects and other confounding effects, to control
for patent-level heterogeneity, and to satisfy the conditional parallel trends assump-
tion. The DiD-matching estimator has been described and used in various forms in
several economics studies (Heckman et al. 1997; Heckman et al. 1998; Smith and
Todd 2005; Abadie 2005; Toole and Czarnitki 2010; Chabé-Ferret and Subervie
2013; Calel and Dechezleprêtre 2016; Biasi and Moser 2018; Teodorescu 2018).
This section provides an overview of the DiD-matching method and discusses the
specific variant implemented for this paper. Additionally, the matching method used
to create the set of “control” patent is described in the Appendix. Finally, this sec-
tion includes a discussion of the assumptions needed for the identification of the
DiD-matching estimator and argues that each assumption is satisfied.
4.6.1 DiD-matching Estimator
The DiD-matching methodology, a method combining difference-in-differences and
matching strategy, overcomes some violations of the unconfoundedness assumption
(selection bias) by eliminating time-invariant heterogeneity. Using the Chabé-Ferret
and Subervie (2013) nomenclature, there are three main assumptions of the DiD-
matching estimator which need to be satisfied to ensure identification: (1) the Stable
Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA); (2) the conditional parallel trends as-
sumption; and (3) the common support assumption. This subsection first discusses
these identification assumptions in detail, and, where applicable, the results for each
robustness check. Then, I present the estimator used for the main empirical analysis.
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4.6.1.1 Assumption 1: Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption
(SUTVA)
The Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA), or the “no interference” as-
sumption (Rubin 1978; Imbens and Wooldridge 2009), requires that the assignment
of individual i into the treatment group not affect the potential outcomes for indi-
vidual j (Yj(Ti,Tj) =Yj(Tj)). In other words, if a patent is further validated through
the reexamination process, the follow-on innovation related to another patent is un-
affected. Generally speaking, the area covered by a patent is narrow and limited
relative to the entire inventive space. However, in analyzing the applicability of this
assumption one should consider two cases, each with a different relationship be-
tween an arbitrary pair of patents. First, consider the case in which the patents are
in two technology areas distant from each other (e.g. telecommunications versus
pharmaceuticals, etc.). It is unlikely that the confirmation of validity would have
any bearing on the follow-on innovation of another patent in a different technology.
Second, consider the case of two patents that are in close technological proximity.
This case could result in a violation of the SUTVA, but Section C.2 in the Appendix
provides further discussion of this case and argues that this assumption should gen-
erally hold.
4.6.1.2 Assumption 2: Conditional Parallel Trends
The second assumption for DiD-matching requires conditional parallel trends over
time (absent treatment), or E[Yit ′(1)−Yit(1)|X ] =E[Yit ′(0)−Yit(0)|X ], where i refers
to an individual patent, t to an arbitrary pre-treatment time period. This expression
implies that the pre-treatment differences in follow-on patenting from period-to-
period, conditional on X , are equivalent for both groups. In other words, in the ab-
sence of treatment, the trends for both groups should be parallel. This assumption is
crucial for the application of both difference-in-differences and the DiD-matching
estimator and can be shown graphically. Figure 4.4 demonstrates the quality of
matched pairs for the overall logged annual forward citations. Trend graphs for
external (rival) and internal (assignee) logged annual forward citations are shown
in the Appendix. The treated and matched non-reexamined patents display simi-
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lar reexamination trends for logged forward citations, logged internal citations, and
logged external forward citations. I further demonstrate the strength of the matching
process by regressing the binary treatment group assignment on pre-reexamination
characteristics for the matched sample (Calel and Dechezleprêtre 2016). The coeffi-
cients on the pre-treatment characteristics are not statistically significant, indicating
that conditional on pre-reexamination characteristics, the assignment seems random
(Calel and Dechezleprêtre 2016), as shown in table 4.4.30 I note that, even if the
conditional parallel trends is satisfied, unobserved, time-varying heterogeneity may
be a concern. This issue is addressed in Section 4.7.2.
Figure 4.4: Logged Annual Forward Citations - Treatment and Control Groups
4.6.1.3 Assumption 3: Common Support
The final assumption on the DiD-matching estimator is the common support as-
sumption, or 0 < P[Ti = 1|Xi] < 1. According to Heckman et al. (1997), “A major
limitation of nonexperimental methods compared to experimental methods... is that
they do not guarantee that the support for the comparison group equals the support
30Consistent with Calel and Dechezleprêtre (2016), I ran the Wilcoxon signed-rank test to deter-
mine if the distributions for lagged forward citations, pendency, family count, scope, and backwards
citations are statistically nonidentical across treatment groups. For each variable, the test failed to
reject the null hypothesis of statistically identical distributions.
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Dependent variable:
Reexamination
















Significant at * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Regressions
include 702 matched patent pairs. The dependent variable is
an indicator variable equal to one if the observation was suc-
cessfully confirmed through reexamination and zero otherwise.
Standard errors are presented in parentheses.
Table 4.4: Probability of Treatment
for programme participants.” The common support assumption requires that there
are no regions in covariate space with only treated or control observations. If such
regions exist, the conditional probability of treatment in those regions will equal
exactly 1 or 0. This assumption is somewhat trivial for estimating the average treat-
ment effect on the treated (ATT) using patent data and can be satisfied using most
matching packages in R.
4.6.1.4 Implementation
The DiD-matching can be implemented in several ways to estimate the aver-
age treatment effect on the treated. Early DiD-matching estimators (Heckman,
Ichimura, Smith and Todd 1997; Heckman, Ichimura, and Smith 1998) utilized a
“regression-adjusted semiparametric difference-in-differences matching estimator”
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while Abadie (2005) introduced an alternative framework using a two-step proce-
dure, accounting for “dynamics of the outcome variable [that] are unbalanced be-
tween the treated and the untreated.” A number of estimators use semi-parametric
or non-parametric methods to estimate the ATT. Additionally, some studies have
implemented the DiD-matching procedure using parametric means, specifically by
running ordinary least squares on the matched sample of treatment and control ob-
servations (Toole and Czarnitzki 2010; Biasi and Moser 2018).Essentially, the em-
pirical strategy in this paper leverages a matching algorithm to improve the pre-
treatment balance between the distribution of covariates for the treatment and con-
trol group. According to Ho et al. (2007), “The immediate goal of matching is to
improve balance, the degree to which the treatment and control covariate distribu-
tions resemble each other ..., without losing too many observations in the process.”
The authors argue that, after matching, parametric analysis should proceed using
“the same parametric analysis on the preprocessed data as would have been used to
analyze the original raw data set without preprocessing.” Additionally, Imbens and
Wooldridge (2009) states, “Given a more balanced sample, one can use any of the
previously discussed methods for estimating the average effect of the treatment, in-
cluding regression, propensity score methods, or matching. Using those methods on
the balanced sample is likely to reduce bias relative to using the simple difference
in averages by treatment status.”
In this paper, the sample of patents is reduced to only the reexamined and
matched patent pairs by the algorithm discussed in the Appendix (without sig-
nificant loss of observations). The patent-level fixed effects included in the DiD-
matching framework controls for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity includ-
ing underlying patent quality, firm fixed effects, patent examiner effects, and any
other time-invariant characteristic that may be correlated with selection into reex-
amination. Specifically, the fixed-effects model can be written as:
Yit = λt + τwit + ci + εit (4.1)
Where Yit is equal to the logged number of forward citations per period (total,
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internal, and external) from both patent grants and pre-grant publications (PGPubs)
to the focal patent, λt represents year fixed effects, wit represents the treatment in-
dicator, and ci is defined to be the patent-level fixed effect. The estimate of the ATT
in this model is defined as τ̂ . For this equation, I run both panel DiD-matching and
two-period DiD-matching regressions. For the panel DiD-matching regressions, I
use logged annual forward citations by citation type as the dependent variables. In
the 2-period DiD-matching regressions, the dependent variable is modified from
logged annual forward citations to logged count forward citations in each period
(three years before and after reexamination) by citation type. The DiD-matching
estimator can be interpreted as the mean difference between two sub-components:
(1) the mean difference in follow-on patenting for the treated group between post-
treatment and pre-treatments years; and (2) the mean difference in follow-on patent-
ing for the control group between post-treatment and pre-treatments years. Under
assumptions 1-3, the DiD-matching estimator estimates the ATT for reexamination
on follow-on patenting.
4.6.2 Similarity Regressions
While the follow-on patenting regressions above show how the patenting rate
changes in response to validation, the regression results provide no evidence on
what might be driving this change. To investigate this question, I turn to an analysis
of the technological similarity between the focal patent and each of its follow-on
patents. Kuhn and Younge (2016) provides a methodology on how to calculate the
technology similarity of two patent documents by measuring the TF-IDF Cosine
Similarity of the patent text for each patent pair. Kuhn, Younge, and Marco (2018)
analyzes the degree of technological similarity between patents and their citations.
In these papers, the degree of similarity is increasing in the technological similarity
measure. Using the data provided by one of the authors,31 one can test how valida-




T Sip = τwip +Xipγ + ci + εip (4.2)
Where the unit of observation is each forward citation to the matched set of
patents. T Sip is equal to the pairwise similarity between the focal patent and its
forward citations, were i denotes the focal patent and p denotes the citing patent.
wip represents the treatment indicator where wip is equal to one if the citing patent
was filed after the reexamination date and zero otherwise; ci is defined to be the a
fixed effect for the focal patent; and Xip are the set of controls, including technology
and year fixed effects for the follow-on patents. This regression is not meant to be
causal but to provide further evidence of how firms react to changes in validity. If
the coefficient on τ̂ is positive, then firms are patenting closer to the focal patent
in technology space. For rivals, this may be indicative of strategic patenting by
patenting defensively or by generating a set of patents as bargaining chits. If the
coefficient on τ̂ is negative, it may be indicative that the rival is attempting to invent
around the focal patenting or is shifting their patenting efforts elsewhere. I run this
regression for each type of forward citation: total, internal, and external.
4.7 Results
4.7.1 Baseline Results
The baseline DiD-Matching results (described in section 4.6) are shown in Table
4.5.32 For the panel model, the results show a positive and significant validation
32Abadie and Spiess (2019) examines ”valid inference in linear regression after nearest-neighbor
matching without replacement” (Abadie and Spiess 2019). Proposition 4 in Abadie and Spiess
(2019) states that post-matching OLS standard errors are valid under the assumption that the post-
matching regression is correctly specified (which is a fairly strong assumption) and the observations
are matched without replacement. Proposition 5 in Abadie and Spiess (2019) shows that if the stan-
dard errors are clustered by matches and under assumptions 1-5 in the paper, then the post-matching
clustered standard errors are valid. These standard errors are also robust to misspecification. The
main results in this paper use standard errors clustered at the patent level in Table 4.5. As a ro-
bustness check, the standard errors were clustered at the match level, show in Table C.14 of the
Appendix. The results in Table C.14 show that the significant of the treatment effects are similar.
Interestingly, the treatment effect in the internal follow-on patenting regression becomes significant,
which is consistent with the panel model. However, once litigated patents are removed from the
sample, the results are insignificant and robust to the type of standard error (Table C.15).
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effect on follow-on patenting, using the log of annual follow-on patents by type.33
This pattern persists for overall, internal, and external follow-on patenting. The
magnitude of the treatment effect is larger for total (0.505) compared to self (0.134)
or external citations (0.454). The positive and significant relationship persists in the
two-period DiD-matching regressions for total and external citations, but not self-
citations. The coefficient on the treatment indicator requires a transformation before
interpretation (τ̂AT T ≈ 100 ∗ [eβ − 1]) because the dependent variable is measured
in logs and the DiD variable is a dummy variable. Therefore, following reexami-
nation, the confirmation of validity through reexamination increased total follow-
on patenting by 65.70 percent. Furthermore, the reexamination process leads to
follow-on patenting increases of 14.34 percent for self-citations and 57.46 percent
for external citations. In regards to the direction of the overall effect on external
follow-on patenting, the increase in external citations post-reexamination indicates
that the strategic patenting effect dominates the reduction in innovative activity.
This relationship is tested further in Table 4.6. The coefficient on Post*Valid
indicates that, post-reexamination, external citations are closer in technology space
to the reexamined focal patents relative to the non-reexamined focal patent and
their respective external follow-on citations. These results indicate that rivals are
patenting closer to the focal patent to pursue a defensive strategy following vali-
dation. An alternative explanation is that rival firms could have pursued licensing
agreements and the increase in technological similarity stems from freedom to op-
erate in the technological space. However, consistent with Cockburn et al. (2010)
and the resulting cost increases due to licensing, follow-on patenting should de-
crease for those firms that have to in-license their products. For incumbents, the
results are mixed. The estimated treatment effect on internal patent citations in
the panel DiD-matching setting is positive and significant, indicating that the in-
crease in the probability of validity should increase follow-on patenting by the the
assignee. However, in the simple 2-period DiD-matching regression, the treatment
33The dependent variable in this case is Ln(Cites + 0.01) to allow for instances of zero follow-on
citations in a particular period. The results are robust to alternate minimum values (e.g., Ln(Cites +
0.0001).
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effect is insignificant, demonstrating that the overall treatment effect for validation
on external citations is not robust.
Dependent variable:
Full Sample 2-Period
Total Internal External Total Internal External
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 0.505∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗ 0.454∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 0.250 0.416∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.068) (0.111) (0.140) (0.156) (0.147)
Period FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
Post FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 9,828 9,828 9,828 2,808 2,808 2,808
R2 0.028 0.018 0.027 0.006 0.025 0.006
Significant at * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Regression results shown in cols. 1 through 3
include an annual panel dataset of the 702 matched patent pairs. For cols. 1 through 3, the sample
size includes seven years of observations for each patent (1404 focal patents - 702 matched pairs).
Regression results shown in cols. 4 through 6 include a 2-period panel dataset of the 702 matched
patent pairs (citations three years before and three years after reexamination). For cols. 4 through
6, the sample size includes 2 periods of observation (three years before and after) for each patent
(1404 focal patents - 702 matched pairs). The dependent variable are defined as the number of
all (cols. 1 and 4), internal (cols. 2 and 5), and external (cols. 3 and 6) forward citations. Each
regression contains grant year and patent fixed effects. Standard errors are presented in parentheses
and are clustered by patent.
Table 4.5: Matching-DiD Results - All Patents
The estimated treatment effects for total and external follow-on citations indi-
cate that the main result in both Galasso and Schankerman (2015a) and Gaessler
et al. (2017) may have been underestimated.34 If the validation effect is similar
between the courts and the reexamination process, “validated” patents may also ex-
perience an increase in the number of forward citations post-decision relative to a
non-litigated patent. Therefore, the invalidity effect should be larger when com-
paring the relationship between the follow-on activity of an invalidated patent to a
non-litigated patent rather than the relationship between the follow-on activity of an
34This assumes that validation effect would be consistent in direction and significance across
venues (CAFC, CRU, and EPO oppositions). The current version of this chapter does not re-estimate
the invalidation results of Galasso and Schankerman (2015a) and Gaessler et al. (2017). Given my
data, this approach is feasible and will be undertaken. Without re-estimating the invalidation effect,
the results estimated in this chapter cannot be directly compared to the earlier works. Thank you to
my Ph.D. Viva examiners for identifying this inconsistency.
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Post*Valid 0.008∗∗∗ 0.005 0.005∗
(0.003) (0.013) (0.003)
Post −0.002 0.018 −0.003
(0.003) (0.013) (0.003)
Observations 72,613 4,922 67,691
R2 0.026 0.070 0.020
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Significant at * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Regres-
sion results shown in cols. 1 through 3 were run on the
set of all (1), internal (2), and external (3) citations to the
treated and control group patents. The sample size in this
table reflects the total (col. 1), internal (col. 2), and external
(col.3) forward citations to each of the focal patents. The
unit of observation reflects the pairwise citation relationship
between the focal patent and a subsequent forward citation.
Regressions include patent, grant year, and technology fixed
effects. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are
clustered by patent.
Table 4.6: Technology Similarity Regressions
Finally, I examine the potentially different relationships between validation and
technology type (complex versus discrete). Tables 4.7 and 4.8 show the regression
results from running equation 4.1 on subsets of individual NBER technology classes
- Electrical and Electronics (complex) compared to Drugs and Medical (discrete).35
In table 4.7, the results show that the validation effect in complex technologies is
consistent with the overall effect for total and external citations. The magnitude of
the overall and rival’s response is larger in the Electrical and Electronics technology
relative to the full sample regression estimates.
Interestingly, the effect is also significant for internal citations as well across
both regression types (panel and 2-period DiD-matching). This result indicates that,
35The technology type designations for each NBER class were taken from Galasso and Schanker-
man (2015a).
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within complex technologies, an increase in the probability of validity leads to more
follow-on patenting. I cannot determine whether this increase in follow-on patent-
ing is due to an increase in strategic patenting behavior or increased innovative ac-
tivity resulting from lower expected costs of such activities. However, these results
illustrate that the relative increase dominates the potential decrease in follow-on
patenting due to lower expected competition. The effect in discrete technologies
(Table 4.8 - Drugs and Medical) is statistically insignificant for all types. These re-
sults together are consistent with the discussion above, suggesting that the validation
effect should be stronger in complex technologies relative to discrete technologies.
Similar to the baseline results above, I find that Galasso and Schankerman (2015a)
may underestimate the invalidation effect in complex technologies. Both the results
in Galasso and Schankerman (2015a) and in this paper find no effect in discrete
technologies.
The results in this section are not necessarily generalizable because the
matched sample is not representative of the patent corpus as a whole, but they
demonstrate the validation effect for patents with similar characteristics as the
matched set (e.g., valuable patents). I discuss this limitation further in the con-
clusion.
4.7.2 Robustness Checks
I perform a number of robustness checks to accompany the main results. As men-
tioned in Section 4.6.1, the DiD-matching estimator controls for time-invariant un-
observed heterogeneity, but assumes the absence of meaningful time-varying unob-
served heterogeneity. A potential source of time-varying unobserved heterogeneity
in this setting is patent litigation. In some instances, reexamined patents may be
utilized in patent litigation, either concurrently with the reexamination process or at
another period in time. To establish that the results in this paper are not driven by
the time-varying effects of litigation, I drop litigated patents from the sample and
re-run each regression described in Section 4.7.1 on this subset. The results, shown
in the Appendix, are consistent with the main results with some minor exceptions.




Total Internal External Total Internal External
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 0.976∗∗∗ 0.461∗∗ 0.787∗∗ 0.889∗∗ 0.882∗ 0.863∗∗
(0.331) (0.203) (0.338) (0.404) (0.475) (0.405)
Period FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
Post FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1,232 1,232 1,232 352 352 352
R2 0.065 0.041 0.070 0.034 0.061 0.034
Significant at * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Regression results shown in cols. 1 through
3 include a subset of the main sample. Regression results shown in cols. 4 through 6 include a
subset of the 2-period sample (citations three years before and three years after reexamination).
Both sets of regressions are restricted to only those patents in the NBER Electrical and Electronics
classification. The dependent variable are defined as the number of all (cols. 1 and 4), internal
(cols. 2 and 5), and external (cols. 3 and 6) forward citations. Each regression contains grant year
and patent fixed effects. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered by patent.
Table 4.7: Matching-DiD Results - NBER: Electrical and Electronics
Dependent variable:
Full Sample 2-Period
Total Internal External Total Internal External
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 0.347 −0.196 0.327 0.155 0.117 0.133
(0.235) (0.159) (0.239) (0.262) (0.371) (0.278)
Obs. 2,002 2,002 2,002 572 572 572
R2 0.021 0.029 0.020 0.001 0.020 0.003
Significant at * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Regression results shown in cols. 1 through
3 include a subset of the main sample. Regression results shown in cols. 4 through 6 include a
subset of the 2-period sample (citations three years before and three years after reexamination).
Both sets of regressions are restricted to only those patents in the NBER Drugs and Medical
classification. The dependent variable are defined as the number of all (cols. 1 and 4), internal
(cols. 2 and 5), and external (cols. 3 and 6) forward citations. Each regression contains grant
year and patent fixed effects. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered by
patent.
Table 4.8: Matching-DiD Results - NBER: Drugs and Medical
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comes insignificant, providing further evidence that the estimated validity effects
related to internal citations are not robust.36 However, the treatment effect is still
positive and significant for internal citations within complex technologies, as shown
in Table C.7.
Second, the set of reexamined patents is restricted to only those with one re-
examination proceeding. Nineteen of the original 702 reexamined patents had been
reexamined more than once and each reexamination had confirmed the validity of
the patents. In the main results, it was assumed that only the original reexami-
nation would have a significant effect on the perception of validity. To check the
robustness of the main result, these patents (and their respective matched pair) were
dropped from the sample. The DiD-matching coefficients are shown in Table C.1 in
the Appendix. The results for the logged total, self, and external forward citations
are consistent with the corresponding coefficient in the main results.
Finally, the magnitude and significance of the treatment effect may differ based
on the length of time between initial patent issuance and the confirmation decision.
In general, unlike at the EPO where patents are eligible for opposition proceedings
for nine months post-issuance, reexamined patents in the U.S. are not re-prosecuted
at a consistent point in a patent’s life-cycle. Therefore, the sample is split into two
groups based on the timing of the reexamination in relation to the issuance year -
lag ≤ 10 or lag > 10. Table C.4 displays the results for the lag ≤ 10 group. The
treatment effect is positive and significant across citation and regression type for
those patents that were reexamined up to ten years after grant but is insignificant
for those with patents that were reexamined more than ten years after grant (not
shown).
4.7.3 Alternative Matching Strategies
As a final robustness check, I re-estimate each model using logged cumulative for-
ward citations instead of annual logged forward citations. First, I re-run the match-
ing algorithm using pre-treatment logged cumulative forward citations as one of the
36Though the results using non-litigated patents are robust to the type of standard error, e.g., robust
standard errors clustered by patent or the Abadie and Spiess (2019) standard errors.
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matching covariates. Trivially, assumptions one and three still hold but the condi-
tional parallel trends assumption was retested for each response type (overall, inter-
nal, external), as shown in Figures C.3 to C.5. For each citation type, the conditional
pre-trends appear parallel. Additionally, I run a linear probability model, regressing
the treatment indicator on the set of covariates used for matching. The results are
similar to those in Table 4.4 in that all matching covariates are insignificant, indicat-
ing a good match. Overall, the regression results using logged cumulative forward
citations are similar in sign but not magnitude to the main results, as shown in Table
C.10. I find reexamination increases overall follow-on patenting by 3.35 percent,
external follow-on patenting by 3.87 percent, and internal follow-on patenting by
5.76 percent.
4.8 Conclusion
This paper, using a DiD-matching estimator on 702 matched patent pairs, esti-
mates the effects of validation by ex parte reexamination on follow-on patenting.
I find that confirmation of validity through reexamination increased total follow-on
patenting by 65.70 percent and 57.46 percent for external citations. The validation
effect differs in magnitude and significance by assignees and rivals but also across
technology type. Overall, the validation effect is positive and significant for to-
tal and external follow-on patenting both overall and in complex technology areas,
but insignificant in discrete technology areas. The results on citations by assignees
are mixed. The significance of the overall treatment effect for internal citations
is dependent on the type of standard errors used in the regression but consistently
insignificant when the sample was limited to non-litigated patents. To better un-
derstand these results, I propose and discuss the channels through which validation
alters patenting behavior of firms and how the effect depends on the underlying
characteristics of the technology area. This analysis is supplemented by technol-
ogy similarity regressions, which provide further evidence that the validation effect
induces increased defensive patenting for rivals.
This work also adds to the literature on the evaluation of post-grant correc-
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tion procedures at patent offices worldwide. Harhoff et al. (2016) argues that the
EPO’s post-grant review process may be susceptible to the public goods problem
and strategic behavior within patent thickets and therefore may not be an effective
way to correct or invalidate erroneously-granted patents. In this paper, the increase
in defensive patenting by rivals after validation demonstrates the unintended con-
sequences of post-issue review procedures. It is my hope that my work will spur
future research into the relative efficiency trade-offs between higher quality initial
patent examination and removing “bad” patents ex post through post-issue review
procedures.
Finally, the two main limitations of this paper are the generalizability of the re-
sults to the entire patent corpus and the possibility of unknown time-varying unob-
served differences between the treatment and control groups. As shown in Section
4.5, the characteristics of “validated” patents do not reflect those of the patent corpus
as a whole (entity size, family size, scope, citations, pendency, etc.). In fact, there is
a statistically significant difference in means between validated and non-reexamined
patents in regards to each of the variables used in the matching procedure. The sam-
ple used in this paper may only capture the validation effect for certain patents and
not the entire patent corpus. Gaessler et al. (2017) discusses this issue with re-
spect to the differences in results between Gaessler et al. (2017) and Galasso and
Schankerman (2015a). The authors identify the weaknesses of using such a lim-
ited sample, indicating the difference in results may stem from the difference in
sample composition. In this paper, the matching procedure improved the balance
between the two groups, but the underlying characteristics of the matched control
group no longer corresponded to those of the non-reexamined patents. Future work
could test whether these results apply to the entire patent corpus. Finally, concern-
ing time-varying unobserved differences between the treatment and control groups,
I tested the robustness of my results against a main potential source of time-varying
unobserved differences, patent litigation. However, as in much of the matching and
DiD-matching literature, I cannot rule out the influence of idiosyncratic shocks on
my results, which is an issue not only for the DiD-matching regressions but cer-
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tainly for the technological similarity regressions. Shocks to technological demand
of focal patents could bias both sets of results in terms of citations counts but also
technological space positioning (technological similarity regressions).
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Appendix A
Patent Claims and Patent Scope
A.1 Validation Results
In this section, we first describe existing measures of patent scope and the cor-
responding methods used to validate these measures. We then discuss how our
measures improve upon the existing scope variables and describe our variant of the
validation methodology. Finally, we present our validation results, finding that our
measures are consistent with other validation tests of patent scope in the literature.
Lerner (1994), one of the first empirical papers to introduce a measure of patent
scope, proposed the number of 4-digit IPCs to which a patent was assigned as a
measure of patent scope. The study found that an increase in the number of 4-digit
Table A.1: Validation Results
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Table A.2: Validation Results (continued)
IPCs assigned to a patent reflects an increasing number of distinct technologies in-
corporated into the invention, which can be interpreted as increasing broadness of
a given patent. Lerner (1994) used a Poisson regression to estimate the relationship
between the count of forward citations for a given patent and the number of IPCs.
He also controlled for the time since grant, to account for varying exposure time
among patents in his sample of biotechnology firms. His results show a positive
correlation. Recent work by Novelli (2015) examines patent scope as measured by
both the number of technological classes and the total number of claims per patent.
She argues that these two measures reflect two dimensions of patent scope and that
a firm’s subsequent inventive activity differs in reaction to movements along each
dimension. Novelli (2015) finds that firms are less likely to cite their own patents
in future inventive activity as the number of technological classes for the origi-
nal patents increase. She does, however, confirm Lerner’s original finding that the
number of technological classes per patent is positively related to the number of
total forward citations a patent receives.
Most of the previous scope metrics, including those shown in Tables A.1 and
A.2, are observed at or after the time of patent issuance (maintenance and forward
citations). The change in the number of technological classes can be observed at
PGPub and grant. However, the classification processes are quite different at filing
and at grant. As described in Section 2, the initial classification is done primarily
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for the purpose of routing the application to the correct art unit for examination.
In contrast, more care is taken in classifying a granted patent to ensure that classes
are included for the purposes of prior art search by other examiners. We do note,
however, that our validation results in Tables A.1 and A.2 are generally consistent
with Novelli (2015) and prior studies. We prefer to use the number of independent
claims, because from a technical point of view, the addition of another dependent
claim does not change the scope of the independent claim on which it depends, but
rather only adds additional complexity as a subset of the embodiments of the inde-
pendent claim. That said, Table 2.2 shows that there is a high correlation between
the number of independent claims and the number of dependent claims, as well as
the number of total claims.
We extend Lerner’s analysis to include maintenance rates and forward citations
(following van Zeebroeck, 2011). Further, we include the number of CPCs as a
substitute for the older IPC classifications. Our dependent variables include two
count variables and one binary indicator, which are defined as follows:
• Fully maintained. A binary indicator of whether the patent was maintained
to its maximum statutory term (paying the requisite fees at 3.5, 7.5, and 11.5
years after grant).
• Forward citations from U.S. New Applications. A count of the number of U.S
new application (or patent) citations1 received by the patent within three years
of the issue date.
• Number of subclasses. A count of the number of unique CPC subclasses (4-
digit) assigned to the patent.
We expect each indicator to be positively correlated with patent scope, along
the lines of Lerner’s argument and the findings in van Zeebroeck (2011). Forward
citations have long been used by economists as a correlate of patent value and scope
(van Zeebroeck, 2011). Patent maintenance is closely related to patent value, and
1We use forward citations from U.S. new applications (i.e. applications without foreign priority
nor a parent application) to eliminate noise caused by cross-citations within a patent family (Kuhn
2011; Kuhn, Younge, and Marco 2018).
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thus indirectly to patent scope. According to Bessen (2008), “[t]he implicit value
of a patent is revealed when its owner pays a renewal fee, implying that the patent
is worth more than the fee required to keep it in force.” Broader patents, ceteris
paribus, have wider applicability than a narrower patent representing similar under-
lying technologies, and should therefore be more valuable.
We expect ICL and ICC to be negatively and positively correlated, respec-
tively, to our patent scope indicators. To confirm this hypothesis, we run Poisson
regressions with forward citations from U.S. new applications and the number of
subclasses as dependent variables, and a linear probability model (ordinary least
squares) for the fully maintained indicator. Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix
present the results of the regressions.
For each of the three dependent variables we estimate four models based on
the explanatory variables: ICL, ICC, ICL and ICC together, and ICL, ICC, and the
number of dependent claims per independent claim. We also include year fixed
effects and US Patent Classification fixed effects, to control for differences in claim
length and citation behavior by applicants between classes and across years. Our
expectation is that ICL will have a negative coefficient and ICC will have a positive
coefficient, corresponding to a positive correlation between scope and the dependent
variables.
For ICC, all coefficients are positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent
significance level for all specifications. For ICL all coefficients are negative and
statistically significant at the 0.1 percent significance level. The robustness of the
results across specifications implies that ICL and ICC are useful measures of patent
scope. Because the models that include both measures tend to have the expected
signs suggests that ICC and ICL may represent different aspects of patent scope.2
As further evidence that ICL and ICC represent patent scope, we rely on results
from Marco et al (2015b). There, the authors find that patent scope—as measured
2Independent claims may take different forms, such as claiming methods and claiming systems,
both directed to the same underlying creative advance. Comparison of scope across such different
forms of embodiments may be difficult (and have significant implications for proof of infringement
(directly and indirectly, such as with multiple actors). These different forms may therefore reflect
one of many of the different aspects of claim scope at issue.
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by average independent claim length and independent claim count—is correlated
with the incidence of patent litigation. Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) explain
why patent breadth should be positively correlated with litigation. Thus, the result
provides more evidence that ICL and ICC are indicators of patent scope.
A.2 Additional Trend Analysis
Similar to the disposition cohorts described in section 2.5, we created contempo-
raneous cohorts, based on the actual publication date of the document: publica-
tion dates for PGPubs and issue dates for patent grants. These “contemporaneous
comparisons” provide an indication of how both application and patent claims are
changing in a particular year, which may be more helpful in identifying the timing
of behavioral changes. The contemporaneous cohort analysis is presented in Figure
A.1.
The contemporaneous cohorts in Figure A.1(a) show that ICL for PGPubs is
trending upwards since 2005. Thus, it appears that the trend towards higher ICL
began with patents, and then began to be reflected in newly arriving applications (as
measured by PGPubs in the contemporaneous comparison). Additionally, as shown
in Figure 2.4(b) in the main text, there is some convergence in the mean ICC be-
tween patent grants and PGPub-grants; the mean change in ICC during prosecution
has gone from -0.7 in 2001 to -0.2 in 2014. However, Figure A.1(b) shows that the
ICC for PGPubs catches up to the ICC for patents for the contemporaneous com-
parison. Granted patents have a higher ICL as measured by the disposition cohorts
(Figure 2.3(a)) and the contemporaneous cohorts (Figure A.1(a)). Figure 2.3(b) also
shows that patents have a smaller ICC than PGPubs; however, that difference has
been getting smaller over the last decade as measured by the disposition cohort. The
difference virtually disappears at the mean when measured by the contemporaneous
comparison in Figure A.1(b), which is driven by a strong decrease in the number of
independent claims for new applications.
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(a) Independent Claim Length
(b) Independent Claim Count
Figure A.1: Contemporaneous Comparison - Mean (a) Independent Claim Length and (b)
Independent Claim Count by Application (2001-2014)
A.3. Alternative Figures 169
Figure A.2: Distribution of Independent Claim Count (2001-2014)
A.3 Alternative Figures
Finally, Figure A.2 represents the histogram version of Figure 2.1(b). The analysis
of this histogram is consistent with the discussion of Figure 2.1(b) in the main text
of this thesis.
Appendix B
Debunking the Myth of the Rubber
Stamp Patent: Impact of Examiner’s
Amendment on Patent Office
Outcomes and the Innovation
Ecosystem
B.1 Additional Examples of Examiner’s Amend-
ments
The first example, beyond the examples given in the text, is one of the smallest
similarity values, 0.07. Application number 14/120,777 received a first-action al-
lowance on July 14th, 2016, and an examiner’s amendment on June 24th, 2016. The
section of the notice of allowance document containing the examiner’s amendment
is shown in figures B.1 and B.2.1 From the examiner’s amendment in the notice of
allowance, all claims were cancelled and one new claim was added. Further, this
claim adds elements of a dependent claim to the first independent claim. According
to Marco et al. (2016), the act of “rolling up” elements of a dependent claim into
1The examiner’s amendment is split into two figures since the amendment occurred on more than
one page in the notice of allowance document.
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an independent claim during patent prosecution is common practice. Applicants
will submit broad independent claims and narrower dependent claims. After an ini-
tial rejection by the examiner, applicants “may roll up at least one dependent claim
limitation into the original independent claim to form a new, longer and narrower
independent claim.” For example, in the application in figure 3, to overcome a po-
tential rejection, Hexaflumuron from the fourth claim is added to Gluconacetobacter
in the first claim, making the claim significantly narrower.
The next example is application 14/172,071 from the median, with similarity
value 0.99. The examiner’s amendment is contained in figures B.10 and B.11. The
word ”type” was removed from the first claim. From the MPEP, “the addition of the
word ‘type‘ to an otherwise definite expression extends the scope of the expression
so as to render it indefinite2.” This example illustrates that the failure to change
a single word in the claims of a patent application can have an important impact
on patent quality. In particular, as described in more detail in the footnote, the
word “type” was crucial in Ex parte Attig, 7 USPQ 2d 1092 for understanding the
boundary of the claimed invention.
2https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2173.html. Specifically,
the relevant section reads ”The addition of the word type to an otherwise definite expression (e.g.,
Friedel-Crafts catalyst) extends the scope of the expression so as to render it indefinite. Ex parte-
Copenhaver, 109 USPQ 118 (Bd. Pat. App. Inter. 1955). Likewise, the phrase ZSM-5-type
aluminosilicate zeolites was held to be indefinite because it was unclear what type was intended to
convey. The interpretation was made more difficult by the fact that the zeolites defined in the depen-
dent claims were not within the genus of the type of zeolites defined in the independent claim. Ex
parte Attig, 7 USPQ 2d 1092 (Bd. Pat. App. Inter. 1986).”
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Figure B.1: Examiner’s Amendment for Application Number 14/120,777: Page 1
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Figure B.2: Examiner’s Amendment for Application Number 14/120,777: Page 2
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Figure B.3: Examiner’s Amendment for Application Number 13/077,181: Page 1
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Figure B.4: Examiner’s Amendment for Application Number 13/077,181: Page 2
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Figure B.5: Examiner’s Amendment for Application Number 13/077,181: Page 3
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Figure B.6: Examiner’s Amendment for Application Number 13/085,015: Page 1
B.1. Additional Examples of Examiner’s Amendments 178
Figure B.7: Examiner’s Amendment for Application Number 13/085,015: Page 2
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Figure B.8: Examiner’s Amendment for Application Number 13/085,015: Page 3
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Figure B.9: Examiner’s Amendment for Application Number 13/085,015: Page 4
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Figure B.10: Examiner’s Amendment for Application Number 14/172,071: Page 1
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Figure B.11: Examiner’s Amendment for Application Number 14/172,071: Page 2
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B.2 Dataset Construction
Figure B.12: Variables: Description and Sources
In line with open data initiatives, this section describes our data construction pro-
cess and how to obtain each individual data sources used to build our sample. The
sample contains both internal and external USPTO data, including patent applica-
tion, scope, and examiner data. While we cannot directly release certain variables
that contain personal information of USPTO examiners, this section provides an
overview on which variables are available from public data sources, which data
components to request via a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, and
how to reconstruct the sample. We constructed our sample using three publicly-
available data sources: Patent Examination Research Dataset - application data,
Patent Examination Research Dataset - transactions, and the Patent Claims Re-
search Dataset. Each of these datasets were produced by the USPTO’s Office of
Chief Economist (OCE) and can be found at https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-
resources/ip-policy/economic-research/research-datasets.
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B.2.1 Patent Examination Research Dataset
The Patent Examination Research Dataset - application data file contains patent
application data including application number, patent number, file and disposal
dates, technology classifications, examiner name etc. The Patent Examination Re-
search Dataset - transactions file contains the transaction history for each publicly-
available patent application filed from 2001 onward. From this file, we construct
the first-action allowance variables (FA allow) and RS Allow), where a first-action
allowance (FA allow) is defined to be an allowance without the observance of a
non-final rejection, final rejection, restriction, or Quayle action.3 We defined a first-
action allowance without an examiner’s amendment (RS allow) to be the same as
allow above, except applications with an examiner’s amendment (Exam Amend)
issued prior to the first-action allowance are reclassified to the same group as the
first-action rejections. Once the FA allow, RS allow, and Exam Amend variables
have been constructed at the application-level, the data can be linked to the Patent
Examination Research Dataset - application data file using the application number,
available in both datasets.
B.2.2 Patent Claims Research Dataset
The Patent Claims Research Dataset - PGPub document stats and patent document stats
files contain document-level claims statistics at PGPub and at grant. The indepen-
dent claim count (ICC) is defined as the number of independent claims at PGPub
(which is a good proxy for the number of claims at filing) and the independent
claim length (ICL) is defined as number of words in the shortest independent claim
at PGPub. ICC and ICL are contained in the Patent Claims Research Dataset - PG-
Pub document stats file (pub clm ct and pub wrd min, respectively). The change
in independent claim count (∆ICC) and length (∆ICL) were constructed by cre-
ating publication-patent pairs, or granted patents for which we observe both the
PGPub and granted patent. We linked the two datasets (PGPub document stats
and patent document stats) by application number, contained in both datasets. The
3The transaction codes are listed as follows: allowance (MN/=.), examiner’s amendment
(Exam Amend) non-final rejection (MCTNF), final rejection (MCTFR), restriction (MCTRS), or
Quayle action(MCTEQ).
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∆ICC and ∆ICL measures are then calculated by taking the simple difference,
e.g. ∆ICC = ICCGRANT − ICCPGPub and ∆ICL = ICLGRANT − ICLPGPub, for each
respective variable.4 This data can then be linked back to the application data us-
ing the patent application number, available in both the Patent Claims and Patent
Examination Research Datasets.
B.2.3 Examiner Docketing Data (FOIA)
The examiner docketing data contains date ranges during which an application is
docketed with a specific USPTO employee, typically an examiner. An application
may be transferred between and therefore records may show that the application
was docketed to multiple examiners over the course of prosecution. To determine
which examiner completed the FAOM decision, one should link the docketing data
with the application-level FAOM data described above and find which examiner
was docketed the application at the time of the FAOM decision. In some cases,
an application was docketed to multiple employees on the FAOM date, therefore
we assumed that the employee to which the application was docketed prior to the
FAOM date most likely conducted the FAOM decision. Therefore, all other ex-
aminers who had the application on their docket on the FAOM date were dropped.
This data has been previously disseminated to researchers via FOIA requests made
to the USPTO. To obtain this data, request data for all examiners docketed to each
publicly-available application and the respective docket date ranges.
B.2.4 Examiner Grade Data (FOIA)
The examiner grade data contains promotion dates for each examiner at the USPTO
over the course of their career (including start date), but is not currently publicly
available in a downloadable format. However, researchers have previously been
granted access to this data via a FOIA request to the USPTO. Specifically, re-
searchers should request the starting and promotion dates for each examiner at the
USPTO. In our sample, using the linked application-examiner data described above,
we determined the GS-level of each respective examiner at first action. We then
4In the patent document stats dataset, ICC and ICL at grant are labelled as pat clm ct and
pat wrd min, respectively.
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calculated experience by subtracting the examiner’s start date from the FAOM date
and divided the experience in days by 30.5 to obtain the experience in months. The
month variable was then truncated using the trunc() function in STATA. The trunc()
function rounds to the nearest integer toward zero.
B.2.4.1 Parent Type Variable
In this section, we detail the construction of the “parent type” variable (parent),
which is in fact a combination of variables contained in three Patent Examination
Research Dataset files: application data, continuity parent, and foreign priority.
First, we merge the application data and foreign priority files based on application
number (contained in both files) and create a binary indicator of foreign priority
for each application in the application data file, i.e. the indicator is equal to one if
the application had a foreign priority and 0 otherwise. Second, using the continu-
ity parent file, we subset the data by keeping the following parent-child patent ap-
plication relationships: continuation-in-part (CIP), continuation (CON), divisional
(DIV), and provisional (PRO). We further subset the data by keeping the most re-
cently filed parent application for each child application. Therefore, the remaining
observations should contain a unique parent-child relationship. We then merge this
data to the application data file by linking the child application numbers in the con-
tinuity parent file to the corresponding application numbers in the application data
file. Finally, we identify PCT applications by creating a binary indicator where
the application is declared to be a PCT application if the first three digits of the
application are “PCT” and is zero otherwise.
Therefore, using the variables created above, we construct the categorical vari-
able parent as follows:
• Foreign - An application has foreign priority but is not a PCT application.
• PCT Foreign - An application has foreign priority and is a PCT application.
• PCT US Application - An application has no foreign priority but is a PCT
application.
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• U.S. Continuation - An application has no foreign priority and is a continua-
tion of another U.S. application.
• U.S. Divisional - An application has no foreign priority and is a divisional
application.
• U.S. Continuation-in-part (CIP) - An application has no foreign priority and
is a CIP application.
• U.S. Provisional - An application has no foreign priority and is a provisional
application.
• U.S. New Application - An application has no foreign priority and has no
parent application.
B.2.4.2 Examiner Specialization
To control for examiner specialization, we generated two sets of measures: (1) the
number of USPCs in which an examiner examined during the previous year, and
(2) the average and variance of TF-IDF cosine similarity between pairs of claims
from first actions submitted by the examiner during the previous year. To calculate
(1), we used summed the number of unique USPCs for each given first-action year
and lagged the variable by one year. This variable captures the technological spread
of each examiner and allows that expertise to evolve over time. One downsize
to this approach is that the USPC specialization variable cannot be calculated for
observations in the examiner’s first year. To calculate (2), we calculated the pairwise
TF-IDF cosine similarity between each application with a first-action decision for a
given examiner in the previous year. The similarity measured was calculated using
the claims at PGPub. The average and variance of the TF-IDF cosine similarity
was then calculated for each examiner-year combination, except each examiner’s
starting year.
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B.3 General Robustness Check Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES TC-Year FE Bal. Sample Exp. FE Exp. Band FE USPC FE
Grade: GS-7 3.24e-06 -0.00194* 0.000880 0.000756 -0.000196
(0.000600) (0.000873) (0.000726) (0.000709) (0.000600)
Grade: GS-11 0.00240*** 0.00110 0.00179* 0.00187** 0.00288***
(0.000583) (0.00107) (0.000703) (0.000693) (0.000579)
Grade: GS-12 0.00378*** 0.000817 0.00310** 0.00323** 0.00428***
(0.000736) (0.00147) (0.00106) (0.00104) (0.000730)
Grade: GS-13 0.00639*** 0.00601*** 0.00651*** 0.00667*** 0.00731***
(0.000903) (0.00174) (0.00139) (0.00137) (0.000880)
Grade: GS-14 0.0123*** 0.00991*** 0.0139*** 0.0141*** 0.0136***
(0.00130) (0.00271) (0.00173) (0.00171) (0.00131)
Exper 0.000154*** 0.000146 0.000148***
(4.36e-05) (7.89e-05) (4.33e-05)
ICC -7.14e-05 0.000215* -7.33e-05 -7.61e-05 -8.16e-05
(5.59e-05) (0.000105) (5.58e-05) (5.59e-05) (5.65e-05)
ICL 0.000161*** 0.000187*** 0.000160*** 0.000161*** 0.000161***
(5.00e-06) (9.10e-06) (5.00e-06) (5.00e-06) (5.02e-06)
Constant -0.00978 -0.000331 -0.0148* -0.0144** -0.00899*
(0.00511) (0.00718) (0.00581) (0.00494) (0.00411)
Obs. 1,031,106 299,384 1,031,106 1,031,106 1,031,106
R-squared 0.012 0.014 0.012 0.012 0.012
Examiners 13,496 2,520 13,496 13,496 13,496
TC-by-Year FE YES YES YES YES NO
Balanced Panel NO YES NO NO NO
Exp. FE NO NO YES NO NO
Exp. Band FE NO NO NO YES NO
USPC FE NO NO NO NO YES
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions include first-action year and examiner
fixed effects. GS-level coefficients are relative to GS-9. Robust standard errors are clustered by
examiner and are reported in parentheses. Column (1) contains all new applications in Public Pair
with an observed first-action decision between 2001 and 2017. TC-by-year fixed effects were added
to Column (1). Column (2) includes only new applications for which the examiner started at GS-7
and was promoted through GS-14. Columns (3) and (4) include experience fixed effects (e.g., months
and 6-month bands, respectively). Column (5) contains USPC fixed Effects. Regressions in this table
correspond to modified versions of equation 3.3.
Table B.1: Robustness Check - Examiner’s Amendment (Dependent Variable:
Exam Amendeit)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES TC-Year FE Bal. Sample Exp. FE Exp. Band FE USPC FE
Grade: GS-7 -0.00145 -0.000219 4.48e-05 -0.000280 -0.00191*
(0.000845) (0.00123) (0.00103) (0.00101) (0.000845)
Grade: GS-11 0.000741 0.000833 0.000917 0.000877 0.000795
(0.000786) (0.00136) (0.001000) (0.000985) (0.000773)
Grade: GS-12 -0.000212 -0.000638 0.00151 0.00166 -0.000630
(0.00106) (0.00186) (0.00166) (0.00163) (0.00103)
Grade: GS-13 -0.000686 -0.00398 0.00378 0.00400 -0.000912
(0.00139) (0.00225) (0.00220) (0.00216) (0.00136)
Grade: GS-14 0.0246*** 0.0154*** 0.0290*** 0.0293*** 0.0248***
(0.00216) (0.00324) (0.00290) (0.00286) (0.00212)
Exper 1.47e-05 0.000196 4.15e-05
(6.48e-05) (0.000106) (6.45e-05)
ICC -0.00193*** -0.000921*** -0.00193*** -0.00193*** -0.00192***
(0.000195) (0.000196) (0.000194) (0.000194) (0.000195)
ICL 0.000480*** 0.000455*** 0.000479*** 0.000480*** 0.000480***
(1.23e-05) (1.81e-05) (1.22e-05) (1.23e-05) (1.23e-05)
Constant -0.00269 0.0237 0.0279 -0.00685 -0.0452***
(0.0137) (0.0170) (0.0344) (0.0136) (0.00861)
Obs. 1,031,106 299,384 1,031,106 1,031,106 1,031,106
R-squared 0.033 0.037 0.034 0.034 0.033
Examiners 13,496 2,520 13,496 13,496 13,496
TC-by-Year FE YES YES YES YES NO
Balanced Panel NO YES NO NO NO
Exp. FE NO NO YES NO NO
Exp. Band FE NO NO NO YES NO
USPC FE NO NO NO NO YES
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions include first-action year and examiner
fixed effects. GS-level coefficients are relative to GS-9. Robust standard errors are clustered by
examiner and are reported in parentheses. Column (1) contains all new applications in Public Pair
with an observed first-action decision between 2001 and 2017. TC-by-year fixed effects were added
to Column (1). Column (2) includes only new applications for which the examiner started at GS-7
and was promoted through GS-14. Columns (3) and (4) include experience fixed effects (e.g., months
and 6-month bands, respectively). Column (5) contains USPC fixed Effects. Regressions in this table
correspond to modified versions of equation 3.4.
Table B.2: Robustness Check - “True Rubber Stamp” Allowance (Dependent Variable:
RS Alloweit)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES All New Applications 3-year New Apps/3-year
Grade: GS-7 -0.00303** 0.000340 -0.00326** -0.000420
(0.00100) (0.00117) (0.00102) (0.00116)
Grade: GS-11 0.00439*** 0.00200 0.00413*** 0.00277**
(0.000849) (0.00105) (0.000900) (0.00107)
Grade: GS-12 0.00934*** 0.00147 0.00805*** 0.00305
(0.00115) (0.00140) (0.00142) (0.00158)
Grade: GS-13 0.0151*** 0.00398* 0.0140*** 0.00717**
(0.00146) (0.00176) (0.00195) (0.00221)
Grade: GS-14 0.0526*** 0.0362*** 0.0422*** 0.0325***
(0.00213) (0.00266) (0.00289) (0.00320)
Exper 0.000250*** 0.000278*** 0.000335*** 0.000269**
(4.69e-05) (7.94e-05) (6.06e-05) (8.97e-05)
ICC -0.00134* -0.00202*** -0.00139*** -0.00116***
(0.000617) (0.000215) (0.000244) (0.000146)
ICL 0.000361*** 0.000645*** 0.000344*** 0.000537***
(3.39e-05) (1.52e-05) (3.94e-05) (1.36e-05)
USPC Spec. (1-20) 0.00257* 0.00485*** 0.00440*** 0.00400**
(0.00116) (0.00132) (0.00109) (0.00123)
USPC Spec. (21-50) 0.00800*** 0.00680*** 0.00805*** 0.00615***
(0.00103) (0.00120) (0.000985) (0.00118)
USPC Spec. (51-100) 0.0102*** 0.00683*** 0.00757*** 0.00535***
(0.00110) (0.00130) (0.00104) (0.00127)
USPC Spec. (101-150) 0.0109*** 0.00947*** 0.00627*** 0.00493*
(0.00137) (0.00182) (0.00139) (0.00193)
USPC Spec. (>150) 0.00905*** 0.00979*** 0.00494** 0.00406
(0.00186) (0.00259) (0.00186) (0.00257)
Constant 0.0534*** -0.0122*** 0.0413*** -0.0104*
(0.00507) (0.00309) (0.00608) (0.00458)
Obs. 4,610,715 1,025,762 2,764,280 671,699
R-squared 0.029 0.041 0.032 0.038
Examiners 13,629 13,415 12,816 12,574
Parent Type FE YES NO YES NO
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions include first-action year and examiner
fixed effects. GS-level coefficients are relative to GS-9. USPC Subclass Specialization FE is defined
as the number of classes in which an examiner examined during the previous calendar year, relative
to zero classes. Robust standard errors are clustered by examiner and are reported in parentheses.
Column (1) contains all applications in Public Pair with an observed first-action decision between
2001 and 2017. Column (2) includes only new applications without a priority. Column (3) includes
applications where the first-action decision occurred within the first 3 years of promotion to the
examiner’s current grade. Column (4) includes the intersection of the samples used in Columns (2)
and (3). Regressions in this table correspond to a modified version of equation 3.2.
Table B.3: Robustness Check - First-action Allowance Regressions (Dependent Variable:
FA Alloweit) - Includes Subclass Specialization
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B.4 Examiner Specialization Tables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES All New Applications 3-year New Apps/3-year
Grade: GS-7 0.000324 0.00100 9.37e-05 0.000966
(0.000519) (0.000665) (0.000526) (0.000678)
Grade: GS-11 0.00232*** 0.00213*** 0.00222*** 0.00213**
(0.000458) (0.000616) (0.000480) (0.000652)
Grade: GS-12 0.00456*** 0.00326*** 0.00396*** 0.00334***
(0.000587) (0.000777) (0.000730) (0.000913)
Grade: GS-13 0.00868*** 0.00627*** 0.00782*** 0.00668***
(0.000735) (0.000923) (0.000982) (0.00127)
Grade: GS-14 0.0148*** 0.0127*** 0.0137*** 0.0136***
(0.00109) (0.00135) (0.00145) (0.00186)
Exper 0.000245*** 0.000194*** 0.000235*** 0.000194***
(2.56e-05) (4.57e-05) (3.34e-05) (5.22e-05)
ICC -0.000231** -8.35e-05 -0.000188** 6.77e-05
(8.13e-05) (5.67e-05) (6.46e-05) (6.54e-05)
ICL 8.77e-05*** 0.000162*** 9.62e-05*** 0.000154***
(8.34e-06) (5.01e-06) (1.11e-05) (5.41e-06)
USPC Spec. (1-20) 0.00374*** 0.00252*** 0.00370*** 0.00231**
(0.000589) (0.000714) (0.000600) (0.000730)
USPC Spec. (21-50) 0.00468*** 0.00371*** 0.00450*** 0.00403***
(0.000538) (0.000683) (0.000537) (0.000706)
USPC Spec. (51-100) 0.00457*** 0.00308*** 0.00310*** 0.00234**
(0.000559) (0.000730) (0.000578) (0.000769)
USPC Spec. (101-150) 0.00486*** 0.00337*** 0.00262*** 0.00193
(0.000689) (0.000931) (0.000735) (0.00109)
USPC Spec. (>150) 0.00551*** 0.00319* 0.00317*** 0.00194
(0.000922) (0.00124) (0.000951) (0.00142)
Constant -0.0160*** -0.0211*** -0.00389 -0.00989***
(0.00139) (0.00120) (0.00216) (0.00233)
Obs. 4,610,715 1,025,762 2,764,280 671,699
R-squared 0.008 0.011 0.010 0.011
Examiners 13,629 13,415 12,816 12,574
Parent Type FE YES NO YES NO
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions include first-action year and examiner
fixed effects. GS-level coefficients are relative to GS-9. USPC Subclass Specialization FE is defined
as the number of classes in which an examiner examined during the previous calendar year, relative
to zero classes. Robust standard errors are clustered by examiner and are reported in parentheses.
Column (1) contains all applications in Public Pair with an observed first-action decision between
2001 and 2017. Column (2) includes only new applications without a priority. Column (3) includes
applications where the first-action decision occurred within the first 3 years of promotion to the
examiner’s current grade. Column (4) includes the intersection of the samples used in Columns (2)
and (3). Regressions in this table correspond to a modified version of equation 3.3.
Table B.4: Robustness Check - Examiner Amendment Regressions (Dependent Variable:
Exam Amendeit) - Includes Subclass Specialization
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES All New Applications 3-year New Apps/3-year
Grade: GS-7 -0.00336*** -0.000656 -0.00336*** -0.00137
(0.000805) (0.000929) (0.000809) (0.000910)
Grade: GS-11 0.00207** -0.000147 0.00190** 0.000629
(0.000669) (0.000830) (0.000697) (0.000837)
Grade: GS-12 0.00477*** -0.00180 0.00408*** -0.000313
(0.000942) (0.00113) (0.00111) (0.00123)
Grade: GS-13 0.00643*** -0.00230 0.00622*** 0.000469
(0.00125) (0.00147) (0.00157) (0.00172)
Grade: GS-14 0.0378*** 0.0235*** 0.0286*** 0.0189***
(0.00187) (0.00225) (0.00234) (0.00248)
Exper 3.21e-06 8.35e-05 9.91e-05* 7.40e-05
(4.05e-05) (6.81e-05) (4.93e-05) (7.43e-05)
ICC -0.00111* -0.00193*** -0.00120*** -0.00123***
(0.000545) (0.000197) (0.000187) (0.000121)
ICL 0.000273*** 0.000483*** 0.000248*** 0.000383***
(2.58e-05) (1.22e-05) (2.85e-05) (1.07e-05)
USPC Spec. (1-20) -0.00118 0.00234* 0.000691 0.00171
(0.000961) (0.00108) (0.000866) (0.000966)
USPC Spec. (21-50) 0.00331*** 0.00309** 0.00354*** 0.00212*
(0.000862) (0.000955) (0.000794) (0.000909)
USPC Spec. (51-100) 0.00565*** 0.00375*** 0.00446*** 0.00301**
(0.000911) (0.00105) (0.000832) (0.000984)
USPC Spec. (101-150) 0.00607*** 0.00611*** 0.00365** 0.00303
(0.00116) (0.00158) (0.00115) (0.00159)
USPC Spec. (>150) 0.00354* 0.00662** 0.00176 0.00214
(0.00158) (0.00225) (0.00147) (0.00218)
Constant 0.0694*** 0.00890** 0.0451*** -0.000530
(0.00417) (0.00272) (0.00469) (0.00393)
Obs. 4,610,715 1,025,762 2,764,280 671,699
R-squared 0.023 0.031 0.023 0.027
Examiners 13,629 13,415 12,816 12,574
Parent Type FE YES NO YES NO
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions include first-action year and examiner
fixed effects. GS-level coefficients are relative to GS-9. USPC Subclass Specialization FE is defined
as the number of classes in which an examiner examined during the previous calendar year, relative
to zero classes. Robust standard errors are clustered by examiner and are reported in parentheses.
Column (1) contains all applications in Public Pair with an observed first-action decision between
2001 and 2017. Column (2) includes only new applications without a priority. Column (3) includes
applications where the first-action decision occurred within the first 3 years of promotion to the
examiner’s current grade. Column (4) includes the intersection of the samples used in Columns (2)
and (3). Regressions in this table correspond to a modified version of equation 3.4.
Table B.5: Robustness Check - “True Rubber Stamp” Allowance (Dependent Variable:
RS Alloweit) - Includes Subclass Specialization
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES All New Applications 3-year New Apps/3-year
Grade: GS-7 -0.00477*** 0.000747 -0.00436*** 0.000730
(0.00127) (0.00157) (0.00126) (0.00153)
Grade: GS-11 0.00479*** 0.00181 0.00428*** 0.00257*
(0.000948) (0.00119) (0.00103) (0.00124)
Grade: GS-12 0.00997*** 0.00176 0.00831*** 0.00328
(0.00122) (0.00148) (0.00155) (0.00174)
Grade: GS-13 0.0160*** 0.00408* 0.0145*** 0.00714**
(0.00152) (0.00185) (0.00211) (0.00244)
Grade: GS-14 0.0534*** 0.0361*** 0.0427*** 0.0320***
(0.00220) (0.00274) (0.00310) (0.00347)
Exper 0.000209*** 0.000260** 0.000286*** 0.000270**
(4.83e-05) (8.38e-05) (6.41e-05) (9.71e-05)
ICC -0.00141* -0.00226*** -0.00153*** -0.00138***
(0.000661) (0.000253) (0.000277) (0.000166)
ICL 0.000368*** 0.000678*** 0.000356*** 0.000577***
(3.60e-05) (1.66e-05) (4.40e-05) (1.50e-05)
Mean Sim. -0.0757*** -0.0800** -0.0508** -0.0577*
(0.0197) (0.0256) (0.0188) (0.0276)
Var. Sim. 0.200*** 0.193* 0.164** 0.191*
(0.0574) (0.0784) (0.0551) (0.0780)
Constant 0.0633*** -0.00674 0.0501*** -0.00685
(0.00547) (0.00363) (0.00692) (0.00517)
Obs. 4,274,690 924,390 2,445,179 574,740
R-squared 0.029 0.043 0.031 0.040
Examiners 12,399 12,160 11,581 11,314
Parent Type FE YES NO YES NO
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions include first-action year and
examiner fixed effects. GS-level coefficients are relative to GS-9. Similarity measures are
defined as the average (Mean Sim.) and variance (Var. Sim.) of the pairwise TF-IDF cosine
similarity for all applications with a first action decision by a given examiner during the pre-
vious year. Robust standard errors are clustered by examiner and are reported in parentheses.
Column (1) contains all applications in Public Pair with an observed first-action decision be-
tween 2001 and 2017. Column (2) includes only new applications without a priority. Column
(3) includes applications where the first-action decision occurred within the first 3 years of
promotion to the examiner’s current grade. Column (4) includes the intersection of the sam-
ples used in Columns (2) and (3). Regressions in this table correspond to a modified version
of equation 3.2.
Table B.6: Robustness Check - First-action Allowance Regressions (Dependent
Variable: FA Alloweit) - Includes Similarity Specialization
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES All New Applications 3-year New Apps/3-year
Grade: GS-7 -0.00133* 0.00115 -0.000904 0.00183*
(0.000627) (0.000866) (0.000653) (0.000891)
Grade: GS-11 0.00201*** 0.00173* 0.00177** 0.00162*
(0.000505) (0.000696) (0.000543) (0.000748)
Grade: GS-12 0.00426*** 0.00320*** 0.00328*** 0.00291**
(0.000622) (0.000822) (0.000793) (0.00100)
Grade: GS-13 0.00833*** 0.00614*** 0.00688*** 0.00592***
(0.000765) (0.000973) (0.00105) (0.00139)
Grade: GS-14 0.0144*** 0.0124*** 0.0122*** 0.0123***
(0.00111) (0.00139) (0.00153) (0.00200)
Exper 0.000235*** 0.000199*** 0.000238*** 0.000230***
(2.64e-05) (4.83e-05) (3.54e-05) (5.69e-05)
ICC -0.000243** -0.000113 -0.000218** 4.28e-05
(8.80e-05) (6.21e-05) (7.14e-05) (7.45e-05)
ICL 8.86e-05*** 0.000168*** 9.85e-05*** 0.000162***
(8.77e-06) (5.39e-06) (1.23e-05) (5.92e-06)
Mean Sim. -0.00993 0.00191 -0.00305 -0.0155
(0.00969) (0.0147) (0.00949) (0.0137)
Var. Sim. 0.0113 -0.0293 0.0368 0.0299
(0.0294) (0.0403) (0.0310) (0.0392)
Constant -0.0132*** -0.0199*** -0.00161 -0.00632*
(0.00156) (0.00147) (0.00245) (0.00255)
Obs. 4,274,690 924,390 2,445,179 574,740
R-squared 0.008 0.011 0.009 0.011
Examiners 12,399 12,160 11,581 11,314
Parent Type FE YES NO YES NO
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions include first-action year and
examiner fixed effects. GS-level coefficients are relative to GS-9. Similarity measures are
defined as the average (Mean Sim.) and variance (Var. Sim.) of the pairwise TF-IDF cosine
similarity for all applications with a first action decision by a given examiner during the pre-
vious year. Robust standard errors are clustered by examiner and are reported in parentheses.
Column (1) contains all applications in Public Pair with an observed first-action decision be-
tween 2001 and 2017. Column (2) includes only new applications without a priority. Column
(3) includes applications where the first-action decision occurred within the first 3 years of
promotion to the examiner’s current grade. Column (4) includes the intersection of the sam-
ples used in Columns (2) and (3). Regressions in this table correspond to a modified version
of equation 3.3.
Table B.7: Robustness Check - Examiner Amendment Regressions (Dependent Vari-
able: Exam Amendeit) - Includes Similarity Specialization
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES All New Applications 3-year New Apps/3-year
Grade: GS-7 -0.00344*** -0.000365 -0.00346*** -0.00106
(0.00104) (0.00128) (0.00103) (0.00124)
Grade: GS-11 0.00277*** 7.29e-05 0.00250** 0.000937
(0.000763) (0.000941) (0.000810) (0.000967)
Grade: GS-12 0.00570*** -0.00145 0.00501*** 0.000366
(0.00100) (0.00120) (0.00122) (0.00135)
Grade: GS-13 0.00763*** -0.00206 0.00756*** 0.00120
(0.00131) (0.00155) (0.00171) (0.00190)
Grade: GS-14 0.0390*** 0.0237*** 0.0304*** 0.0197***
(0.00194) (0.00232) (0.00251) (0.00271)
Exper -2.75e-05 6.05e-05 4.72e-05 4.01e-05
(4.18e-05) (7.19e-05) (5.24e-05) (8.04e-05)
ICC -0.00117* -0.00215*** -0.00132*** -0.00142***
(0.000582) (0.000230) (0.000213) (0.000138)
ICL 0.000279*** 0.000511*** 0.000258*** 0.000415***
(2.74e-05) (1.33e-05) (3.19e-05) (1.19e-05)
Mean Sim. -0.0658*** -0.0822*** -0.0479** -0.0427
(0.0164) (0.0208) (0.0157) (0.0231)
Var. Sim. 0.189*** 0.223*** 0.128** 0.163**
(0.0450) (0.0636) (0.0409) (0.0627)
Constant 0.0765*** 0.0132*** 0.0517*** -0.000530
(0.00453) (0.00322) (0.00540) (0.00447)
Obs. 4,274,690 924,390 2,445,179 574,740
R-squared 0.023 0.033 0.023 0.029
Examiners 12,399 12,160 11,581 11,314
Parent Type FE YES NO YES NO
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions include first-action year and
examiner fixed effects. GS-level coefficients are relative to GS-9. Similarity measures are
defined as the average (Mean Sim.) and variance (Var. Sim.) of the pairwise TF-IDF cosine
similarity for all applications with a first action decision by a given examiner during the pre-
vious year. Robust standard errors are clustered by examiner and are reported in parentheses.
Column (1) contains all applications in Public Pair with an observed first-action decision be-
tween 2001 and 2017. Column (2) includes only new applications without a priority. Column
(3) includes applications where the first-action decision occurred within the first 3 years of
promotion to the examiner’s current grade. Column (4) includes the intersection of the sam-
ples used in Columns (2) and (3). Regressions in this table correspond to a modified version
of equation 3.4.
Table B.8: Robustness Check - “True Rubber Stamp” Allowance (Dependent Vari-
able: RS Alloweit) - Includes Similarity Specialization
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B.5 Examination Quality Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV
Exam Amend -15.45*** 0.587 -16.23*** 16.43
(0.820) (5.610) (0.749) (12.18)
Exper 0.0458* 0.0391* -0.0519 -0.0506
(0.0197) (0.0192) (0.0391) (0.0398)
ICC 0.463*** 0.437*** -1.218*** -1.280***
(0.113) (0.0245) (0.143) (0.0896)
ICL -0.186*** -0.191*** -0.154*** -0.168***
(0.0196) (0.00180) (0.0101) (0.00518)
Constant 48.54*** 49.07 50.18*** 49.46
(2.470) (63.00) (4.090) (57.48)
Obs. 1,032,745 1,020,144 207,958 204,376
R-squared 0.084 0.0688 0.049 0.0520
Examiners 12,700 12,043 10,848 10,326
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The sample for each regression
in this table includes all applications with a first-action allowance with an exam-
iner’s amendment or a single non-final rejection and subsequent allowance. The
sample is further restricted to exclude any applications with a claim amendment
filing by the applicant between the pre-grant publication (PGPub) date and the
first-action date. Regressions include first-action year, examiner, GS-level, and
specialization fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by examiner and
are reported in parentheses. Columns (1) and (3) contain the OLS estimates and
Columns (2) and (4) contain the IV estimates. Regressions in this table corre-
spond to equation 3.5.
Table B.9: Examination Quality (Dependent Variable: ∆ICL) Between
Allowed Patent Applications With One Rejection and FA Al-
lowances with an Examiner’s Amendment (APPFT)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV
Exam Amend -0.423*** -0.277 -0.478*** -0.753
(0.0186) (0.273) (0.0206) (0.560)
Exper -0.0129*** -0.0132*** -0.00893*** -0.00924***
(0.00103) (0.000937) (0.00182) (0.00183)
ICC -0.546*** -0.549*** 0.370*** 0.375***
(0.151) (0.00119) (0.0505) (0.00412)
ICL -0.00223*** -0.00229*** -0.000646** -0.000559*
(0.000531) (8.76e-05) (0.000211) (0.000238)
Constant 4.141*** 4.207 1.937*** 1.991
(0.464) (3.068) (0.283) (2.643)
Obs. 1,032,756 1,020,155 207,961 204,379
R-squared 0.188 0.130 0.062 0.0370
Examiners 12,700 12,043 10,848 10,326
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The sample for each regression in this
table includes all applications with a first-action allowance with an examiner’s amendment
or a single non-final rejection and subsequent allowance. The sample is further restricted to
exclude any applications with a claim amendment filing by the applicant between the pre-
grant publication (PGPub) date and the first-action date. Regressions include first-action year,
examiner, GS-level, and specialization fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by
examiner and are reported in parentheses. Columns (1) and (3) contain the OLS estimates
and Columns (2) and (4) contain the IV estimates. Regressions in this table correspond to
equation 3.5.
Table B.10: Examination Quality (Dependent Variable: ∆ICC) Between Allowed
Patent Applications With One Rejection and FA Allowances with an Ex-
aminer’s Amendment (APPFT)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV
Exam Amend -13.55*** 1.613 -13.87*** 9.582
(0.806) (4.918) (0.685) (9.082)
Exper 0.0498* 0.0405* -0.0440 -0.0481
(0.0195) (0.0192) (0.0386) (0.0395)
ICC 0.491*** 0.465*** -1.163*** -1.208***
(0.119) (0.0244) (0.140) (0.0874)
ICL -0.183*** -0.188*** -0.155*** -0.167***
(0.0193) (0.00180) (0.00977) (0.00485)
Constant 47.91*** 48.69 49.28*** 48.95
(2.465) (63.14) (4.091) (57.40)
Obs. 1,055,264 1,042,554 212,990 209,376
R-squared 0.083 0.0671 0.050 0.0559
Examiners 12,712 12,053 10,879 10,358
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The sample for each regres-
sion in this table includes all applications with a first-action allowance with an
examiner’s amendment or a single non-final rejection and subsequent allowance.
Regressions include first-action year, examiner, GS-level, and specialization fixed
effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by examiner and are reported in
parentheses. Columns (1) and (3) contain the OLS estimates and Columns (2)
and (4) contain the IV estimates. Regressions in this table correspond to equation
3.5.
Table B.11: Examination Quality (Dependent Variable: ∆ICL) Between
Allowed Patent Applications With One Rejection and FA Al-
lowances with an Examiner’s Amendment
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV
Exam Amend -0.428*** -0.266 -0.522*** -0.608
(0.0172) (0.238) (0.0186) (0.415)
Exper -0.0128*** -0.0132*** -0.00876*** -0.00907***
(0.00101) (0.000926) (0.00178) (0.00180)
ICC -0.541*** -0.545*** 0.370*** 0.375***
(0.151) (0.00118) (0.0498) (0.00399)
ICL -0.00219*** -0.00227*** -0.000608** -0.000585**
(0.000526) (8.71e-05) (0.000206) (0.000221)
Constant 4.144*** 4.214 1.956*** 2.013
(0.464) (3.052) (0.279) (2.621)
Obs. 1,055,275 1,042,565 212,993 209,379
R-squared 0.185 0.128 0.064 0.0388
Examiners 12,712 12,053 10,879 10,358
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The sample for each regression in this table
includes all applications with a first-action allowance with an examiner’s amendment or a
single non-final rejection and subsequent allowance. Regressions include first-action year,
examiner, GS-level, and specialization fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by
examiner and are reported in parentheses. Columns (1) and (3) contain the OLS estimates
and Columns (2) and (4) contain the IV estimates. Regressions in this table correspond to
equation 3.5.
Table B.12: Examination Quality (Dependent Variable: ∆ICC) Between Allowed
Patent Applications With One Rejection and FA Allowances with an Ex-
aminer’s Amendment
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B.6 Examiner’s Amendment Quality by Grade and
Experience Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES All New Applications 3-year New Apps/3-year
Grade: GS-7 -3.794 -10.29* -3.718 -9.318
(2.423) (5.626) (2.583) (5.956)
Grade: GS-11 1.894 -5.298 1.192 -7.301
(1.944) (5.582) (2.079) (6.061)
Grade: GS-12 4.629** 5.824 3.790* 4.951
(1.890) (5.414) (2.218) (6.702)
Grade: GS-13 2.891 1.986 1.365 -1.101
(1.847) (5.144) (2.426) (7.546)
Grade: GS-14 0.176 -5.671 -2.562 -11.35
(2.043) (5.188) (3.258) (10.14)
Exper 0.0143 -0.142 -0.0195 -0.233
(0.0668) (0.193) (0.113) (0.384)
ICC 1.857*** 1.902*** 2.203*** 2.214**
(0.558) (0.635) (0.310) (1.031)
ICL -0.101*** -0.0746*** -0.116*** -0.0742***
(0.0102) (0.0141) (0.0172) (0.0258)
Constant 72.15*** 11.47 57.18*** -0.624
(12.53) (13.63) (13.02) (21.60)
Obs. 73,951 12,053 37,391 6,468
R-squared 0.053 0.028 0.058 0.028
Examiners 7,810 3,934 6,517 2,885
Parent Type FE YES NO YES NO
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions include first-action year and ex-
aminer fixed effects. GS-level coefficients are relative to GS-9. The sample for each regression
in this table includes all applications with a first-action allowance with an examiner’s amend-
ment. The sample is further restricted to exclude any applications with a claim amendment
filing by the applicant between the pre-grant publication (PGPub) date and the first-action
date. Robust standard errors are clustered by examiner and are reported in parentheses. Col-
umn (1) contains all applications in Public Pair with an observed first-action decision between
2001 and 2017. Column (2) includes only new applications without a priority. Column (3)
includes applications where the first-action decision occurred within the first 3 years of pro-
motion to the examiner’s current grade. Column (4) includes the intersection of the samples
used in Columns (2) and (3). Regressions in this table correspond to equation 3.4.
Table B.13: Examiner’s Amendment Quality and ∆ICL (Dependent Variable: ∆ICL)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES All New Applications 3-year New Apps/3-year
Grade: GS-7 0.0385 0.125* 0.0365 0.187**
(0.0388) (0.0730) (0.0358) (0.0767)
Grade: GS-11 0.00124 0.0409 0.000815 0.0694
(0.0313) (0.0637) (0.0297) (0.0678)
Grade: GS-12 -0.00668 0.00755 0.0209 0.0293
(0.0322) (0.0617) (0.0344) (0.0730)
Grade: GS-13 -0.00428 0.0622 0.0562 0.123
(0.0329) (0.0618) (0.0372) (0.0845)
Grade: GS-14 0.0195 0.0702 0.107** 0.150
(0.0351) (0.0661) (0.0479) (0.111)
Exper 0.000726 0.00356 0.00184 0.00335
(0.00116) (0.00236) (0.00161) (0.00449)
ICC -0.591*** -0.263*** -0.397*** -0.315***
(0.132) (0.0331) (0.0306) (0.0587)
ICL -0.000456 0.000197 0.000140* 0.000109
(0.000377) (0.000136) (7.47e-05) (0.000193)
Constant 0.538 0.547 -0.391 0.425
(0.700) (0.399) (0.427) (0.518)
Obs. 73,951 12,053 37,391 6,468
R-squared 0.562 0.205 0.361 0.254
Examiners 7,810 3,934 6,517 2,885
Parent Type FE YES NO YES NO
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions include first-action year and ex-
aminer fixed effects. GS-level coefficients are relative to GS-9. The sample for each regression
in this table includes all applications with a first-action allowance with an examiner’s amend-
ment. The sample is further restricted to exclude any applications with a claim amendment
filing by the applicant between the pre-grant publication (PGPub) date and the first-action date.
Robust standard errors are clustered by examiner and are reported in parentheses. Column (1)
contains all applications in Public Pair with an observed first-action decision between 2001 and
2017. Column (2) includes only new applications without a priority. Column (3) includes ap-
plications where the first-action decision occurred within the first 3 years of promotion to the
examiner’s current grade. Column (4) includes the intersection of the samples used in Columns
(2) and (3). Regressions in this table correspond to equation 3.4.
Table B.14: Examiner’s Amendment Quality and ∆ICC (Dependent Variable: ∆ICC)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV
Exam Amend -0.789*** -0.737*** -0.783*** -0.798***
(0.00214) (0.0223) (0.00408) (0.0474)
Exper 0.00123*** 0.00121*** 0.000968*** 0.000999***
(9.12e-05) (8.70e-05) (0.000207) (0.000205)
ICC 0.00314*** 0.00307*** 0.00601*** 0.00613***
(0.000409) (0.000111) (0.000535) (0.000454)
ICL -8.70e-05*** -0.000105*** -0.000112*** -0.000104***
(8.98e-06) (8.17e-06) (1.30e-05) (2.53e-05)
Constant 2.269*** 2.271*** 2.176*** 2.174***
(0.00934) (0.286) (0.0196) (0.298)
Obs. 1,054,801 1,042,092 212,949 209,340
R-squared 0.416 0.374 0.380 0.351
Examiners 12,711 12,052 10,876 10,358
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The sample for each regression in this table
includes all applications with a first-action allowance with an examiner’s amendment or a
single non-final rejection and subsequent allowance. Regressions include first-action year,
examiner, GS-level, and specialization fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by
examiner and are reported in parentheses. Columns (1) and (3) contain the OLS estimates
and Columns (2) and (4) contain the IV estimates. Regressions in this table correspond to
equation 3.6.
Table B.15: Examiner Amendments and Log Post-first-action Pendency (Depen-
dent Variable: ln(PENDeit))
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(a) All GS-Levels
(b) GS-levels 7 Through 13
Figure B.13: GS-Level Effect for (a) All GS-Levels and (b) GS-levels 7 Through 13
Appendix C
Patent Validity and Follow-on
Patenting: Evidence From Ex Parte
Reexamination at the USPTO
C.1 Matching Procedure
DiD-matching combines two popular econometric techniques, Difference-in-
differences (DiD) and matching. This sections discusses the simple matching
estimator, how the assumptions associated with this estimator fail when applied
to the setting described in this paper, and how the matching algorithm of the
DiD-matching estimator was executed. Typically matching estimators require un-
confoundedness (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983; Rubin 1990):
{Yi(0),Yi(1)}Ti|Xi (C.1)
or in other words, conditional on the set of covariates (Xi), treatment assignment
(Ti) is independent of outcomes. This process is also referred to as the Conditional
Independence Assumption (Angrist and Pishcke 2009). Under equation C.1 and the
overlap assumption (0 < P[Ti = 1|Xi]< 1), one can use the propensity score to find
suitable matches between the treatment and set of potential controls (Rosenbaum
and Rubin 1983). To estimate a causal effect, both assumptions mentioned above
must hold. In this paper, the unconfoundedness assumption is violated because
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there is almost certainly unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity (patent quality,
innovative step, etc.) that is correlated with selection into reexamination. While
the matching and DiD methods are not appropriate in this setting, econometricians
have developed a method that combines features of the two estimation methods to
produce a new type of estimator, DiD-matching.
I constructed a comparison set treated and non-treated observations, matched
on the observable characteristics that might influence selection into reexamination,
as discussed in Section 4.5. A combination propensity score and exact matching
algorithm is used in the main empirical portion of this paper to ensure pre-treatment
similarity of the treatment and control groups. The sets of treated and non-treated
patents are initially matched directly on issue year, entity size, and NBER tech-
nology classification. This initial match limits the number of potential matches for
each “treated” patent but ensures that each potential match will be similar in techno-
logical content and face a consistent USPTO examination landscape. The matching
procedure was implemented using a propensity score matching package (matchit) in
R. The propensity matching process includes regressing the probability of treatment
on the set of observed covariates (family size, backward citations, pre-treatment ci-
tations,1 ICL, ICC, pendency) within exact matching group, where the propensity
score is the predicted probability of treatment. The propensity score in this instance
was estimated with a logit regression and each treated patent was matched “to the
nearest control unit on the unidimensional metric of the propensity score vector,”
(Sekhon 2011).2 According to Sekhon (2011), in order to avoid the issue of com-
pressed probability scores near 0 or 1 when using a logit model, the matched sets are
1Researchers using DiD-matching estimators often condition on pre-treatment outcomes when
the conditional parallel trends assumption fails (Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd 1997; Heck-
man, Ichimura, and Smith 1998; and Calel and Dechezleprêtre 2016). As Chabé-Ferret (2017) sum-
marizes, “The theoretical argument suggests that combining DID with conditioning of pre-treatment
outcomes combines the strengths of both methods: DID differences out the permanent confounders
while conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes captures transitory ones.” A working paper, Chabé-
Ferret (2017), argues that this practice is flawed and might increase the bias of the difference-in-
differences estimator. Chabé-Ferret (2017) suggests using “DID symmetrically around the treatment
date,” if the conditional parallel trends assumption fails, which was done in this paper. It should be
noted that the paper has yet to be published and the debate surrounding this practice has not been
settled.
2This process is also called “Nearest Neighbor Matching” or “NNM”. The set of potential
matches is restricted to one control per treated patent.
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constructed using the linear predictor (µ̂ = X ′β̂ ) and not the predicted probabilities.
C.2 Verifying Assumptions
C.2.1 Assumption 1
The SUTVA assumption requires “no interference”, or that successful reexamina-
tion does not affect the potential follow-on patenting outcomes of other patents. At
first glance, one could argue that the validation of a patent through reexamination
would send a signal of patent strength to competitors that operate in the surround
technology space, violating Assumption 1. While this conclusion is possible, one
could also argue that, due to large sets of available comparison patents, the control
group could include patents representing a similar technology to the reexamined
patent but not directly influenced by the reexamination process. A prior art cita-
tion consists of “patents or printed publications which that person believes to have
a bearing on the patentability of any claim of a particular patent,” (35 USC 301). In
other words, the claimed invention in the citing patent is directly or indirectly related
to the citing patent’s claimed invention in at least some form. Prior art is cited a few
ways, but the two main types of citations are examiner and applicant citations. The
applicant, who has a duty to disclose all relevant prior art,3 submits an Information
Disclosure Statement containing all relevant prior art to the USPTO during prose-
cution. Typically before the first-action-on-the-merits, the examiner assigned to the
patent application performs her own prior art search on the claimed invention and
includes all relevant prior art in a PTO-892 form (MPEP 707.05). The combined
prior art citations should include most relevant art related to the claimed invention,
though errors can happen. To reduce the likelihood of violating the SUTVA, po-
tential matches cited by or citing the reexamined patents were removed prior to
matching.
3“Each individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent application has a duty of
candor and good faith in dealing with the Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all
information known to that individual to be material to patentability,” (37 CFR 1.56).
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C.3 Robustness Checks
C.3.1 Parallel Trends Figures
Figure C.1: Logged Annual Forward Self-citations - Treatment and Control Groups
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Figure C.2: Logged Annual Forward External Citations - Treatment and Control Groups




Total Internal External Total Internal External
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 0.503∗∗∗ 0.126∗ 0.454∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗ 0.233 0.383∗∗
(0.112) (0.070) (0.113) (0.143) (0.160) (0.150)
Period FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
Post FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 9,562 9,562 9,562 2,732 2,732 2,732
R2 0.028 0.018 0.027 0.005 0.025 0.005
Significant at * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Regression results shown in cols 1 through 3
include subset of the main sample which includes treated patents that were reexamined a single
time (and their matched pairs). Regression results shown in cols 4 through 6 include a subset of
the main 2-period panel sample (citations three years before and three years after reexamination)
which includes treated patents that were reexamined a single time (and their matched pairs). The
dependent variable are defined as the number of all (cols. 1 and 4), internal (cols. 2 and 5), and
external (cols. 3 and 6) forward citations. Each regression contains grant year and patent fixed
effects. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered by patent.
Table C.1: Matching-DiD Results - Single Reexamination
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Dependent variable:
Full Sample 2-Period
Total Internal External Total Internal External
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 0.488∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗ 0.521∗∗∗ 0.258 0.537∗∗∗
(0.122) (0.079) (0.124) (0.151) (0.175) (0.160)
Period FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
Post FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 7,378 7,378 7,378 2,108 2,108 2,108
R2 0.037 0.014 0.035 0.013 0.018 0.013
Significant at * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Regression results shown in cols 1 through 3
include a subset of the main sample. Regression results shown in cols 4 through 6 include a 2-
period panel of the 702 matched patent pairs (citations three years before and three years after
reexamination). Both sets of regressions are restricted to only those reexamined patents that were
reexamined between 2004 and 2010 (and their respected matched control patent). The dependent
variable are defined as the number of all (cols. 1 and 4), internal (cols. 2 and 5), and external (cols.
3 and 6) forward citations. Each regression contains grant year and patent fixed effects. Standard
errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered by patent.
Table C.2: Matching-DiD Results - Reexam. Year 2004-2010
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Dependent variable:
Full Sample 2-Period
Total Internal External Total Internal External
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 0.559∗∗ 0.039 0.567∗∗ 0.022 0.226 0.050
(0.239) (0.136) (0.242) (0.328) (0.339) (0.342)
Period FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
Post FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 2,450 2,450 2,450 700 700 700
R2 0.014 0.037 0.017 0.002 0.054 0.004
Significant at * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Regression results shown in cols 1 through
3 include a subset of the main sample. Regression results shown in cols 4 through 6 include
a 2-period panel of the 702 matched patent pairs (citations three years before and three years
after reexamination). Both sets of regressions are restricted to only those reexamined patents
that were reexamined between 1999 and 2003 (and their respected matched control patent). The
dependent variable are defined as the number of all (cols. 1 and 4), internal (cols. 2 and 5), and
external (cols. 3 and 6) forward citations. Each regression contains grant year and patent fixed
effects. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered by patent.
Table C.3: Matching-DiD Results - Reexam. Year 1999-2003
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Dependent variable:
Full Sample 2-Period
Total Internal External Total Internal External
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 0.548∗∗∗ 0.136∗ 0.506∗∗∗ 0.438∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗
(0.126) (0.082) (0.128) (0.161) (0.189) (0.171)
Period FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
Post FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 7,602 7,602 7,602 2,172 2,172 2,172
R2 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.007 0.031 0.007
Significant at * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Regression results shown in cols 1 through 3
include a panel dataset of the 702 matched patent pairs. Regression results shown in cols 4 through
6 include a 2-period panel dataset of the 702 matched patent pairs (citations three years before
and three years after reexamination). The sample is restricted to only those reexamined patents
that were reexamined ten years or fewer years after issuance (and their respected matched control
patent). The dependent variable are defined as the number of all (cols. 1 and 4), internal (cols.
2 and 5), and external (cols. 3 and 6) forward citations. Each regression contains grant year and
patent fixed effects. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered by patent.
Table C.4: Matching-DiD Results - ≤ 10 years
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C.3.3 Regression Results - Non-litigated Patents
Dependent variable:
Full Sample Single Reexam.
Total Internal External Total Internal External
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 0.572∗∗∗ 0.098 0.503∗∗∗ 0.398∗ 0.239 0.411∗
(0.158) (0.093) (0.161) (0.218) (0.219) (0.227)
Period FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
Post FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 5,208 5,208 5,208 1,488 1,488 1,488
R2 0.024 0.020 0.023 0.005 0.034 0.005
Significant at * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Regression results shown in cols 1
through 3 include a subset of the main sample. Regression results shown in cols 4
through 6 include a 2-period panel of the non-litigated matched patent pairs (citations
three years before and three years after reexamination). Both sets of regressions are re-
stricted to only those reexamined patents that had never been litigated (and their matched
pairs). The dependent variable are defined as the number of all (cols. 1 and 4), internal
(cols. 2 and 5), and external (cols. 3 and 6) forward citations. Each regression contains
grant year and patent fixed effects. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are
clustered by patent.
Table C.5: Matching-DiD Results - Non-litigated Patents - Main Results
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Dependent variable:
Full Sample 2-Period
Total Internal External Total Internal External
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 0.568∗∗∗ 0.097 0.504∗∗∗ 0.390∗ 0.240 0.403∗
(0.159) (0.094) (0.162) (0.220) (0.221) (0.229)
Period FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
Post FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 5,152 5,152 5,152 1,472 1,472 1,472
R2 0.024 0.020 0.023 0.004 0.034 0.005
Significant at * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Regression results shown in cols 1
through 3 include a subset of the main sample. Regression results shown in cols 4
through 6 include a subset of the main 2-period sample (citations three years before and
three years after reexamination). Both sets of regressions are restricted to only those re-
examined patents that had never been litigated and were reexamined only once (and their
matched pairs). The dependent variable are defined as the number of all (cols. 1 and 4),
internal (cols. 2 and 5), and external (cols. 3 and 6) forward citations. Each regression
contains grant year and patent fixed effects. Standard errors are presented in parentheses
and are clustered by patent.
Table C.6: Matching-DiD Results - Non-litigated Patents - Single Reexam.
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Dependent variable:
Full Sample 2-Period
Total Internal External Total Internal External
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 1.251∗∗∗ 0.468∗ 1.087∗∗ 0.905∗ 1.103∗ 0.999∗∗
(0.433) (0.260) (0.445) (0.484) (0.639) (0.502)
Period FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
Post FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 756 756 756 216 216 216
R2 0.081 0.063 0.080 0.040 0.089 0.047
Significant at * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Regression results shown in cols 1
through 3 include a subset of the main sample. Regression results shown in cols 4 through
6 include a subset of the main 2-period sample (citations three years before and three
years after reexamination). Both sets of regressions are restricted to only those reexam-
ined patents that had never been litigated and are in the NBER Electrical and Electronics
classification (and their matched pairs). The dependent variable are defined as the num-
ber of all (cols. 1 and 4), internal (cols. 2 and 5), and external (cols. 3 and 6) forward
citations. Each regression contains grant year and patent fixed effects. Standard errors
are presented in parentheses and are clustered by patent.
Table C.7: Matching-DiD Results - Non-litigated Patents - NBER: Electrical and Elec-
tronics
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Dependent variable:
Full Sample 2-Period
Total Internal External Total Internal External
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 0.387 −0.218 0.327 −0.094 0.040 −0.134
(0.334) (0.209) (0.339) (0.382) (0.472) (0.414)
Period FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
Post FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1,176 1,176 1,176 336 336 336
R2 0.033 0.047 0.030 0.0004 0.034 0.006
Significant at * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Regression results shown in cols 1
through 3 include a subset of the main sample. Regression results shown in cols 4
through 6 include a subset of the main 2-period sample (citations three years before
and three years after reexamination). Both sets of regressions are restricted to only
those reexamined patents that had never been litigated and are in the NBER Drugs and
Medical classification (and their matched pairs). The dependent variable are defined as
the number of all (cols. 1 and 4), internal (cols. 2 and 5), and external (cols. 3 and 6)
forward citations. Each regression contains grant year and patent fixed effects. Standard
errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered by patent.
Table C.8: Matching-DiD Results - Non-litigated Patents - NBER: Drugs and Medical
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C.3.4 Parallel Trends Figures - Alternative Matching Methods -
Cumulative Citations
Figure C.3: Logged Total Forward Citations - Treatment and Control Groups
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Figure C.4: Logged Total Forward Self-citations - Treatment and Control Groups
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Figure C.5: Logged Total Forward External Citations - Treatment and Control Groups
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Significant at * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Regres-
sions include the 702 matched patent pairs. The depen-
dent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the
observation was successfully confirmed through reexam-
ination and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors are
presented in parentheses.
Table C.9: Probability of Treatment (Matched Set) -
Alternative Matching
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Dependent variable:
Full Sample Single Reexam.
Total Internal External Total Internal External
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 0.033∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Obs. 9,828 9,828 9,828 9,562 9,562 9,562
R2 0.506 0.110 0.496 0.504 0.111 0.494
Significant at * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Regression results shown in cols 1 through 3
include a panel dataset the 702 matched patent pairs. Regression results shown in cols 4 through 6
include only the reexamined patents that had been reexamined once and their respective matched
non-reexamined patent. The dependent variable are defined as the number of all (cols. 1 and
4), internal (cols. 2 and 5), and external (cols. 3 and 6) forward citations. Each regression
contains year, patent, and period fixed effects. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and
are clustered by patent.
Table C.10: Matching-DiD Results - Alternative Matching
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Dependent variable:
Mechanical Computers
Total Internal External Total Internal External
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 0.077∗ 0.059∗ 0.089∗ 0.044∗∗ 0.046∗ 0.044∗∗
(0.047) (0.032) (0.050) (0.019) (0.024) (0.020)
Obs. 1,330 1,330 1,330 2,492 2,492 2,492
R2 0.452 0.106 0.449 0.489 0.115 0.464
Significant at * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Regression results shown in cols 1 through 3
include a panel dataset for reexamined patents (and the respective matches) in the Mechanical
NBER technology classification. Regression results shown in cols 4 through 6 include a panel
dataset for reexamined patents (and the respective matches) in the Computers and Communications
NBER technology classification. The dependent variable are defined as the number of all (cols.
1 and 4), internal (cols. 2 and 5), and external (cols. 3 and 6) forward citations. Each regression
contains year, patent, and period fixed effects. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are
clustered by patent.
Table C.11: Matching-DiD Results - Mechanical & Computer - Alternative Matching




Treatment 0.004 −0.003 0.025
(0.032) (0.034) (0.035)
Obs. 2,002 2,002 2,002
R2 0.598 0.116 0.581
Significant at * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Regression results shown in cols 1 through 3 in-
clude a panel dataset for reexamined patents (and
the respective matches) in the Drugs and Medical
NBER technology classification. The dependent
variable are defined as the number of all (1), inter-
nal (2), and external (3) forward citations. Each re-
gression contains year, patent, and period fixed ef-
fects. Standard errors are presented in parentheses
and are clustered by patent.
Table C.12: Matching-DiD Results - Drugs
Medical - Alternative Matching
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Dependent variable:
≤ 10 years > 10 Years
Total Internal External Total Internal External
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 0.034∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.020
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.013) (0.018) (0.013)
Obs. 7,602 7,602 7,602 2,226 2,226 2,226
R2 0.527 0.125 0.517 0.562 0.062 0.569
Significant at * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Regression results shown in cols 1 through 3
include a panel dataset for reexamined patents (and the respective matches) where the patent was
reexamined ten years or less after grant. Regression results shown in cols 4 through 6 include a
panel dataset for reexamined patents (and the respective matches) where the patent was reexam-
ined greater than ten years after grant. The dependent variable are defined as the number of all
(cols. 1 and 4), internal (cols. 2 and 5), and external (cols. 3 and 6) forward citations. Each regres-
sion contains year, patent, and period fixed effects. Standard errors are presented in parentheses
and are clustered by patent.
Table C.13: Matching-DiD Results - Years Between Issuance and Reexamination - Al-
ternative Matching
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Total Internal External Total Internal External
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 0.505∗∗∗ 0.134∗ 0.454∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 0.250∗ 0.416∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.075) (0.119) (0.129) (0.150) (0.136)
Period FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
Post FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 9,828 9,828 9,828 2,808 2,808 2,808
R2 0.028 0.018 0.027 0.006 0.025 0.006
Significant at * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Regression results shown in cols. 1 through 3
include an annual panel dataset of the 702 matched patent pairs. For cols. 1 through 3, the sample
size includes seven years of observation for each patent (1404 focal patents - 702 matched pairs).
Regression results shown in cols. 4 through 6 include a 2-period panel dataset of the 702 matched
patent pairs (citations three years before and three years after reexamination). For cols. 4 through
6, the sample size includes 2 periods of observation (three years before and after) for each patent
(1404 focal patents - 702 matched pairs). The dependent variable are defined as the number of
all (cols. 1 and 4), internal (cols. 2 and 5), and external (cols. 3 and 6) forward citations. Each
regression contains grant year and patent fixed effects. Standard errors are presented in parentheses
and are clustered by “validated” patent, allowing for estimators that are robust to misspecification
(Abadie and Spiess 2019).
Table C.14: Matching-DiD Results - All Patents - Abadie and Spiess (2019) Standard
Errors
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Dependent variable:
Full Sample 2-Period
Total Internal External Total Internal External
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 0.572∗∗∗ 0.098 0.503∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗ 0.239 0.411∗∗
(0.179) (0.103) (0.183) (0.200) (0.216) (0.207)
Period FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
Post FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 5,208 5,208 5,208 1,488 1,488 1,488
R2 0.016 0.016 0.012 0.005 0.034 0.005
Significant at * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Regression results shown in cols. 1 through
3 include an annual panel dataset of the 702 matched patent pairs. For cols. 1 through 3, the
sample size includes seven years of observation for each non-litigated patent. Regression results
shown in cols. 4 through 6 include a 2-period panel dataset of the non-litigated matched patent
pairs (citations three years before and three years after reexamination). For cols. 4 through 6, the
sample size includes 2 periods of observation (three years before and after) for each non-lititgated
patent. The dependent variable are defined as the number of all (cols. 1 and 4), internal (cols. 2
and 5), and external (cols. 3 and 6) forward citations. Each regression contains grant year and
patent fixed effects. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered by “validated”
patent, allowing for estimators that are robust to misspecification (Abadie and Spiess 2019).
Table C.15: Matching-DiD Results - Non-litigated Patents - Abadie and Spiess (2019)
Standard Errors
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C.3.7 Parallel Trends Figures - Full Sample Differences-in-
Differences
Figure C.6: Logged Annual Forward External Citations - Treatment and Control Groups -
Full Sample DiD
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Figure C.7: Logged Annual Forward Self-citations - Treatment and Control Groups - Full
Sample DiD
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Figure C.8: Logged Annual Forward External Citations - Treatment and Control Groups -
Full Sample DiD
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